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Enacting standards in organic agriculture. Maarten van der Kamp, BEng, MSc. Thesis 
submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Management School, Lancaster 
University Management School, June 2011. 
This is a thesis about the standardisation of food through ‘sustainability’ labels, like those 
signifying organic or Fairtrade status. It examines how the voluntary product standards that 
underpin such labels are enacted through the everyday practices of producing, certifying and 
marketing farmed produce.  
This qualitative study of the enactment of organic standards in the UK suggests that such 
standards coordinate practices, forming an infrastructure which is normally invisible but 
which can be mobilised by producers to differentiate organic from conventional products. I 
describe the ways in which organic standards are enacted by farmers, certification bodies, 
policy makers and market actors. I suggest that standards provide process injunctions for 
farmers, requiring them to configure their farms in particular ways, adopt a preventative mode 
of farming, and a distinctive method of calculating value. I argue that organic standards are 
continually rewritten in the certification process, and that the multi-sited reproduction of 
different versions of organic standards results in markets characterised by a fragmented 
common space and partially maintained boundaries. Finally, I suggest that policy 
interventions formalise and frame organic farming as a public benefit. 
I argue that a multiplicity of ‘organics’ coexists with global notions of a singular 
‘organic’, implying that the diffusion of ‘organic’ as a coherent concept is perfectly possible, 
even if the enactment of ‘organics’ in local practices is diverse. I suggest that all site-specific 
enactments of organic standards are abstracted into various formal spaces where they are 
made commensurable, and argue that the uniformity of organic ‘stuff’ is a result of the way 
local enactments are conjoined. These abstractions remove specifics of production and 
certification, and allow organic ‘stuff’ to circulate between actors. 
I conclude that the way in which voluntary product standards shape agricultural systems 
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Chapter 1 Unwrapping a cereal bar 
1.1  A cereal bar loaded with labels 
At first sight, the flapjack I found on the shelves of the Spar supermarket on campus in 
2007 was just that: a flapjack. Costing 40p, a healthy snack to go with a cup of coffee; an 
inconspicuous everyday consumption item. Except, a quick comparison with some of the 
other cereal bars on offer revealed that this flapjack was different: the packaging indicated that 
this was the only one flavoured with apples and sultanas, but it also showed three separate 
labels specifying some additional properties. Whereas the packaging of some of the other 
cereal bars sported no or maybe one or two labels, the labels on the packaging of this flapjack 
indicated that this bar was the only one that was organic, Fairtrade and approved by the 
Vegetarian Society (see Figure 1.1).  
 
Figure 1.1: Doves Farm Apple and sultana flapjack 
I regarded these labels routinely: since the late 1980s their presence on products was an 
increasingly common sight in supermarkets1. Therefore, as a consumer I was familiar with the 
fact that they told me something about how those products had been produced: for clued in 
consumers they provided a possibility to support a more environmental and ethical way of 
                                                     
1
 In the Netherlands, the Eko-label for organic produce was introduced in 1985, and the Max Havelaar 
label for fairtrade coffee in 1988; in the UK, the Soil Association introduced its label in 1973, and the 
Fairtrade label in 2002.  
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producing and/or trading produce through the purchase of labelled products—for them, they 
made the products a little less inconspicuous on retailers’ shelves (Cochoy, 2007).  
Yet, I did not discard the packaging as the combination of three labels puzzled me. The 
labels seemed to take over the packaging, prominently providing different messages about the 
single product inside. Indeed, they almost seemed to burden the product: this flapjack 
complied with all of the different requirements of all these labels. Did this make the flapjack a 
super-ethical product, or did this only cause confusion about the claims Doves Farm wanted to 
make? For example, the Vegetarian label seemed superfluous to me as I would not have 
expected animal products in a flapjack in the first place. As such, I was curious about the 
multitude of labels on the packaging, and about how those three labels related and what 
messages they conveyed.  
In fact, this bar became the topic of discussion during a supervision meeting. The quick 
internet search I did in preparation for the meeting revealed how different these labels were: 
they had radically different origins, and embodied distinctly different ideas about how food 
should be produced and consumed. Firstly, the Vegetarian Society was founded in 1847 by 
followers of Reverend William Cowherd, who advocated abstinence from flesh-eating. While 
that was based on a Protestant ethic, current publications of the Society position vegetarianism 
as being a personal moral choice which can stem from different concerns and beliefs about 
animal welfare, the environment and health. In 1969, the Society introduced a voluntary 
quality standard, which stipulates that food products should be free from animal flesh or any 
other ingredients resulting from slaughter, contain only free range eggs, be free from 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs), and be cruelty free—the standard prohibits animal 
testing. Companies applying for the mark provide a list of ingredients, sign a declaration that 
this list complies with the Society’s standard, and pay a licence fee, upon which the product is 
approved. Currently, more than two thousand products have been approved. 
Secondly, the Soil Association was founded in 1946 by a group of farmers, scientists and 
nutritionists who observed a direct connection between farming practice and plant, animal, 
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human and environmental health. This is still reflected in the ecocentric philosophy of the 
organisation which advocates “[r]everence for and learning from nature, and living within the 
limits set by the need to maintain the earth’s natural resources”, and “an ecological approach 
to conserving life on earth (not just for human needs, as in sustainable development, but to 
allow the integrity and autonomy of the natural environment, wildlife and kept animals)” (Soil 
Association, 2006: 4). The Soil Association published a first version of their standards 
governing organic farming in 1967, and introduced the first certification scheme in 1973. 
Organic farming grew slowly until some of the UK’s supermarkets started stocking organic 
produce in the mid 1980s to increase consumer choice. Around that time, a national regulation 
was drawn up to harmonise standards for organic agriculture (there were other organisations 
offering certification according to their own standards in Britain) before the European Union 
adopted its first, European regulation on organic farming in 1991. Yet, until now the Soil 
Association has retained its own set of standards which are in some areas more strict than the 
EU regulations. Through its trading subsidiary Soil Association Certification Ltd, the 
Association indicates that it currently certifies between seventy and eighty percent of all 
organic products sold in the UK.  
Finally, the Fairtrade Foundation, which administers the Fairtrade mark in the UK, was 
established in 1992 when a number of fair-trade organisations collaborated to establish one, 
UK-wide recognisable label for fair-trade products. Most fair-trade organisations emerged in 
the 1950s and 1960s when they established, often through missionary posts (mainly in Africa 
and South America), direct relationships with small-scale producers in the developing world 
to pay fair prices to producers. The underlying concept of these relationships was that a trade 
relationship based on equality and fairness would be better in stimulating and helping 
developing societies than development aid given by Western countries. Through the buying 
behaviour of consumers, the destructive power of large, exploitative organisations could be 
curbed, and trade relations would become transparent. Nowadays, products carrying the 
Fairtrade label have been produced by cooperatives certified by the Fairtrade Labelling 
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Organisation, which owns and administers a global Fairtrade standard (the international 
organisation of the Fairtrade movement is elaborate, with some five or six related bodies 
governing different parts of the operation). The Fairtrade standard refers to ten conditions, 
ranging from creating opportunities for economically disadvantaged producers and capacity 
building, to having a transparent and accountable supply chain, and striving for gender equity, 
improved working conditions and the abolition of child labour.  
Comparing the different approaches of these labels, the Vegetarian label facilitates 
individual, moral choice. Based on a missionary history, the Fairtrade movement aims to 
reshape trade relations by calling consumers to arms. Contrasting both, the Soil Association is 
based on the conviction that its members want to have good produce for a healthy lifestyle, 
not particularly based on a religious belief. The notions of morality, wrapped around my 
cereal bar, therefore emphasise individual choice to act appropriately regarding one’s own 
welfare and that of other animals (Vegetarian Society), care for the planet and everything it is 
inhabited by (Soil Association), and care for exploited people (Fairtrade). On an operational 
level, these organisations have completely different requirements and methods of verifying 
compliance with their standards. For example, companies applying for a label must 
respectively self-declare, undergo external inspections or have their trade relations monitored. 
As these brief histories show, these three labels embody very different narratives and 
rationales of what is important in how products are produced: the organisations involved each 
have their own requirements for how these products should be standardised. That is, each 
standard underpinning a label constructs some qualities that are common to all compliant 
products. To standardise something is to stipulate how some elements of production should be 
shaped or what needs to be included or excluded; as each single product with a certain label 
has been produced with the same requirements, they are standardised and in at least some 
respects uniform. For example, all vegetarian approved products are uniform in that no animal 
flesh was used and that animal cruelty was avoided. 
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These are not the only labels available to producers to make their products a little less 
inconspicuous: over the course of my doctoral research I found that there are at least eighteen 
labels representing sixteen different standards that are routinely used on food products and 
farmed commodities (see appendix 1 for an overview and brief descriptions of the standards 
they represent)2. Put differently, there is a multitude of voluntary standards that can be 
mobilised or used by producers, traders and retailers to simultaneously organise and describe 
how food is produced, traded and marketed. Of course, these voluntary standards are not the 
only ones governing the production of food and therefore it is necessary to consider the wider 
field of how food standards operate. 
1.2  Food, standards and sustainability 
Standardisation of food products has a long history. For instance, the English court of 
Henry II standardised the quality of bread in the thirteenth century by means of the Assize of 
Bread [1266]. Loaves of bread were sold for a standard price for a certain quality of bread, 
and the weight of a loaf would vary from year to year to accommodate fluctuating grain 
prices. The price of grain was fixed each year by local magistrates throughout England, and 
on this basis the allowable weights for bread of eight different qualities were reviewed so that 
bakers would have a guaranteed income and consumers could rely on the quality of bread on 
the market (Ross, 1956; Davis, 2004). Bakers were required to stamp their products with a 
mark to indicate that the loaves were of the right weight. Individual marks ensured traceability 
in case cheating bakers sold bread that would be too light or adulterated with chalk, grit or 
clay, potentially resulting in prosecution. The stamp therefore protected the consumer, but it 
also barred others from selling unregulated bread on the market, thus providing protection for 
bakers (Schechter, [1925] 2000). 
                                                     
2
 These eighteen labels apply to the products themselves, and do not include company-specific 
indicators or voluntary logos about for example the recyclability of the packaging. 
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Nowadays, food in the UK and the EU is subject to a much larger and more complex 
body of regulation to protect and inform consumers and to organise industrial sectors. For 
instance, there is a standardised way of indicating tolerances on volumes and weights of 
products (DIUS, 2007), there are maximum limits for contaminants such as fertiliser and 
pesticides and minimum hygiene standards in processing of food (EC, 2004), and there are 
rules on what is allowed in terms of marketing (EC, 2006). Most food is sold packaged in 
regulated materials, and each piece of packaging contains several texts, symbols and marks to 
indicate where and to what standards the item was produced, and what some of its essential 
properties are (FSA, 2008). For example, my flapjack contained a complete list of ingredients, 
some warnings for allergy sufferers, nutritional information as well as a statement where it 
was manufactured and a business address—all required by law. Once the packaging is 
removed, different kinds of mandatory regulatory and normative standards are invisibly 
present: inter alia, ingredients are grown in environments also governed by regulation, they 
are sorted and graded according to various classifications which are subject to their own 
standards, and traded using standardised forms of transactions (Busch, 2000; Hatanaka et al., 
2006; Dubuisson-Quellier, 2010; see also Bowker and Star, 2000, and Lampland and Star, 
2009). 
Thus, grades and standards are ubiquitous in the production of food (Busch, 2000). 
Whereas most of these standards are mandatory regulatory requirements or normative 
arrangements, some forms of standards are in principle voluntary: in contrast to rules for 
spraying pesticides, food hygiene, use of weights and measures, etc., there are no statutory or 
legal requirements for farmers and producers to comply with voluntary standards if they do 
not actively choose to do so (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000).3 Compliance with voluntary 
standards of the kind in which I am interested is usually monitored and certified by an 
independent organisation without legislative powers, which issues a licence to apply a label of 
                                                     
3
 For individual producers, commercial pressures may not always make this a voluntary choice though. 
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compliance to the certified product (Boström and Klintman, 2008). For buyers of these 
products, the certificate provides a guarantee of compliance with these ‘extra’ standards 
(Hatanaka et al., 2005) and therefore enables the transaction in markets constituted by these 
additional conditions. Some such schemes offer reassurance that certain produce is safer than 
non-labelled produce, e.g. the Lion mark on British eggs indicates that they are guaranteed 
salmonella-free. Others indicate that a product is free from particular types of ingredients, 
such as the vegetarian label. The third category of labels signify that environmental or social 
aspects of the production process have been a consideration for the producer and therefore that 
the resulting products provide particular benefits (e.g. Fairtrade; organic). It is important to 
note that for this latter category, the independent certification of farming practices is the 
precondition for the functioning of global markets for ‘sustainable’ produce: only once 
conformity with the relevant standards has been externally verified can produce legitimately 
be qualified and traded as such.  
In this thesis I consider standards as a rule-based mechanism for the coordination of 
disparate elements of practice across time and space (Timmermans and Epstein, 2010). In 
other words, voluntary standards—and the labels associated with them—coordinate the 
practices of different actors in particular ways: consumers are encouraged to change their 
patterns of consumption, manufacturers are offered a particular image and access to a 
premium market if they change their production processes, and producers of raw ingredients 
are offered the opportunity to reap better rewards for their produce if they alter their farming 
practices. Mostly, these standards are developed by organisations which present themselves as 
advocates for more sustainable practices and lifestyles (NGOs like the Fairtrade Foundation 
and the Soil Association). These organisations explicitly set out how material production 
processes must be structured and how living beings (humans and animals) must be treated. 
Underpinning the political consumerist argument (see for example Elkington et al., 1990; 
Micheletti, 2003; Føllesdal, 2004; Boström and Klintman, 2008), these standards are framed 
and legitimised as a means of radically altering the way in which food is produced, processed 
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and marketed: they are aimed at reshaping economic, social, institutional and cultural relations 
surrounding the production and consumption of food (e.g. Raynolds, 2000; Hassanein, 2003; 
Coff, 2006; Hatanaka and Busch, 2008; see also Neyland and Simakova, 2010, on clothing).  
As such, such voluntary standards do more than merely assist in the value-free and 
neutral resolution of technical aspects of sustainable practices. Indeed, recent studies (e.g. 
Schmidt and Werle, 1998; Bowker and Star, 2000; Busch, 2000; Timmermans and Berg, 
2003; Bingen and Busch, 2006; Boström and Klintman, 2008; Lampland and Star, 2009; 
Higgins and Larner, 2010) have illustrated how standards in general incorporate social, 
political and economic interests, and therefore how they, as thoroughly sociotechnical 
objects4, shape social and material relations. The brief histories of the three labels above 
already indicate how standards emerge from different ideas about personal and collective 
morality, and give a sense of the implications of their adoption for how producers and 
manufacturers go about their business. Moreover, they suggest that standards do not exist in a 
vacuum and that they involve different actors, for instance to verify compliance, facilitate 
trade and to stock labelled produce. Put differently, standards are not mere abstract knowledge 
(episteme), but require infrastructures5 through which they are embodied (Bowker and Star, 
2000; Dunn, 2009).  
This implies that to include the labels on the packaging of the flapjack, Doves Farm 
mobilised three separate infrastructures involving application packs, standards, inspections, 
certain growing practices (Doves Farm produces its own cereals), certified suppliers, 
administration, certificates and probably a host of other elements. For each of the labels, those 
organisational infrastructures were already in place, they did not need to be invented 
                                                     
4
 I see objects as entities which are “constructed by actors as they make sense, name, stabilize, represent 
and enact foci for their actions and activities” (Engeström and Blackler, 2005: 310). But these entities 
cannot be constructed arbitrarily: they have histories and enable particular ways of doing, but also offer 
resistance to change. In this thesis, objects are generally not material (although they are usually 
embodied in material artefacts). 
5
 In this thesis, I regard infrastructures not as physical structures, but as systems which structure how 
sets of practices are organised. 
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especially for the flapjack (Bowker and Star, 2000). Yet, they do not ‘just’ exist: they need to 
be carefully maintained to do their work in the background and therefore remain invisible 
(Bowker, 1994; Star and Lampland, 2009). According Star and Ruhleder (1996), 
infrastructures of this kind enable local practices in that they constitute a supportive, larger-
scale ‘technology’ (in a broad sense) which is transparent and ready-to-hand. As such, they 
argue that infrastructures are fundamentally relational and constituted in the organisation of 
practices. The local practice of labelling a flapjack with three labels, then, requires three 
separate larger-scale technologies, each of which informs the organisation of local practice in 
a slightly different way.  
This raises further questions: What was involved in getting the labels on the packaging of 
the flapjack? What technologies (broadly defined) were implied? What are the properties of 
those standards-making infrastructures? How do they shape local practices of farming and 
marketing, and how do they constitute a framework that is transparent (to those involved) and 
yet invisible (to consumers)? The aim of this thesis is to foreground these infrastructures 
through what Bowker (1994) has called an ‘infrastructural inversion’: I examine how the 
normally invisible infrastructures of ‘sustainability’ labels are constituted through the 
practices which are organised by the standards on which those labels are based. This means 
that this thesis is about the everyday activities of different actors. It is about how these 
activities are shaped by the standards they reproduce, and how different practices ‘hang 
together’ to form the infrastructure. 
Consequently, this is not a thesis about the Doves Farm flapjack as such. Nor is it about 
political consumerism, i.e. the processes through which ‘sustainability’ labels enable 
consumers to shape their identities (for such debates, please refer to Micheletti, 2003, and 
Boström and Klintman, 2008), or about governance, i.e. network-based systems of regulation, 
mostly in market settings (e.g. Tanner, 2000; Carnoy and Castells, 2001; Jessop, 2002). 
Rather, this thesis is about the infrastructures constituted by standards that form a precondition 
for both political consumption and the governance of supply chains: it is only because of those 
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infrastructures that individual acts of consumption and devolved regulation of supply chains 
can be considered as an option in the production, trade and consumption of food. This is not to 
say that standards and their infrastructures existed prior to or outside of these practices. 
Historically, voluntary product standards and their infrastructures have coevolved with ideas 
about consumer involvement in the reshaping of how food should be produced and how trade 
relations should be shaped, and ideas about how supply chains should be organised without 
hierarchically imposed regulations. Moreover, it is only because market actors adopt these 
standards, because they serve to organise supply chains, and because consumers buy labelled 
products that those infrastructures are maintained. At heart, my interest is in what lies behind 
the many labels Doves Farm applied to its flapjack, and therefore the way in which standards 
shape social and material relations through practice, i.e. how their reproduction in the 
everyday activities of farming, certifying farmers, and marketing produce also configures 
these same activities. 
1.3  Outline of the thesis 
Within the social science literature there are many accounts of how standards are made 
and maintained, and how they shape economic and organisational connections (e.g. Liebowitz 
and Margolis, 1995; Brunsson et al., 2000), but there are few studies of how standards affect 
sociomaterial practice and, in reverse, how practice affects what standards do. This thesis adds 
to this small number of studies by examining in detail how standards for organic agriculture 
are enacted, thereby contributing to the argument that such studies are necessary to describe 
the social, political, organisational and ethical consequences of standardisation (e.g. Bowker 
and Star, 2000; Timmermans and Berg, 2003; Lampland and Star, 2009). 
To examine the interrelations between standards, practices and the infrastructure 
constituted through them, the argument of this thesis is as follows. Situating my thesis in 
relevant literature on standardisation and practice, I draw on various concepts to capture the 
active role of how standards organise and coordinate practices. In particular, I suggest that 
standards ‘come alive’ through the activities of different actors; in turn they affect what these 
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actors do, thereby acting out the inescapably political and ethical implications of the 
organising and ordering entailed in the standard (Chapter 2). This is followed by a more 
detailed discussion of my selection of the site in which to study the enacting of standards; I 
chose to focus on a single infrastructure for which organic farming provided an especially 
revealing site due to its historical emergence and current constitution. I provide a brief history 
of the organic sector and the relevant actors in it, and a discussion of the qualitative research 
methods and sampling I used to generate my data (Chapter 3). 
In the five empirical chapters, I examine the ‘coming alive’ of organic standards for the 
practices of distinctly different actors as separate recognisable entities. I start by examining 
how compliance with organic standards in farming practice is shaped. I suggest that standards 
provide process injunctions (Kaufmann, 1998) for farmers, requiring them to configure the 
temporal and spatial organisation of their farms in particular ways. I show that these 
configurations draw on activities and tools that are already standardised through different 
standardisation processes, and that they result in a preventative mode of farming. I argue that 
each enactment of organic standards is unique and therefore that the ‘doing’ of organic is 
characterised by multiplicity (Chapter 4).  
However, these temporal and spatial configurations are not the only ones required to 
produce organic ‘stuff’: I show how the organisation of organic farming is constituted and 
codified in a number of calculative devices and in the prioritisation and valuation of certain 
elements. I show how a particular form of farming economics, the integration of enterprises, 
the choice of varieties and breeds and the extension of farming practices through 
administrative activities are shaped by injunctions which do not directly follow from specific 
rules in organic standards, but from the practicalities of interpretation in everyday life, and of 
‘doing’ of organic itself. I suggest that this results in farm systems which are agronomically, 
economically and socially feasible and which allow the traceability of the organic status of 
their produce (Chapter 5). 
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Turning to the process through which farming practices are certified, I suggest that the 
activity of certification is based on an interpretation of standards and practice in the context of 
each other. I argue that inspectors and certification officers are not mere external observers 
trying to reveal how a licensee enacts certain standards, but that they are active participants in 
shaping this object (the standard) and therefore how a particular, ‘sustainable’ form of farming 
is enacted by a licensee. I argue that the licensee-specific knowledge object underpinning this 
process can be characterised as having partial epistemic properties (drawing on Knorr Cetina, 
2001) which need to be managed through a standardised process to avoid paralysis or 
arbitrariness in the certification of licensees. I conclude that standards for organic agriculture 
are not only written by the standard setter, but that they are continually rewritten—re-
produced—in the certification process. As such, they are alive: with each new interpretation 
and with each new instantiation they subtly change and reconfigure how a particular form of 
farming is and can be enacted (Chapter 6).  
Once organic ‘stuff’ has been produced and certified, it enters a market. To examine how 
standards for organic agriculture organise these markets, I draw on the concept of a market 
device (Muniesa et al., 2007), and argue that the multi-sited reproduction of different versions 
of organic standards results in a multiplicity of organics which are enacted through a 
horizontally and vertically segmented array of markets. I show how heterogeneous sets of 
standards, viewed as market devices, render organic products ‘economic’ in a necessarily 
incomplete way, and argue that the distributed enactment of standards results in a multiplicity 
of markets which is characterised by a fragmented common space and boundaries that can 
only be partially maintained (Chapter 7). 
Finally, because voluntary organic standards are situated in a wider regulatory 
framework, I consider this arena and identify policy interventions which shape the ways in 
which ‘organic’ can be enacted. Starting from the idea that policy interventions are located at 
the intersection of different practices, I explore two strategies mobilised by EU and UK policy 
makers in their attempts to enable and stabilise organic and to turn the activities of organic 
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farmers into a resource for different policy objectives. I argue that policy makers are actively 
involved in homogenising the organic sector and suggest that this homogenisation of organic 
proceeds alongside, but not in the same way, as that involved in the construction of ‘organic’ 
as a single, recognisable category in terms of which consumption can be organised. I conclude 
that the two policy interventions for organic agriculture establish a frame in which farmers 
respond and to which they adjust what they do (Chapter 8).  
Drawing together these different strands, I argue that standards for organic agriculture 
organise more than only markets or farming practices: other actors are implicated in how the 
practices governed by the rules in those standards are enacted. I argue that the necessarily 
distributed reproduction of organic standards results in a multiplicity of different ‘organics’, 
which coexists with global, homogenised and coordinated notions of a singular ‘organic’—
suggesting that that the diffusion of ‘organic’ as a coherent concept is perfectly possible, even 
if the enactment of ‘organic’ in local practices is very different. I suggest that all site-specific 
enactments of organic standards are abstracted into various formal spaces where they are 
made commensurable, and argue that the uniformity of organic ‘stuff’ is not located in the 
individual enactments through which it was produced, but in the way these enactments are 
conjoined: products and practices are not ‘homogenised’ or made the same through 
standardisation but rather that particular aspects of how local, sociomaterial practices are 
organised are configured in particular ways so that different instances can become comparable 
or equivalent. As such, voluntary organic standards can shape different forms of agriculture—
or more precisely a related set of agricultural systems—dependent on the local practices, 
coordinative structures, calculative devices, mechanisms of verification and discretion and 
systems of valuation which are mobilised in their ordering.  
Finally, I argue that the move towards the use of voluntary standards in creating a more 
sustainable form of agriculture (however that may be defined) has implications that stretch far 
beyond debates in which the relative merits of one system over another are compared in 
supposedly ‘objective’ terms; I conclude that the way in which voluntary product standards 
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shape agricultural systems has political, organisational and ethical consequences for how 
‘sustainable’ products are constituted (Chapter 9). 
A reading guide 
The empirical material presented in this thesis describes an infrastructure, which means 
that all of the sets of practices considered have to be enacted simultaneously and continuously 
for the infrastructure to be transparent and ‘ready to hand’—in effect such an infrastructure 
defines a ‘web of practices’ in which no practice has a privileged or ontologically prior 
position to the others. This means that there is no single possible way of reading this thesis: 
readers can navigate through the empirical chapters (4 to 8) in a number of different ways. 
While chapter 5 cannot be read independently from chapter 4, the other chapters do not build 
on concepts and ideas that were developed in earlier empirical chapters—they are about 
different practices altogether. I have chosen a sequence that reflects the social and material 
trajectory of the flapjack: it is grown and processed in ways that need to be certified before it 
can be marketed in a sector that is shaped by certain policy interventions. Yet, for readers 
interested in the certification process, in market organisation or in policy interventions do not 
have to follow this route: they can jump to the chapter that is of interest before exploring the 
accounts I provide of the other practices that make up the total standards-complex. 
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Chapter 2 Standards, practices and infrastructures 
2.1  Standards through time 
Standards have been around for a long time. For example, Bell (2007) describes how in 
ancient Egypt blocks of granite were shaped according to specific instructions at the quarry 
before being shipped more than a thousand kilometres down the Nile to Gizeh where master 
craftsmen in the royal studios finalised the statues. Grid markings were used to coarsely shape 
the body according to a template, thus removing excess shipping weight and reducing the 
work for the master craftsmen. To accommodate this, an organisational system was required 
with standardised measurements, material specifications (to avoid cracked blocks), and 
codified features of the finalised statue; furthermore, these projects were funded by tax 
revenues which required sophisticated accounting methods and standardised measures, land 
and labour classifications (Carmona and Ezzamel, 2005). These sets of standards were 
mobilised year after year and over vast distances throughout the territory of the Egyptian 
pharaohs.  
In contrast, other historical examples of standardisation show a spatially fragmented use 
of standards: in medieval times (lasting until the introduction of the metric system during the 
nineteenth century), most cities in Europe would have their own weights and lengths, often 
confusingly referred to by the same name. These measurements were often based on local 
customs and instances of practice, such as the amount of work a labourer could do in a day 
(Busch and Bingen, 2006). Other local standards dealt with the adulteration of foods and the 
maximum price that could be charged for a certain quality of food, such as that defined by the 
assize of bread referred to in the previous chapter, or the Bavarian Reinheitsgebot for the 
brewing of beer (Eden, 1993). While these latter standards were codified by written laws, 
other standards did not rely on text or numerical specifications but were embodied in artefacts 
which could be mobilised by different craftsmen using simple ‘rules of thumb’. For example, 
Turnbull (1993) describes how templates (wooden patterns or moulds) were used in the 
construction of the great medieval cathedrals to transmit knowledge both spatially (between 
 16
masons, carpenters and ecclesiastical clients both on and off site) and temporally (between 
discontinuous building campaigns due to fluctuating funding and between changing groups of 
craftsmen working on a cathedral). 
In increasingly industrialised settings, new forms of standardisation emerged. For 
example, Adam Smith (1779: I.1.3) described the increased productivity allowed by the 
division of labour of pin manufacturing into eighteen distinct operations which could be 
reproduced repetitively. Smith argued that the breaking down of the process of making pins 
into standardised elements (such as cutting wire or fitting pin heads) reduced the skills 
required to complete each step, leading to an increased dexterity for the particular tasks of a 
workman, saved time lost in moving between tasks, and allowed for the invention and use of 
“a great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labour, and enable one man to do 
the work of many” (I.1.5). Put differently, the division of labour resulted in the assembly of a 
sociotechnical ensemble (Bijker, 1995: 12) in which productivity increased as the relations 
between products, labour, skills and machinery were standardised.  
A few decades after Smith published his account of the pin factory, this type of 
standardisation was extended to include the compatibility of different components of mass 
produced goods such as firearms, clocks, and later motorcars. Moreover, these components 
needed to be interchangeable and therefore required manufacturing processes based on 
templates and machine tools (Hounshell, 1984). Other processes led to yet further forms of 
standardisation: in the nineteenth century, railroad companies were actively involved in 
creating and disseminating a uniform, standard time through the temporal coordination of 
timetables connecting cities with their own time zones (Zerubavel, 1982). The twentieth 
century was characterised not only by advancing technological and bureaucratic 
standardisation but also the emergence of professional practices which were standardised so 
that they could be made comparable: the comparative assessment of clinical treatments was 
made possible by the development of protocols for the systematic treatment of patients 
(Timmermans and Berg, 2003), and management standards were developed to control and 
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harmonise business processes (e.g. Furusten, 2000). Finally, a type of quality standard 
emerged to differentiate between similar products on the basis of certain additional qualities, 
such as organic and Fairtrade standards (e.g. Hatanaka et al., 2006). 
The above examples of standardisation are based on referential standards, 
categorisations, compatibility standards, work protocols, performance standards, material 
specifications, and design standards. While many of these examples were designed and 
instigated by public actors, i.e. (local) governments, over the past two centuries private actors 
(companies) have become increasingly active in the production of standards. For these actors, 
standardisation was connected with powerful modernist discourses of rationality-driven 
progress as it promised to deliver uniformity, which in turn was connected with notions of 
predictability, accountability and objectivity (Timmermans and Berg, 2003: 8)6. According to 
Krislov (1997), this does not mean that standardisation has emerged only as a result of a 
modernist project, or that changes occurred in the type of standards that were developed, but 
that modernist standardisation processes are characterised by “the specificity of the processes 
created to prescribe them, and by the multiplicity of standards, their ubiquity, and their 
formality” (1997: 16). Indeed, various scholars have argued that standardising social and 
material aspects of life “has become a central feature of social and cultural life in modernity” 
(Star and Lampland, 2009: 10; see also Timmermans and Epstein, 2010).  
As such, it would be unthinkable to live in a world without standards organising myriad 
aspects of everyday life. And yet standards often remain invisible to actors not involved in 
their (re)production (Bowker and Star, 2000; Lampland and Star, 2009). In fact, as Star and 
Lampland argue, “[t]he purpose of standardizing—to streamline procedures or regulate 
behaviours, to demand specific results, or to prevent harm—is rarely queried because it has 
come to be understood as a valuable and necessary, even if cumbersome, process” (2009: 10). 
Only when standards seem absent, or more precisely when incompatible systems of standards 
                                                     
6
 In fact, Zeiss concludes from her review of the literature on standards that “the modernist claims to 
objectivity and universality of standards do not hold” (2004: 43). 
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clash (e.g. going abroad with a device with a UK electricity plug; ordering a Lipton ice tea 
anywhere in the world and expecting the fizzy version only available in the Netherlands) or 
when accommodating non-standard options is a problem (e.g. ordering a fast-food burger 
without onions; see Star, 1991), do they become visible: as an irritation that something does 
not perform as well as expected. Yet other standards—or at least some of their effects—
require visibility as they are used to distinguish or grade product qualities in market 
transactions (e.g. grains are graded for milling or for feed; Busch, 2000). 
This necessarily very brief overview of just a few empirical examples shows that 
standardisation and standards are have been used to organise different aspects of everyday life 
throughout recorded history, and indeed that they are ubiquitous: there are few, if any aspects 
of social interaction that do not rely on some form of standardisation. Over the past century, 
therefore, processes of standardisation have been studied extensively by different disciplines: 
initially from a technical and scientific angle to achieve mechanical standardisation in product 
design and manufacturing (e.g. Harriman, 1928) and to make manufacturing more efficient 
through scientific management (e.g. Taylor, 1911). Later, standards gave rise to a large body 
of literature in economics (e.g. Schumpeter, 1954; Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Liebowitz and 
Margolis, 1995) and have been an important element in social theory (e.g. Weber, [1922] 
1978; Foucault, 1977; Miller and O’Leary, 1987). More recently, scholars in management and 
organisation studies (MOS; e.g. Brunsson et al., 2000; Higgins and Tamm Hallstrom, 2007), 
science and technology studies (STS; e.g. Bijker, 1995; Fujimura, 1996; Bowker and Star, 
2000), and sociology of medicine (e.g. Berg, 1997; Timmermans and Epstein, 2010) have 
examined how standardisation shapes the social and material organisation of everyday life.  
This thesis is firmly situated in the latter two traditions: my objective to foreground the 
infrastructures constituted by voluntary product standards stems directly from the STS 
tradition of revealing the implications of normally invisible features of everyday life. 
Moreover, many of the concepts I will mobilise in building my argument stem from different 
branches of STS. Other concepts stem from branches of sociology which take the performance 
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of social practices as the central feature of how everyday life is composed. Jointly, this allows 
me to examine the interrelation between infrastructures and the practices through which they 
are constituted. In this chapter I outline the theoretical threads that run through the entire 
thesis; in some of the empirical chapters I will bring in further concepts to examine particular 
features of the set of practices discussed in that chapter. 
This chapter proceeds as follows: in the next section I discuss a number of different 
notions of what standards do and how they achieve this. I start by offering a characterisation 
of standards with reference to three mechanisms (coordination, classification and 
normalisation) through which particular forms of uniformity are achieved. This is followed by 
a classification of standards, which leads me to suggest that voluntary product standards are 
design standards which are based on third party certification. I then examine how standards, as 
active entities, shape practices and how the resulting universalities are necessarily local due to 
the interpretative work that is required to make standards applicable to local contexts. 
Subsequently, I discuss ideas about how standards produce order and simultaneously produce 
the disorder(s) they attempt to eradicate. I end the section by suggesting that especially the 
latter two notions (of local universalities and orders/disorders) are useful for examining 
voluntary product standards, but that as they have emerged from the study of a different kind 
of standard (protocols) they cannot entirely account for how voluntary product standards 
shape practice. In section 2.3 I therefore introduce three practice-theoretical concepts which 
act as resources to understand how practices relate to the material and social circumstances in 
which they are situated, the ontological tensions between singularity and multiplicity in 
objects that follow from reproduction in situated practices, and how mutually constituted 
practices and orders transform each other. In the final section of this chapter I introduce the 
notion of a standard ‘coming alive’, using this idea to refer to the way in which standards 
actively shape practices and orders in all of their multiplicities, and how they, through this 
active shaping, act out the inescapably political and ethical implications of their organising. 
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This leads me to pose the three research questions which underpin the empirical part of this 
thesis. 
2.2  Conceptualising standards 
The examples in the previous section show that standards are pervasive: they are 
involved in organising (almost) all domains of life. They also come in numerous different 
forms and guises: some are formal, others implicit; some are set by public authorities, others 
by companies or other actors; some classify, others prescribe courses of action; some are 
mandatory, others voluntary; some are extensive and multi-dimensional, others very simple; 
some are abstract, others are concrete; etc. Based on this multitude and diversity, how can 
they be conceptualised? Many authors have tried to define what standards are (e.g. Harriman, 
1928; Cargill, 1989; de Vries, 1999), but these definitions usually are either generic or limited 
to one type of standard (e.g. industrial or management standards). As such, their value in 
analysing standards is limited. In contrast, in this thesis I draw on accounts of standards which 
provide conceptualisations, not of what standards are or are not, but of some of their key 
features. In this section I explore the fundamental role of standards in organising social and 
material relations. I then develop a scheme for classifying standards, and use this to narrow 
down the type of standards that are the subject of this thesis. In the second half of this section, 
I examine in more detail how standards shape practices, and the relation between standards, 
order and disorder. 
Characterising standards 
According to the international standardization organization (ISO), standardisation is the 
“activity of establishing, with regard to actual or potential problems, provisions for common 
and repeated use, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given 
context” (ISO, 2004: 4). In a note accompanying this general definition, ISO indicates that 
this provides benefits in the form of products, processes and services which are more suitable 
for their intended purposes, and the prevention of barriers to trade and technological 
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cooperation. Therefore, to standardise something is to provide the means through which a 
recurring, (potentially) problematic aspect can be resolved. Not once, but again and again so 
that products, processes and services are better suited to fulfil their purpose. As central 
features to (most) forms of standardisation, standards provide rules through which this can be 
achieved: they consist of agreed-upon rules through which uniformities across time and space 
are constructed (Timmermans and Epstein, 2010: 71). 
Standards have at least three qualities relevant in constructing these uniformities: firstly, 
they extend beyond a single community of practice or site of activity, and are positioned to 
make “things work together over distance and heterogeneous metrics” (Bowker and Star, 
2000: 14). As such, they establish relations between distributed social and material aspects of 
everyday life, with enduring effects. That is, they coordinate between these aspects so that 
some degree of order is achieved7. Secondly, Bowker and Star suggest that standards are 
carriers of classification systems which segment the world along spatial, temporal or 
spatiotemporal lines. Such classifications structure knowledge and practices: they form a set 
of boxes which can be used to sort and organise categories of something and therefore enable 
the ordering of entities according to the logic embedded in the classification system. 
According to Bowker and Star, any successful standard imposes a classification system, “at 
the very least between good and bad ways of organizing actions or things” (2000: 15).  
This points to the third mechanism: standards organise how actors think about what or 
who is good or bad (Busch, 2000). Busch contends that they set norms through which 
different entities can be judged on a moral basis (see also Larssæther, 2010). In particular, he 
argues that formal, capitalist standards simultaneously standardise, and therefore pass moral 
judgment on things, workers, markets, capitalists, standards themselves, those who make 
standards, consumers, and the environment. This suggests that, as they have the capacity to 
grade a heterogeneous set of entities, the reach of standards stretches beyond the actors 
                                                     
7
 I will return to the point of order towards the end of the section. 
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involved in their production and the object that is standardised. While all authors referred to in 
this section contend that the shaping of social and material relations by standards is inherently 
political (see also Hanseth and Monteiro, 1997; Brunsson et al., 2000; Zeiss, 2004; Higgins 
and Larner, 2010), Busch’s sketch of the domains affected by standards and grades 
emphasises the potential reach of standards in transforming these relations. 
Thus, standards organise constellations of objects, activities, actors and knowledge across 
time and space through rules rooted in coordinating, classifying and normalising processes. 
Through these processes, standards shape the trajectories of actors, objects and activities 
(Timmermans and Berg, 1997): by ordering some of the complexities of practices carried by 
different actors, they close off a multitude of possible trajectories. For example, actors such as 
assembly line workers need to follow standardised procedures so that the products they 
manufacture conform to a specification: the standardised performance of certain activities 
restricts what these workers can and cannot do at a given time, but it also restricts the 
trajectories of artefacts. Moreover, such standardisations allow the management and 
administration of activities so that profit—as a standardised object for managers and 
investors—can be calculated through standard accounting practices.  
As such, standards contribute to sameness and difference (Higgins and Larner, 2010): 
actors, things and practices become standardised and therefore, in some sense, the same—uni-
form. In relation to entities which are not, or differently, standardised, these entities become 
different. Yet, uniformity is relative: as Hatanaka et al. (2006) point out, there still remain 
possibilities for difference within equally standardised entities as no two standardised entities 
ever can be the same in all respects; even widgets machined by the same computerised lathe 
with the same tools and protocols from the same rod of material will have individual 
differences. These differences may not matter for the substitutability of the widgets as long as 
they are within the allowable tolerances: this makes the widgets uniform in relation to their 
function within an assembly, even if they are not entirely identical.  
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But as noted above, the reach of standards can extend beyond their immediate scope: 
Michael (2010) provides a compelling example of how differently standardised sticking 
plasters turn consumers into choice-makers. He argues that this is a meta-standardisation, as 
with the emergence of different sizes and types of plasters consumers have to choose; in that 
sense, all consumers have become standardised. While this is not an explicit objective of the 
standards governing the different shapes of plasters that can be used to treat different kinds of 
minor injuries, it is a consequence which imposes an ordering upon consumers and wounded 
patients alike. Thus, what is made uniform is not necessarily restricted to the relations 
between objects, practices and actors which are made explicit by a standard: the presence of 
standardised entities can establish enduring relations with aspects of social and material 
aspects of everyday life for which the standard did not include rules.  
Classifying standards 
The examples I have used so far to illustrate some different features of standards also 
show that there are many different sorts of constellations that are coordinated by different 
types of standards. To narrow down where voluntary product standards are located in relation 
to this multitude of possibilities it is useful to impose a classification system on standards. 
A first distinction that can be made about different forms of standards is about what is 
made uniform. Brunsson and Jacobsson (2000)8 provide a useful typology as they consider 
ideal type standards to be either about being something, about doing something or about 
having something. The first type contains definitions, such as scales of measurement, 
classifications for objects, such as the Linnean system to categorise plants, and nomenclatures, 
such as the International Nomenclature for Diseases as referred to by Bowker and Star (2000). 
                                                     
8
 Brunsson et al. (2000) provide a programmatic attempt to develop a theory of standardisation in 
organisation studies in which they consider standards to provide a form of regulation which constitutes 
an ideal-type social form next to formal organisation, the market and normative communities. While 
their contribution is widely cited, I draw on only a few insights in a very limited manner: their analysis 
does not provide insights into the constitution of infrastructures, but rather the way in which these 
infrastructures can be mobilised by actors as a tool for organised governance within institutional fields. 
As outlined in the previous chapter, in this thesis those considerations fade into the background. 
 24
Standards about being something, then, define things, or prescribe the intervals which are to 
be used to measure something; they classify objects and actors on the basis of some essential 
properties, which allow these entities to be integrated into a practice. 
The second type identified by Brunsson and Jacobsson contains requirements for what 
actors or objects should do. This includes material specifications such as the elementary 
composition of a particular stainless steel, prescriptions of certain performances, such as how 
different technologies should interface (see for example Schmidt and Werle, 1998), rules 
about how certain practices should be carried out, such as treatment protocols (Timmermans 
and Berg, 2003), and specifications of how certain management processes are constituted (e.g. 
Furusten, 2000). As such, standards about doing something provide rules about particular 
performances, and therefore define structural properties of objects, actors and practices. 
The final ideal type in Brunsson and Jacobsson’s typology contains requirements of 
particular properties that actors or objects should have, such as competences, qualities and 
skills. This includes things such as a qualification as a chartered accountant, or for 
organisations to have strategic plans. This is, in essence, a subtype of a classificatory 
standard—although Brunsson and Jacobsson do not recognise it as such. However, it is useful 
to retain the qualificatory dimension of this type of standards: the difference between ‘being’ 
and ‘having’ standards depends on where their politics are located. Whereas the establishment 
of categories through ‘being’ standards is inherently political and precedes the categorisation 
of entities, the political work of ‘having’ standards only starts once entities have been 
categorised; these categories are mobilised to exclude certain entities from the integration in 
practices (e.g. only chartered accountants can legitimately sign off company accounts; any 
other actor is excluded on the basis of not having this qualification). 
As such, standards can be divided according to what is made uniform: is it what entities 
are, do or have? However, it is possible to be more precise with regards to standards which are 
about what entities do. In their conceptualisation of different standards, Timmermans and 
Berg (2003) define four different ideal type standards, one of which is analogous to the 
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classificatory type described above; the other three refine the category of standards related to 
‘doing’. Firstly, Timmermans and Berg identify design standards as defining the structural 
properties and features of objects, such as the dimensions of needles and the constitution of 
hospital resuscitation teams. Secondly, performance standards set outcome specifications. 
They do not prescribe what or how something needs to be done; rather, they prescribe things 
like a maximum complication level for a treatment, a minimum score at an examination, and 
the activities occurring at the interface of different devices without prescribing how these 
activities should be constituted. Finally, Timmermans and Berg describe procedural standards, 
i.e. protocols which specify steps that need to be taken when specified conditions are met. 
This includes the different steps of an oncological protocol through which certain types of 
cancer are treated, and the specific steps of checking airway, restoring breathing functions, re-
establishing blood circulation, and defibrillation and drug therapy (A-B-C-D sequence) in the 
Advanced Cardiac Life Support (ACLS) resuscitation algorithm (see Berg and Timmermans, 
2000). 
Thus, categorising (‘being’) standards and qualifying (‘having’) standards classify 
entities differently, and design, performance and procedural standards organise what entities 
‘do’ in different ways9. But this is not the only way of distinguishing different types of 
standards. A second distinction can be made through reference to the actors that are involved 
in the setting and enforcement of standards. Not all standards are formalised: some exist as 
norms and conventions among certain types of actors or even entire societies (Brunsson, 2000; 
Star and Lampland, 2009). Indeed, conceptions of normality are standards, for example about 
comfort and cleanliness, which diffuse and become embedded in everyday life (see Shove, 
2003). However, in this thesis I focus on formal standards which “tend to be those developed 
and adopted through explicit procedures that historians can trace” (Timmermans and Epstein, 
2010: 71). In my conception, formal standards are based on material documents which contain 
                                                     
9
 There are other possibilities of classifying standards; for a comparison of different typologies see for 
example Zeiss (2004). 
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the rules through which the standards can become embodied in practices, actors and objects. 
Moreover, they are set and controlled by identifiable actors, and require active, deliberate 
implementation. Such formal standards can be set by different kinds of actors: for example, 
standards of measurement or of food safety are set by public authorities. Other standards are 
set by organisations for their own benefit or by collectives of organisations within an industry 
to regulate how that industry operates. Finally, some standards are set by organisations which 
are not directly involved in the production of the products or services to which the standards 
apply (third party standards). Usually, these standards are set by an organisation promoting 
the benefits of standardised products and services in the public domain—they are designed as 
instruments through which market interactions are structured (see also Brunsson and 
Jacobsson, 2000; Henning, 2000).  
The work of verifying compliance with the rules set out in formal standards can be 
carried out by different actors: organisational and industry standards, and sometimes third 
party standards, often rely on self-assessments through which actors adopting a standard 
declare that they comply with its requirements. In contrast, regulatory and third party 
standards are usually accompanied by a regime in which compliance is verified by an external 
actor. For standards issued by a public authority this can be by the regulator directly, or by a 
body contracted to do the work of verification on behalf of the regulator. Compliance with 
third party standards is usually verified by an actor who has no stake in the outcome of the 
verification process—a third party certification regime (Hatanaka and Busch, 2008). Such 
regimes usually are based on processes for certifying compliance, sanctions for violation, and 
processes through which the certifier is accredited to ensure independence (Loconto and 
Busch, 2010).  
A further distinction can be made in terms of where the decision for an actor to comply 
with standards is located: standards can be mandatory or statutory regulated requirements, 
making compliance a necessary precondition for operating in a certain way or in a certain 
industry. In contrast, other standards are voluntary: there are no statutory or legal 
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requirements for actors to comply with those standards if they do not actively choose to 
commit to it (industry or market pressures may make this not quite a voluntary choice 
though).  
Having sorted standards into different categories, I can now identify the kind of standards 
behind the labels on the flapjack: they are voluntary design standards—but they are also 
standards about artefacts ‘having’ certain qualities. They are third party standards, and, at least 
for the organic and Fairtrade labels, they are third party certification standards. Yet, the 
characterisation and classification of standards does not explain how standards produce order 
and uniformity; my next task is to examine in more detail how standards shape practices and 
orders. 
Standardisation in practice: ‘standards at work’ 
So far, I have discussed standards as ideal types and in isolation. However, in everyday 
life the trajectories of actors, objects, material ‘stuff’ and practices are governed by a 
multitude of standards. Taking this as a starting point, Star and Lampland (2009) argue that 
standards are nested within each other, and that they are “increasingly linked to and integrated 
with one another across many organizations, nations, and technical systems” (2009: 5): 
standards are recursively organised as they refer to and draw on each other. Moreover, Star 
and Lampland suggest that they are unevenly distributed over the social landscape: how 
certain aspects of social life are standardised is culturally variable and historically and 
geographically situated. Finally, they “are also relative in their impact, meaning, and reach 
into individual and organizational lives. Standards, and the actions surrounding them, do not 
occur acontextually” (2009: 7). As such, they are relative to practitioners as the shaping of 
social and material relations affects actors differently depending on their setting.  
This corresponds with Berg’s (1997) argument that the implementation of standards 
requires their embedding “to coordinate disparate elements in societies already saturated with 
countless routines and standards” (Timmermans and Epstein, 2010: 81). To examine what is 
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standardised—which disparate elements are coordinated and how this is achieved—it is useful 
to consider how ‘standards at work’ have been conceptualised. This concept refers to the ways 
in which “standards, whether they are more or less universal, exist next to other standards, or 
are the dominant or the only one, have to be locally interpreted and negotiated in order to fit 
into a local socio-technical and political settings” (Zeiss, 2004: 59). In other words, ‘standards 
at work’ refers to the interrelation between standards and the local contexts in which they are 
mobilised. 
Many of the studies that have explored ‘standards at work’ (e.g. Hanseth and Monteiro, 
1997; Zeiss, 2004; Ellingsen et al., 2007; Hadders, 2009) draw on the work of Timmermans 
and Berg (Berg, 1997; Timmermans and Berg 1997, 2003; Berg and Timmermans, 2000), 
whose accounts were based on how medical protocols shape and are shaped in local settings. 
Their theoretical starting point is to consider standards as ‘scripts’ (Akrich, 1992) which 
specify for various users what their role is along with their skills, requirements, tools, and 
outcomes of the script. According to Akrich, designers inscribe a vision of the world in the 
technical objects they develop. This vision then pre-scribes (at least some of) the 
sociotechnical settings in which users are supposed to interact in specific ways with the 
object. However, this may not unfold in the way the designer has imagined the use of an 
object: there is a potential for difference between “the world inscribed in the object and the 
world described by its displacement” (1992: 209, italics in original). But Akrich argues that “it 
is only when the script set out by the designer is acted out—whether in conformity with the 
intentions of the designer or not—that an integrated network of technical objects and actors is 
stabilized” (1992: 222). According to Timmermans and Berg (1997), this (temporary) 
stabilisation is achieved when standards intervene in the trajectories of different actors and 
objects through such embedded scripts, redirecting their course so as to bring these 
trajectories, at least temporarily, together.  
But Timmermans and Berg also suggest that the trajectories of the actors and objects are 
contingent on other factors, such as local infrastructures. Their argument is set in a debate 
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about the role of standardisation in relation to medical and scientific practice (being valid and 
applying everywhere and through time; see Bowker, 1993; Latour, 1993), and they argue 
convincingly that universality is achieved by changing these local infrastructures to conform 
to the standard. This achievement “depends on how standards manage the tension involved in 
transforming work practices, while simultaneously being grounded in those practices” (1997: 
273). Since no single actor can be in control of a standard, local universality emerges from the 
interaction of multiple trajectories. These interactions result in an ongoing process of 
crystallisation into a protocol which continuously transforms itself as well as the actors 
involved in the constitution of the protocol. As such, they suggest that “universality always 
rests on real-time work, and emerges from localized processes of negotiations and pre-existing 
institutional, infrastructural, and material relations” (1997: 275). From this they put forward 
the notion that there are multiple ‘local universalities’, which are linked to the contexts in 
which they are reproduced.  
This means that standards are incomplete and overdetermined at the same time 
(Timmermans and Epstein, 2010). Incomplete, as they can never pre-scribe every situation 
accurately and therefore that local interpretation will always be required. Indeed, as Jasanoff 
argues, discretionary space is co-constituted with the presence of rules: “The unruliness of the 
real world creates discretionary space for individuals or institutions to exert their tacit 
knowledge and subjective moral sensibilities” (1998: 180). But standards are also 
overdetermined, as they contain pre-scriptions which need to be circumvented, subverted or 
tinkered with to make standards work in local sociomaterial and political settings (Star and 
Lampland, 2009: 4). Thus, “[t]o coordinate diverse interests and activities, standards 
necessarily delegate some residual work that requires active participation and submission of 
people to the standard’s directives” (Timmermans and Epstein, 2010: 81). In other words, 
implementing standards requires actors in local settings to articulate and negotiate them, in an 
active process of simultaneously transforming practices as well as the standards (Timmermans 
and Berg, 2003). This suggests that working with standards is not a passive act of 
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disempowerment, but “an active act of allowing oneself to be transformed while at the same 
time transforming the standard” (2003: 73). The active adaptation of the rules in the standard 
to a particular situation requires the use professional discretion, and results in a localised 
universality.  
This is in line with Akrich’s (1992) observation quoted above that the use of an object 
may not correspond to its script: its trajectory does not follow the trajectory embedded in the 
standards by the author of the script(s). As such, the notion of deviance (associated with the 
concept of a script which is acted out in particular ways) informed a number of studies of 
standards at work to explore the tinkering10 necessary to implement standards in local 
contexts. But, as Zeiss (2004) argues, this is not always useful:  
“[...] by stressing (the negative) deviance as opposed to (positive) compliance, it 
limits an understanding of the multiplicity of ways in which people can deal with 
standards. They do not either deviate or comply; instead standards are mobilised 
for a wide variety of purposes. I would therefore like to add the notion of 
mobilisation to prevent getting caught up in an interpretation of a practice around 
standards as either deviance or compliance.” (2004: 65) 
Zeiss argues for retaining deviance as a useful device to explore how notions of non-
compliance are constructed, but suggests that the concept of mobilisation can better account 
for how standards are adjusted to local contexts. This mobilising is an inherently political 
activity, as the way in which different actors mobilise standards (and their ability to do so) 
shapes how practices are transformed and affects the position of various actors in the local 
reproduction of the standards (Timmermans and Berg, 2003). Thus, the notion of mobilisation 
points to the multitude of ways in which standards can be used as a resource by different 
actors to achieve a variety of goals. Moreover, it emphasises that standards are boundary 
objects (Star and Griesemer, 1989): as a single object, they affect the practices of intersecting 
                                                     
10
 The term tinkering refers to the ongoing adjustments which are required to adapt a practice to the 
local conditions of its enactment and to improve its outcomes; therefore it is integral to the reproduction 
of practice. It requires making do with whatever materials are at hand, and therefore is based on 
improvisation and sometimes innovation on existing ways of doing.  
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communities in different ways while retaining their specific identity within each community. 
Standards are sufficiently plastic that adjustments to local communities and infrastructures are 
possible (their boundaries can be moulded to some extent), while they retain a common 
identity through which the local universalities constituted by these communities and 
infrastructures are connected and coordinated. To examine what underpins this identity, it is 
necessary to examine the nature of universality aspired to by a standard. 
Orders and their disorders 
As indicated above, standardisation generally aims to achieve an order which is to some 
degree universal, i.e. applicable across time, space and communities of practice. From the 
discussion about local universality it is clear that in everyday life it is impossible to ever attain 
this order in a pure state: necessary local adjustments add and change things which were not 
foreseen. Yet, this discussion only referred to the universality of an order; it does not elaborate 
on the nature of order itself. But orders are not homogeneous, singular and unproblematic 
aspects of standardisation. Indeed, as Berg and Timmermans (2000) argue, orders and 
disorders are interrelated in several dimensions. Firstly, they suggest that standards do not 
create order from a pre-existing disorder; rather, they simultaneously “produce the very 
disorders they attempt to eradicate” (2000: 45; emphasis in original). Distributed objects and 
practices only become disorderly when a standard is deployed to achieve some degree of 
universality in how the relations between them are constituted. This means that orders and 
their co-produced disorders do not stand in opposition, with order emerging from and thereby 
replacing disorder, but that they are intimately connected and entail each other. 
Second, drawing on empirical cases involving different sorts of orders, Berg and 
Timmermans argue that orders are based on particular forms of rationalities, or logics. For 
example, decision analysis for clinicians is based on a mathematical logic, in particular 
statistical inference. These logics are not purely conceptual: they are reproduced in distributed 
and sociomaterial performances, such as documents, particular ways of doing, calculative 
devices (see also Vollmer et al., 2009), etc. This implies that these logics are tied to 
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heterogeneous infrastructures, resulting in a ‘logistics’ (Seltzer, 1992) through which a 
particular rationality is performed. Order, in the form of a rationalised practice, is a practice in 
which such a logistics is prevalent. Thus, a standard draws on a logistics through which an 
order is produced; and the reproduction of the standard in local settings (‘standard at work’) 
results in a local universality of this order.  
However, as Berg and Timmermans show, the heterogeneous infrastructures through 
which particular logistics are constituted incorporate elements which draw on the specific 
disorders which should be eradicated: absence of quantitative links and of rigorous calculation 
in statistical inference requires solutions which draw on guesswork and estimated rather than 
quantified probabilities; too many rules prescribing how to resuscitate patients reduces the 
uniformity of how resuscitation is performed as practitioners fail more often to reproduce the 
prescribed sequence, etc. Therefore, orders can only survive by actively incorporating—
‘parasitically’ including—the disorder it coproduces (Singleton, 1998). This implies that 
orders cannot overcome their disorder by gradually increasing their scope at the cost of their 
disorder: 
“Every order necessarily envelops the disorder it has brought into being [...] It 
invariably contains its Other—both in its history, and in its everyday operation. It 
does not know a pure state; even the ideal-typed logics in the writings of their 
advocates twist and swirl in the attempt to deal with the impossibility of their own 
purity.” (Berg and Timmermans, 2000: 51) 
What is more, the order constituted by one logistics can become a disorder within another 
when rationalities overlap: pre-established sequences of basic procedures are problematic for 
statistical inference as there is no solid mathematical foundation for how each of the steps in 
the protocol are linked; but statistical order can become disorder in a protocol as it cannot 
provide explanations about why certain actions have to follow each other. This suggests that 
orders not only incorporate and perform their own disorder, but that they are also entangled 
with others through which their own disorder can be reinforced. These entanglements do not 
only occur with other orders produced by a standard: Singleton (2010) provides an account 
where standardised record keeping on farms is entangled with practices of tending to cattle. 
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These latter practices are not standardised or universalised—indeed this would be impossible 
as they require flexibility and individual assessments—yet they are based on a logic which is 
recognisable, namely a logic of care. Order, in these practices, is that each individual animal 
received the care it requires. Thus, whereas Berg and Timmermans (2000) only examine the 
relations between two orders produced by different kinds of standards, Singleton’s (2010) 
analysis allows the extension of their argument to include how orders produced through 
different mechanisms become disorders in standardised practices. 
A final point is that orders and their disorders are not static: in their intricate 
interrelationship they change and transform themselves, giving rise to new orders with their 
own coproduced disorders (Star, 1991; Singleton, 2010). Such continually emerging orders 
produced through multiple local universalities are not singular: they exist in different forms, 
always incorporate their own disorder, and are intersected by other orders which reinforce 
their disorder. It is important to emphasise that this does not mean that different orders—and 
their universalities—are more or less rationalised at different points in time or in comparison 
with other orders: they are constituted in relation to different rationalities, each with their own 
disorders and logistics. This suggests that standardising something is dynamic too: not only do 
the local settings through which local universalities are constituted subject to change, the 
logistics underpinning an order enshrined in a standard also change and transform, thereby 
reshaping the universalities associated with that standard. 
Conclusion 
In this section, I have explored what standards do and how they do this by examining 
them in relation to concepts of uniformity and universality, by providing a typology, and by 
exploring some notions about the order produced by standards. The multitude of types of 
standards and the multiplicities involved in their reproduction emphasise that “not much [is] 
standard about standards” (Timmermans and Berg, 2003: 24).  
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Methodologically, the discussion is useful in pointing out what key elements of standards 
to examine: what is made uniform, how local universalities are constituted and what orders 
and disorders are produced by a standard. However, with the notable exceptions of Zeiss 
(2004) and Shapiro (1997) most studies that have examined ‘standards at work’ and 
order/disorder have remained close to the empirical basis of the studies of Timmermans and 
Berg, i.e. medical protocols (e.g. Ellingsen et al., 2007; Tournay, 2008; Hadders, 2009). These 
protocols are procedural standards which are intended to structure and sequence sets of 
activities—they “intervene directly in the organization of work” (Timmermans and Berg, 
2003: 56). These protocols therefore contain clear scripts through which different activities 
are coordinated and put in sequence; their adaptation usually requires tinkering to make them 
fit in local contexts. In contrast, other kinds of standards (e.g. design standards which are 
verified through a third party certification) are structured differently.  
For example, the mechanism of third party certification introduces a distinctly different 
group of actors into how voluntary product standards are reproduced—actors which are, 
according to the dominant discourse, independent, which forms the basis for claims that third 
party certification is particularly effective in organising compliance with standards (Hatanaka 
and Busch, 2008). However, as Hatanaka and Busch suggest these claims cannot be 
maintained as certification bodies act as strategic actors promoting specific objectives, and are 
embedded in social, political and economic systems (see also Mutersbaugh et al., 2005). This 
implies that how voluntary product standards are mobilised and reproduced through the 
practices of certification bodies is itself a constitutive element of the infrastructure represented 
by those standards. This extends beyond political influence at the institutional level (e.g. 
Hatanaka et al., 2005; Mutersbaugh et al., 2005) and in the constitution of new markets (e.g. 
Higgins et al., 2008) through to the everyday activities and practices of individual actors 
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involved in the certification of licensees11. Consequently, the empirical accounts of 
Timmermans and Berg (1997, 2003) and others are not sufficient to describe how other types 
of standards organise the practices of actors involved in their reproduction. Therefore, a 
second ambition of my thesis is to provide a parallel account to the work of Timmermans and 
Berg by examining third party certified standards while using similar concepts to those used in 
their work on protocols.  
However, in order to do so I need to mobilise further resources: so far, I have mentioned 
practices as constitutive of standards, infrastructures and logistics without elaborating their 
key characteristics. As such, in the next section I examine some concepts of practices which 
will ground the rest of the thesis. 
2.3  Concepts of practice 
Within philosophy and the social and cognitive sciences, there have been many different 
attempts to develop an understanding of how everyday activities—such as going to a shop and 
buying a flapjack—are structured (e.g. Luhmann, 1989; Marcuse, 1991; Durkheim, 1997; 
Simon, 1983). Many theories have located social structures outside of those activities, for 
example in norms, goals, minds, discourses or interactions between actors—these elements 
precede and therefore determine action (Schatzki, 2001; Reckwitz, 2002). In contrast, theories 
of practice12 start from the premise that social structures are reproduced by the everyday 
activities they organise. While there are many aspects to this interdependency between action 
and structure, I only draw on a limited set of concepts from this literature, namely those that 
will help me capture the infrastructure behind voluntary product labels—my argument is 
                                                     
11
 Yet, with the notable exception of Seppänen and Helenius (2004), who analysed the role of advice in 
inspection practices in relation to the definition of organic farming in Finland, to date there are no 
studies examining the practices through which licensees are certified. 
12
 There is no single, homogeneous Theory Of Practice, but rather a loosely connected body of 
literature in which different aspects of practices are examined (e.g. Wittgenstein, 1953; Bourdieu, 1977; 
Giddens, 1984; Schatzki, 1996; Warde, 2005; Shove and Pantzar, 2005; Shove et al., 2007). What binds 
the accounts in this body is that they all foreground practices as the primary social phenomenon through 
which social structures are reproduced. 
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situated in the sociological understanding of standards, and as such an extensive review of 
practice theoretical concepts will distract from the objective of this thesis. However, it is 
important to recognise that in Management and Organisation Studies there is a growing 
number of accounts based on a practice-theoretical approach, in which a variety of concepts is 
mobilised to analyse different aspects of business and management, such accounting (e.g. 
Vollmer et al., 2009), organisations (e.g. Blackler and Regan, 2009; Engeström, 2000; 
Engeström and Blackler, 2005; Miettinen et al., 2009), marketing (e.g. Araujo, 2007; Araujo 
et al., 2010a; Kjellberg and Helgesson, 2006), and, to a lesser degree, strategy (e.g. 
Jarzabkowski, 2005; Johnson et al., 2007). 
In this thesis, I focus on three concepts which act as resources to understand the practices 
in relation to the material and social circumstances in which they are situated (Suchman, 
2007), the ontological tensions between singularity and multiplicity in objects that follow 
from reproduction in situated practices (Mol, 2002), and how mutually constituted practices 
and orders transform each other (Giddens, 1984; Shove, 2003). In this section I introduce each 
of these concepts and relate them to the understanding of standards and standardisation as 
developed in the previous section. At this point, I only present these ideas briefly and by no 
means exhaustively as they will be developed in relation to and come clearer into focus 
through the empirical material. 
The first concept to consider concerns the interrelation between practices and the settings 
in which they are performed. Based on her research on human-technology interfaces, 
Suchman (1987, 2007) argued that actions are always situated in social and material 
circumstances which shape “in essential ways” (2007: 70) every course of action, i.e. how 
actors carry out these actions. In particular, Suchman studied the relation between plans and 
actions, and questioned behaviouristic and mentalistic accounts that positioned plans as 
preceding and determining action. Rather, she argued that rational plans help actors project 
and organise future action, and that they can be used afterwards to justify a particular course 
of action, but that action itself is situated in circumstances that actors reflexively relate to 
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while drawing on the plan as a resource for action. In this, it is important to note that the 
social and material circumstances are not fixed entities, determining in a hardwired way the 
direction of a course of action: 
“[...] the structuring of behaviour is not done a priori, but in reflexive relation to 
circumstances that are themselves in the process of being generated, through the 
same actions that they in turn work to make comprehensible” (2007: 19)  
As Suchman argues, purposeful action, therefore, is always situated in concrete situations 
which provide “specific, local, contingent determinants of significance” (2007: 84) which 
shape action but which are also shaped through the same action. 
This provides an understanding of the mechanism behind local universality as achieved 
through standardisation: the courses of action organised through a standard (the trajectories of 
practices and the actors and objects involved in those practices) are reflexively shaped by 
local, contingent social and material conditions—and these conditions are recursively shaped 
by those courses of action. Thus, the concept of situated action (or practice) captures the 
“localized processes of negotiations and pre-existing institutional, infrastructural, and material 
relations” that are involved in reproducing standards in a local setting (Timmermans and Berg, 
1997: 275). 
The second concept is drawn from Mol’s (2002) study of how one entity can be 
performed in different, coexisting ways. Before discussing this in more detail, I introduce two 
terms of Mol’s vocabulary which I have adopted throughout this thesis: Mol provides an 
account of how a disease ‘is done’, i.e. enacted in a number of different practices. In this, the 
term ‘enactment’ denotes the performing of an object through practice: it refers to the 
emergent ‘doing’ of an object in instantiations of practice which are locally situated. There are 
large overlaps with the notion of reproduction, but whereas the latter term has connotations of 
stability and permanence of the object that is reproduced, enactment also allows for a more 
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dynamic conception of practice, where enactments can accommodate change as well as 
stability13.  
Mol provides an ethnography of a disease, atherosclerosis, and shows how it is ‘done’ in 
different practices. She argues that these different enactments of the disease are not different 
facets of a singular object, but that in each practice a slightly different atherosclerosis is 
‘done’: the entity that is enacted by a patient is different from the one enacted by a surgeon, or 
by a pathologist, or a radiologist, or a physiotherapist: the entity is enacted differently each 
time, using different equipment, treatments, measurements, ways of discussion the disease, 
etc. They constitute more than one disease—but as Mol points out, less than many. The 
multiplicity of these enactments does not imply a fragmentation: they do hang together 
through processes of coordination, which accomplishes a drawing together of multiple entities 
into a singular name so that elements like representations, treatments and measurements can 
be shared between practices. Yet, this does not mean that incompatibilities between different 
enactments need to be resolved to retain the integrity of the object, but rather that they are 
separated out. In other words, different variants of a disease can coexist without the need to 
resolve tensions as long as they are distributed over different sites. But different enactments 
can also come to include each other, as when aggregate statistics become an indicator for 
treatment while drawing on those treatments as the source of data that is then aggregated. 
As such, Mol’s argument is about ontology: she suggests that there is no one, single, 
given ontology but that there are multiple ontologies which are “brought into being, sustained, 
or allowed to wither away in common, day-to-day, sociomaterial practices” (2002: 6). The 
concept of a multiple object, then, points to the inherent multiplicity of objects in their 
enactment in situated practices as well as the different processes that resolve this multiplicity 
                                                     
13
 It does not, therefore, refer to the process of ‘putting into operation’ prior to standards becoming 
effective (e.g. the passing of a law); it refers to the practices through which objects are re-produced.  
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with the singular term by which these objects are referred to—resolving local and global 
universalities. 
The final concept I will mobilise starts from Giddens (1984). In his structuration theory, 
social structures are both an essential resource for and a product of situated practices; they 
organise practices but require enactment in local contexts so that they are reproduced. They 
are the mechanism through which social order is achieved: they achieve a stretching of social 
relations across space and time. The concept that is relevant throughout the thesis is how 
practices are reproduced and how they change—standardisation requires an adaptation of 
situated practices and therefore induces changes in how these practices are structured.  
A first point to make about structuration theory is that routinisation plays a key role in the 
accomplishment of order: social norms and conventions are reproduced through practices 
which are enacted without further thought or reflection—the order is located in the habitual, 
routinised performance of a certain way of doing. For individual actors in their particular 
sociomaterial contexts, an order takes the shape of what Kaufmann (1998) calls an injunction, 
i.e. “a social construction (historical, family based, personal) which has produced the 
framework of assumptions triggering the action—the thing that simply has to be done” (1998: 
21; quoted in Shove, 2003: 161). Yet, as Shove (2003) points out, this leaves the question 
open as to how new injunctions come into being and how new patterns of ‘doing’ can be 
established. While some scholars (e.g. Weick, 1993) argue that when practices are challenged 
(by whatever source), the underlying, invisible injunction becomes visible which provides an 
opportunity for transformation before routinisation makes the new injunction invisible again, 
Shove argues that practices can “emerge through barely visible adaptations and adjustments 
within and across existing frameworks of order (2003: 163). This implies that change in a 
practice can emerge from a reshaping of order by actors questioning an injunction, or from 
within that practice, thereby changing the order. In either case, the change emerges as a 
different configuration of actors, objects and ways of doing which stretches beyond the local, 
across time and space. 
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While the discussion in the previous section would point to standards requiring actors to 
reveal and adjust injunctions, Shove’s observation that practices transform through 
adaptations in how they are enacted suggests that standardised elements, in becoming 
standardised, can shape practices in other frameworks of order. An example of this would be 
Michael’s (2010) account of how plasters meta-standardise consumers. As such, the concept 
of how practices change is useful to examine how orders (and their disorders) relate to the 
practices which they shape and through which they are enacted. 
As indicated above, the three concepts presented here will run as threads through the 
thesis—and therefore inform the research questions which underpin the empirical work. In the 
next section I will describe these questions in more detail. 
2.4  Revealing infrastructures 
As I wrote in the Introduction, the ambition of this thesis is to reveal the infrastructures 
of voluntary product labels. From the discussion in this chapter, it will be clear that this 
involves the enactment of the standards which underpin at least some of the labels in a number 
of situated practices, which in turn provide a resource for action for practitioners within these 
practices. However, infrastructure only becomes infrastructure in relation to organised 
practices (Star and Ruhleder, 1996; my emphasis), and therefore carrying out an 
infrastructural inversion (Bowker, 1994) requires both the mapping of how standards are 
enacted through individual practices as well as analysing the interrelations between these 
practices as shaped by those standards.  
It is important to note that this is not merely a descriptive exercise: “Each standard and 
each category valorizes some point of view and silences another. This is not inherently a bad 
thing—indeed it is inescapable. But it is an ethical choice, and as such it is dangerous—not 
bad, but dangerous” (Bowker and Star, 2000: 5-6; emphasis in original). Therefore, a 
foregrounded infrastructure reveals some of the political and ethical implications of 
organising these practices in a particular way. While a lot of the political work is done in 
setting a standard (see for example Schmidt and Werle, 1998; Zeiss, 2004; Ransom, 2006), the 
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studies of Bowker and Star, Timmermans and Berg and others illustrate that this political 
work becomes active in shaping the trajectories of actors, objects and practices only when the 
standards are negotiated and enacted in everyday practices; indeed the politics only becomes 
visible when enacted (thus, how voluntary product standards are set fades into the background 
too). In fact, a standard, as a document provided by a standard setter, cannot act 
independently: it takes the active inclusion of its rules into practices before that the standard 
‘comes alive’ (Berg, 1996), i.e. that the standard becomes active in shaping those practices. 
My use of the metaphor of a standard ‘coming alive’ therefore refers to the way in which they 
are enacted through practices, and how they, through the active shaping of these practies, act 
out the inescapably political and ethical implications of their organising. This leads to my first 
research question: 
How do voluntary product standards ‘come alive’ through the situated practices of different 
actors, and in turn how do they, as living entities, shape these practices?  
As Timmermans and Berg (1997) argued, the situated enactments through which a 
standard ‘comes alive’ results in local universalities. Moreover, Mol’s (2002) study showed, 
the enactment of an object in distributed, situated practices leads to a multiplicity in the 
object—it is not one, but also not many. Hence, these studies signal a tension between local 
universalities and the singular notion which exists globally through a standard. This tension 
leads to my second research question:  
How do the local universalities constituted by situated enactments of a voluntary product 
standard relate to the singular concept diffused by this standard? 
With different actors involved in how the standards ‘come alive’, there are different 
orders (and therefore disorders) associated with that standard (Berg and Timmermans, 2000), 
each with their own logics and injunctions. This suggests that there are different frameworks 
of order that coexist through a standard. Yet, it is unclear how these orders relate to each other 
and how transformations in one order lead to changes in other orders. This observation leads 
to my final research question: 
 42
How do voluntary product standards produce order for different actors, and how are these 
orders interconnected? 
In the next chapter I will describe the methods which I used to answer these questions. 
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Chapter 3 Studying infrastructures 
3.1  Introduction 
The questions posed at the end of the previous chapter point to my research being about 
analysing how something is constituted: it is a ‘mechanical’ intellectual puzzle (Mason, 2002: 
18). To study the mechanics of how organic standards ‘come alive’ and constitute an 
infrastructure I chose a research strategy which allowed me to explore the everyday practices 
of different actors. In particular, I drew on a number of ethnographic methods (observation, 
interviewing, archival research; Hammersley and Atkinson, 1994), albeit without the intention 
to construct an ethnography. In fact, rather than people or communities, this thesis takes 
practices as central, and therefore I have produced something akin to a praxiography (Mol, 
2002: 31-32): it is a story about the practicalities of doing organic, an entity that is never alone 
but which “depends on everything and everyone that is active while it is being practiced.”  
In this chapter I describe how I used qualitative methods to generate rich, detailed, 
contextual data suitable for interpretative and reflexive analysis of the practices through which 
voluntary product standards are enacted. I chose to undertake a relatively small scale, in-depth 
study of the infrastructure behind one of the labels on the flapjack—the organic label. In the 
next section I describe the selection criteria for this, and provide a brief history of the sector to 
contextualise the empirical part of the thesis and to explain which actors were relevant to my 
study. Then, I describe what sort of data I generated through each of the qualitative methods, 
and the sampling strategies I used for each of the actors. I conclude by describing how I 
analysed the data and how this resulted in the organisation of the thesis. 
3.2  Organic farming in the UK 
Choosing the site 
The starting point of this thesis was the flapjack described in the Introduction. Once it 
became clear that there was a highly relevant and interesting research puzzle behind the labels 
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on the cereal bar, it made sense to continue the empirical research with the flapjack as a point 
of departure. Thus, the initial idea for the site was to trace how the infrastructures behind the 
three labels intersected at the producer, Doves Farm, to analyse how different infrastructures 
are superimposed, and how they reinforce as well as clash with each other. As access did not 
materialise, I considered a comparative study of the three standards; but their size, scope and 
organisation differed greatly and examining the features of each in the light of each other 
would have shown little, if anything, about how infrastructures behind voluntary product 
standards are constituted. However, my exploration of the three labels showed that the Soil 
Association standards provided an interesting site for an in-depth study of how standards were 
reproduced through different practices. It was so on four counts. Firstly, the Soil Association 
introduced the first voluntary product standards for organic produce in the 1960s, with the aim 
of promoting more sustainable forms of production and consumption. Moreover, they devised 
a very early precursor to the current system of third party certification. As such, the site of 
organic standards includes a well-established standard-setting and certification organisation 
for voluntary product standards.  
Secondly, the Soil Association still maintains its own standards, but these are now set in 
an intricately interwoven space of EU regulations which set minimum standards for organic 
produce and which are restricting the freedom for individual standards bodies to add their own 
standards. Moreover, there are separate policy regimes for organic farming which set 
additional boundary conditions for how organic standards can be enacted. This suggests that 
there is a policy element to the infrastructure, which is unusual for voluntary product 
standards.  
Thirdly, unlike in many countries, in the UK there are seven different certification bodies 
that are authorised to certify farmers (I will return to this in the next section). This has led to 
the situation that different organic standards compete with each other in a relatively stable 
setting, but also that there are collaborative efforts to agree on approaches to common 
standards. In the literature I have not found any report of this kind of co-existence; instead, it 
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is argued that multiple standards may emerge during an initial phase but that at some stage 
one standard will emerge dominant (see for example Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000). In 
supply chains, the existence of different standards leads to situations where standards 
organisations, like the Soil Association, need to verify that ingredients certified by others meet 
their own standards. Especially in long supply chains this introduces issues of equivalence and 
traceability that need to be resolved on a daily basis and therefore provides a site where the 
infrastructure becomes visible. 
Finally, and more practically, I could study the organic sector in its entirety—from 
standard setting to farming and certification to markets and policy regimes—within the UK; 
studying the Fairtrade infrastructure (with some different idiosyncrasies) would have been 
logistically much more challenging and expensive due to its globally distributed organisation. 
Thus, the site of my research was circumscribed by the Soil Association standards for 
organic farming. However, this did not mean that this was a clearly bounded, singular place 
that I could visit: the research site is distributed over time, space and different actors which 
stand in different relations to the infrastructure constituted by standards for organic 
agriculture. Below, I therefore turn to the emergence of organic farming as it is shaped today 
so as to identify which practices and actors play a role in the reproduction of standards for 
organic agriculture. 
A brief history of organic farming in the UK 
The first ideas about organic farming emerged in the early twentieth century, when a 
number of unconnected scientists, farmers, doctors and conservationists tried to formulate 
responses to crises in agriculture and nutrition (Conford, 2001). By the start of the First World 
War, drives for efficiency in farming and the use of early artificial fertilisers had started to 
deplete soils around the globe. Between the two World Wars, this process intensified, 
resulting in soil degradation, poor food quality and impoverished rural communities (Vogt, 
2007). In attempts to mitigate soil degradation, individuals in the British Empire and Germany 
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independently developed different scientific alternatives which were based on more 
traditional, and in the case of the British, Indian and African indigenous forms of agriculture14. 
Separately, some nutritionists and doctors became increasingly concerned with the nutritional 
qualities of intensively grown food, and with the promotion of public health through food 
along with exercise and a ‘natural’ lifestyle. While these projects differed in their focus, they 
all were based on the inseparability of human and animal health of human from the health of 
crops, which in turn was inseparable from the health and the ‘natural’ fertility of the soil.  
In the UK, these initiatives resulted in two scientifically run experiments, one which was 
aimed to improve public health (the Pioneer Health Centre in Peckham, London), and the 
other to conduct a comparative trial between farming based on artificial fertilisers and on 
compost (the Haughley experiment; Reed, 2001). The latter resulted in a seminal book, The 
Living Soil, by Lady Eve Balfour ([1943] 1948), which attracted responses from others 
working and thinking along similar lines to the extent that a formal organisation was created 
to pool experiences (Conford, 2001). Thus, the Soil Association was founded in 1946, in 
which the two experiments were melded together along with a third project which was aimed 
at rural reconstruction. This latter project, Kinship in Husbandry, was controversial in that it 
developed a social notion of Soil which included far-Right concepts of racial determinism and 
nationalism, and included supporters of Nazi Germany and even some outright fascists among 
its members (Conford, 2001; Reed, 2001). These different ideas were never resolved, and so 
for two decades the Soil Association remained an assembly of these diverse concepts along 
with others which became attached to it after its founding. 
In the late 1960s, a scientific and a political crisis forced a reorientation of the Soil 
Association around a new discourse: after more than two decades there was still no conclusive 
scientific evidence in support of organic farming, and there was no noticeable demand for 
                                                     
14
 For example, botanist Sir Albert Howard developed his ideas about composting based on his 
observations of Indian farmers; Major-General Sir Robert McCarrison derived his nutritional ideas 
from his observation of Indian tribesmen; and conservationist Richard St Barbe Baker founded an 
organisation to protect forests in Africa (Conford, 2001). 
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organic food. Moreover, the organisation was sidelined by other actors in the emerging 
environmental movement due to the Soil Association’s quasi-religious approach to farming. 
Until this point the political and philosophical differences within the organisation were 
subsumed by the search for scientific proof (Reed, 2001). As a result of internal changes and 
in response to developments in the environmental movement and a developing international 
organic movement15, the new discourse abandoned the search for scientific proof but became 
based on moral claims about the safety of organic food (Conford and Holden, 2007). In 
conjunction with these developments, the Soil Association published its first set of standards 
for organic farming in 1967. As such, this constituted a new start which allowed parts of its 
past (the association with the far-Right) to be forgotten:  
“The re-made organic movement had found ethical standards that bound them to 
new ethical ways of relating to plants, people and the planet.” (Reed, 2001: 141) 
This was reflected in a definition of organic agriculture that could be drawn up as a result 
of the reorientation:  
“The use of, or abstinence from, any particular practice should be judged by its 
effect on the well-being of the micro-organic life of the soil, on which the health of 
the consumer ultimately depends.” (Soil Association, 1967) 
In practical terms, this meant that farming practices were organised around the 
production of crops and livestock with minimal reliance on inputs that were not generated on 
the farm. For example, livestock was fed with crops which were fertilised with the manure of 
those same animals; a mix of different kinds of animals and crops reduced disease pressure for 
each individual species (in contrast to intensive, single crop systems which rely on herbicides 
and pesticides to manage crop and livestock health). As most organic farms were family-run 
                                                     
15
 For the sake of brevity and relevance, this history ignores the international developments, such as the 
formation and role of the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM). This is 
an umbrella organisation founded in 1972 with the aim to provide a unified, organised voice for organic 
food and to diffuse knowledge about the principles and practices of organic agriculture around the 
globe (see Geier, 2007).  
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entities, this almost necessarily meant that they were small in scale, with little turnover to 
cover the costs of production.  
In the 1970s therefore, organic farmers realised that their way of farming would only be 
feasible through the cultivation of new markets: the European subsidy system (the Common 
Agricultural Policy) was geared towards supporting farming based on high inputs of artificial 
fertilisers to maximise yields, and did not provide support for less intensive forms of farming 
(Conford and Holden, 2007). Indeed, as Tomlinson (2010) describes, there was little interest 
in organic farming from policy makers until the early 1980s. Thus, groups of mostly young 
organic farmers developed mechanisms to market their produce to consumers who shared 
their ideals, using a price premium to cover the additional cost of running an organic farm. 
Whereas organic standards were initially geared towards helping interested farmers to convert, 
they became a mechanism to protect consumers from fraud by defining the organic production 
system and making possible the policing of its integrity (Conford and Holden, 2007). This 
required the development of an early form of organic certification which was introduced in 
1973. This system substituted the preliminary standards which were published as a 
supplement to the Soil Association’s magazine Mother Earth in 1967 with formally published 
standards, and replaced the voluntary declaration which was included in the 1967 standards 
with an inspection system in which farmers would be inspected (by inspectors who usually 
were also colleagues) to assess how they enacted organic standards (Soil Association, 2010a). 
By the start of the 1980s, with an increased consumer interest in organic food, 
supermarkets started to offer organic products as part of a diversification strategy. Moreover, 
farmers and horticultural growers established support organisations for the exchange of 
knowledge about production and marketing (Conford and Holden, 2007), other organisations 
were starting to offer certification services, and various research centres were active in the 
organic movement. Indeed, Tomlinson (2010) argues that the activities of these different kinds 
of organisations were difficult to disentangle. In parallel, some council members of the Soil 
Association established contacts with the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
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(MAFF; Conford and Holden, 2007). This led to more attention to organic farming by policy 
makers, which resulted in the creation of the United Kingdom Register of Organic Food 
Standards (UKROFS) in 1987, a body which oversaw the creation of national standards (first 
published in 1989 based on the Soil Association standards), maintained a register of certified 
farms and approved inspection bodies and inspectors for organic production (Lampkin, 1990). 
Moreover, UKROFS helped formulate Britain’s response to the European Community’s draft 
legislation on organic farming, which was developed to harmonise national schemes of 
member states to facilitate intra-community trade. When this regulation was passed in 1991 
(EC, 1991), organic standards embedded in the regulation were largely based on the UKROFS 
standards. The presence of legislation also made it possible for organic farming to become 
institutionalised in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP; see Lynggaard, 2007) as a form of 
farming delivering environmental benefits (Tomlinson, 2008). 
By the end of the 1980s, UK consumers were faced with a number of food scares, such as 
concerns about pesticide residues, antibiotics and hormones in food, salmonella and other 
forms of bacterial contamination, BSE and genetic engineering (Conford and Holden, 2007). 
This undermined consumer confidence in mainstream agriculture, and provided the organic 
movement with a number of opportunities to offer a morally and chemically safe alternative 
(Reed, 2001). As a result, the market share for organic produce rapidly expanded in the 1990s 
and 2000s. This attracted producers who regarded organic farming as an economic proposition 
rather than an ideal form of farming, which according to some in the organic movement 
signalled a process of conventionalisation in which ideals were given up in favour of profits 
(Michelsen, 2001), thereby circumscribing the potential of the organic movement to radically 
change how farming is done (Reed, 2009). This conventionalisation thesis simplifies many 
aspects of farming into a dichotomy (Tomlinson, 2008) with commercial and ethical forms of 
organic farming at the poles. This dichotomy is perpetuated in controversial issues such as the 
addition of new forms of agriculture to organic standards: for example a recent issue about 
aquaculture involved a hotly contested debate about whether standards for organic agriculture 
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should accommodate industry practices such as the caging of migratory fish species (see 
Mansfield, 2004; Rigby and Brown, 2007). 
While the basic principles underpinning organic production have not changed much over 
the past 65 years, they have been reformulated several times. Currently, organic agriculture is 
defined as consisting of the following four principles (IFOAM, 2011): 
 Principle of health: Organic Agriculture should sustain and enhance the health of soil, 
plant, animal, human and planet as one and indivisible. 
 Principle of ecology: Organic Agriculture should be based on living ecological systems 
and cycles, work with them, emulate them and help sustain them.  
 Principle of fairness: Organic Agriculture should build on relationships that ensure 
fairness with regard to the common environment and life opportunities 
 Principle of care: Organic Agriculture should be managed in a precautionary and 
responsible manner to protect the health and well-being of current and future generations 
and the environment. 
Underpinned by these principles, organic agriculture can therefore be characterised by 
reliance on locally or farm-derived, renewable resources and the management of self-
regulating natural processes (ecosystem management) to produce crops and livestock and to 
protect these from pests and diseases.  
In fact, in organic agriculture, farms are conceptualised as “an organism, in which all the 
component parts—the soil minerals, organic matter, micro-organisms, insects, plants, animals 
and humans—interact to create a coherent and stable whole” (Lampkin et al., 2008: 2). 
Relevant actors in the organic sector 
So far, I have said little about the actors in the organic sector. However, to identify which 
actors are relevant for my research, it is necessary to be more specific about the constitution of 
the sector (see Figure 3.1). First, the policy side: from the history of the organic sector it is 
clear that all organic standards are now embedded in EU regulation, and administered in 
member states by a ministry. The successor to MAFF, the Department for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), is currently responsible for the implementation of these standards 
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and their certification, and supports the organic sector through the Organic Entry Level 
Stewardship (OELS) and Organic Conversion Information Service (OCIS) schemes16. 
UKROFS no longer exists; concerns about its capacity to effectively supervise certification 
bodies due to lack of resources, legal status and a clear remit led to its replacement by the 
Advisory Committee on Organic Standards (ACOS) in 2003. This was purely an advisory 
body, without the supervisory powers of UKROFS; the powers of which were transferred to 
regulators within DEFRA and outsourced to the UK Accreditation Service (not depicted). 
While ACOS was still active during my fieldwork, it was abolished in Autumn 2010 by the 
coalition government. As such, it still is present in my thesis even if it has since ceased to 
exist—it was not replaced by anything fulfilling a similar role. 
Second, the certification of licensees: the historical market-based approach to 
certification which preceded the EU regulation has been maintained, which meant that during 
my fieldwork seven bodies were offering certification services: four national bodies (with one 
body offering two types of scheme) and three regional schemes (for Wales, Scotland and 
Ireland; the diagram below does not include these regional schemes for reasons of simplicity). 
Due to my concept of standards ‘coming alive’ through situated practices, this means that 
effectively there are seven sets of standards through the certification bodies and their licensees 
which have the EU regulations in common. I have depicted this as separate strands running 
parallel to each other. Within the certification bodies, there usually is a division of labour 
between officers dealing with standards and their interpretations and those interacting with 
licensees, the latter being split between office-based certification officers and field-based 
inspectors. The importance of this division for my thesis will become clear in Chapter 6. 
Advisers, farmers and processors make up the third group of actors. Advisers and 
consultants often provide advice to farmers about how to enact standards in their local setting, 
and sometimes act as representatives of farmers in dealing with certification bodies. Farmers 
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 The ministry also represents the interests of the UK organic sector at the European level. 
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individual producers in this sector. However, they are only marginally involved in how the 
difference between conventional and differentiated ‘sustainable’ products is made and they 
have no resources to influence how organic standards are enacted in farming practice (Klein 
and Kleinman, 2002). Moreover, while retailers may emphasise difference in marketing 
products, and consumers may attach subjective meanings to these differently singularised 
products which may or may not coincide with the differences constructed by the standard 
setter (see for instance Eden et al., 2008a, b), all such processes presume the presence of a 
perceptible difference—a logo or label on a product. As will be clear, this difference only 
comes into being through an infrastructure which is the subject of this thesis. 
3.3  Data generation 
As already outlined above, I used a combination of different methods to generate the data 
for this thesis. Due to the distributed nature of the infrastructure underpinning organic 
standards in the UK, concentrating on the practices of a single group of actors would have 
shown one element of this infrastructure in great detail while providing a highly partial 
perspective on the other elements of the infrastructure. Instead, I used various qualitative 
methods to study the practices of actors involved in the certification of licensees to generate 
rich insights into how voluntary product standards ‘come alive’ in a different way from 
Timmermans and Berg’s (1997, 2003) protocols. As such, I observed certification officers and 
inspectors in their everyday activities; observing farmers while they were ‘doing’ something 
specifically ‘organic’ was not feasible as such instances are not sharply delineated in time. 
Moreover, as someone without a background in farming, I would not have been able to grasp 
what exactly made a practice organic rather than conventional17. Therefore, I chose to conduct 
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 In this thesis I use the term ‘conventional’ to denote farming systems which are based on the use of 
chemicals and fertilisers—and what is mostly taught as mainstream approaches in agricultural colleges. 
Belz (2004) refers to this as ‘industrialized’ agriculture, but this is not a very accurate term as organic 
farming practice has emerged from and draws on industrialised agriculture in that there is a high degree 
of specialisation and a reliance on technology (even if some forms of technology are eschewed). These 
characteristics are especially noticeable in the recent emergence of ‘intensive’ organic systems. Thus, I 
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semi-structured interviews with farmers and other individuals in the organic sector who could 
provide particularly detailed perspectives on how this sector was constituted and/or how 
specific practices were shaped. I supplemented these data sources with archival data and a 
study of publicly available documents. In this section, I discuss each of these methods in more 
detail and describe how I entered the field. 
Observations 
Observations allow “the generation of multidimensional data on social interaction in 
specific contexts as it occurs” (Mason, 2002: 85), which particularly includes the use of tacit 
knowledge and interactions between activities, actors, objects, artefacts and setting that cannot 
be easily articulated by practitioners. As such, I aimed to construct an account of how 
processes of certification and of ‘doing’ organic were carried out in their local context or field 
of practice (Czarniawska, 2007), and supplemented this with planned and spontaneous 
interviewing of practitioners (Mason, 2002). This is not to say that I generated ‘objective’ or 
impartial data—indeed, my account is necessarily partial due to my position as participant-
observer (Silverman, 2005): my presence was situated and particular, and thereby influenced 
how the practitioners I observed carried out their activities (even if I did not actively 
participate as a practitioner). Namely, they explained steps in the process to me, provided a 
background of farming practice, perhaps took greater care in how they performed certain 
activities, and in general maintained a relation with someone studying what they did. This 
meant that I adopted a reflexive approach to my observational methods (Mason, 2002), 
recognising the ongoing negotiations that shaped what I observed and recorded (Coffey, 1999) 
in my field notes. 
My observations of the Soil Association were distributed over four sites. Firstly, I 
attended Cereals 2009—the Cereals event is the largest annual trade fair in the UK for arable 
                                                                                                                                                        
have adopted the term ‘conventional’ from my respondents, who used it to denote the mainstream 
farming systems from which the organic sector is distancing itself.  
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producers and their suppliers—to observe staff from the Soil Association charity at their stand 
while they interacted with visitors. The aim was to observe how organic farming was 
constructed in those interactions, and how the Soil Association standards were positioned in 
relation to queries from interested farmers and others. Secondly, for ten consecutive weeks 
from the end of September 2009, I spent one day a week observing and interviewing 
certification officers during their daily activities in their offices in Bristol (ten days in total). 
Thirdly, I attended a training day for SACL inspectors in November 2009 to observe how 
knowledge was shared between inspectors and SACL’s management. Finally, I accompanied 
an inspector to observe the inspection of a licensee in December 2009. As most of my data 
about the practices of certifying licensees came from the observations of certification officers 
and the inspection, I will describe these in more detail (I will describe how I gained access to 
this team below). 
The team of certification officers I observed was the team dealing with farmers—
producers in SACL’s language. To capture different aspects of their everyday activities, I sat 
next to different officers while they carried out their daily activities. This showed differences 
in how certain routines were carried out, but also how members of the team interacted over 
areas in organic standards for which certain officers acted as specialist advisers to the team 
(each of the senior certification officers had their own specialism). As I had been introduced 
to them as a researcher interested in their work, the certification officers initially explained 
their activities to me without needing prompting. Yet, this only resulted in a partial and 
‘cleaned up’ account: they made explicit many aspects of the certifying process, but did not 
refer to some tacit assumptions and knowledge that they mobilised in doing so. After the 
second week, the main elements of this process were clear to me, and the officers reduced 
their voluntary explanations to a contextualisation of the cases they were dealing with. This 
allowed me to observe and probe about tacit elements, for example how they decided which 
areas in a certification report to focus on. Towards the end I started to actively explore, 
through the cases that I had observed, some activities that had not been articulated, such as the 
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careers that cases go through. Thus, my position as an observer changed from being informed 
by my respondents to an active participant in teasing out how the practices of certifying 
licensees were constituted. 
My presence in the office and identity as researcher was accepted without too much 
thought. Moreover, they were used to individuals occasionally looking over their shoulder for 
a day: inspectors would regularly spend a day sitting next to certification officers to foster 
mutual understanding and to coordinate reporting style and content. Occasionally, a 
certification officer would be curious about my research, and we discussed what I was trying 
to do. This usually resulted in a conversation about a specific aspect of their work that I had 
picked up during that day and that I wanted to probe further. After a few weeks, I became a 
familiar face in the office, and I managed to establish rapport with them to the extent that in 
one of the final weeks I earned the ‘dumb hat’ that passed between officers for remarks that 
they considered particularly ‘nerdy’18—as the surprised team manager commented, new 
colleagues usually earn this hat for the first time only after some three months in the team. 
In two instances, my presence affected licensees: in the first case, the certification officer 
had finished going through an inspection report with me, but as I asked a question he returned 
to a section in the report where he then spotted an entry that should have been a non-
compliance. In the other case, the certification officer made an error in some calculations, 
which I helped correct and which meant that what a licensee was proposing to do would be 
non-compliant with a particular standard. In the former case, the consequence for the licensee 
was a mark in their record and, if they would not correct the error, an escalation of the issue 
during next year’s inspection leading to potential sanctions. In the latter case, the licensee was 
informed that what he was planning to do was not allowed and that the proposal had to be 
revised. This was an animal welfare issue, which, if found non-compliant during an 
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 The comment that earned me the hat was that procedures provided surprisingly interesting reading—I 
was returning to the computer terminal that I had been given after a meeting, ready to further explore 
SACL’s quality manual. 
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inspection, would have immediately resulted in a critical non-compliance with potential 
sanctions. While ethically defensible (licensees are responsible for compliance), I felt 
uncomfortable having become an active participant in the certification process: when I started 
this fieldwork I did not imagine that my presence in the SACL offices would have a direct 
effect on licensees; moreover, these licensees had not given their consent for me to be 
involved in their cases. However, in both cases there was no possibility to reflect on the 
consequences before acting—I did not have a choice to become involved. This suggests that 
researchers in the field of certification can become more entangled in the practice they are 
studying than they may have anticipated in their research design (for other examples of 
researcher role shifting, see Jarvie, 1969; Wade, 1984; Murray, 2003). 
The inspection I observed was of a company supplying seed to the agricultural sector. 
The inspector I accompanied arranged for me to be present, and briefed me on how he would 
conduct the inspection prior beforehand. He introduced me to the licensee and assured her that 
my observations were covered by a confidentiality agreement (see below). I introduced my 
research to the licensee, who then reaffirmed her consent for me to be there. The inspector 
then carried out his inspection, occasionally explaining to me how he interpreted certain 
findings. This included a walk around the plant and the examination of paperwork in the 
office of the licensee. Like the certification officers, the inspector was used to someone 
accompanying him: inspectors regularly have certification officers shadowing them, and carry 
out a number of witnessed inspections per year for their inspector accreditation. At times 
where the inspector was busy entering details on his laptop, I chatted with the licensee about 
technical details of their operations and organisation. In total, the inspection lasted 6 hours, at 
the end of which the inspector discussed all of his findings with the licensee and with me. 
Also, once we had left he invited me into his car to provide some further thoughts on how the 
day went and to hear about my impressions. He confirmed that my conduct had been 
appropriate for an observer to an inspection, and seemed pleased with the points that I had 
picked up. 
 58
During all of my fieldwork I kept extensive notes of the activities I observed, the objects 
and artefacts that were mobilised in them, and the context in which these activities were 
carried out. After each day in the field I spent a considerable amount of time typing up my 
notes, starting the long train journey home with some general impressions and reflections on 
the day. It would usually take a few days to convert them into clear narratives about what had 
happened and to include the cases and their contexts. Often, I found that I could add further 
details to cases beyond my notes as I remembered past observations. I kept a rough 
chronological order to the notes, so that they became representations of field days (Emerson et 
al., 2001). This was necessary to capture the flow of activities as carried out by actors—the 
sequence of what certification officers did was as important as what they were doing. 
However, it also helped me to add reflections as I could recall situations within the flow of 
those days—the chronology provided the context for me to analyse how I negotiated relations. 
Both the observations of certification officers and the inspection were covered by 
confidentiality agreements. The general confidentiality agreement covering my observations 
in SACL was amended on my request to ensure that I would still be able to publish from the 
data generated—the agreement stipulates that I will not reveal commercially sensitive and 
confidential information relating to specific certification activities and decisions, or 
commercially sensitive financial and/or administrative details of SACL. This means that, 
while I am using certain cases to construct my argument, I have removed every detail that 
could provide a link to specific licensees. The inspection was covered by a separate agreement 
to the same effect.  
Interviews 
My approach to interviewing was based on Holstein and Gubrium’s (2004) notion of the 
active interview. Rather than considering interviews as providing a neutral means of 
extracting information from a respondent in a one-way flow of information, Holstein and 
Gubrium propose that the participants in an interview are actively involved in meaning 
construction in interpretive practice. This means that interviews have a developing plot which 
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is produced as an improvisation between the interviewer and respondent, and through which 
alternative perspectives and stocks of knowledge can be activated. Thus, interviews generate 
situated accounts through the co-construction of narratives (Silverman, 2005) which are 
guided, but not determined by the interviewer. This meant that I attempted to structure the 
interviews loosely around a limited number of topics related to the themes of my research, 
with the aim of generating accounts of how practices were ‘done’ in the local setting of the 
respondent and of how the relations with other actors within and outside the organic sector 
were shaped. To achieve this, I adopted a conversational interview style and allowed 
respondents to develop narratives rather than sticking closely to a predetermined agenda. I did 
prepare a guide for each interview which was structured around the main themes of my 
research, but which was tailored to the particularities of the situation of the respondent. These 
interview guides also progressively reflected my understanding of the constitution of the 
organic sector and the particular issues that were likely to be relevant to a respondent (for a 
sample of these guides, see appendix 2). 
In total, I conducted 43 interviews in roughly three periods. The first period, from March 
2009 to September 2009 consisted of interviews with a variety of respondents (a director of 
SACh, two farmers, a merchant, an adviser, a researcher and a policy maker; details about my 
respondents and my sampling strategy follow below). The second period, from October 2009 
to December 2010 coincided with my observations at SACL and therefore consisted of 
interviews with employees of SACL and SACh. The third period, from December 2010 to 
March 2010, consisted of interviews with farmers and advisers, and included further 
interviews with researchers and policy makers. Four interviews were with two respondents; 
five individuals were interviewed twice as time ran out or because there were further topics 
that could be explored with those respondents.  
Interviews ranged from 45 minutes to three and a half hours although most were between 
an hour to two hours in duration. Two interviews had to be conducted over the telephone, all 
of the others occurred at the site of the respondent or, in two cases at a venue of their 
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choosing. In preparation for the interview, I emailed a research outline to each respondent in 
which I explained the background of my research, the questions I was trying to answer, a 
statement of how the activities of the respondent’s organisation provided relevant insights to 
my research, and brief statements of possible outcomes, the ethics covering the research and 
about Lancaster University Management School, and my contact details (for an example see 
appendix 3). At the start of each interview, I explained my research again and asked whether 
respondents had any questions or needed any clarifications about the research. One respondent 
asked me to clarify what I was looking for in the interview; I explained the value of his 
narrative to my understanding of how standards ‘come alive’, which was sufficient to proceed.  
Every interview was recorded on a digital recorder and fully transcribed afterwards. At 
the start of each interview, I asked permission to do so before switching on the recorder; no-
one refused. I explained that the interview was confidential, and that I would make the 
interview data non-attributable by anonymising respondents, and where necessary, their role 
in their organisation. Despite these safeguards, respondents could end up revealing more than 
they would be comfortable with as a result of the conversational style (Mason, 2002), and 
therefore at the end of each interview I explained that I would transcribe the interview and 
asked whether there were any bits of the interview that the respondent was, on reflection, 
uncomfortable with being used in my research. In two cases a respondent indicated that a 
particular comment could not be used in the public domain as this related to current, sensitive 
affairs, and in transcribing I clearly marked those comments as not suitable for use in any 
form of publication. To provide respondents with another opportunity to reflect on the data 
generated, I attached the transcript to the email in which I thanked respondents for their time. 
These elements—informing respondents about the research, guaranteeing confidentiality, 
anonymising respondents and providing two moments of reflection on the interview—
constituted my procedure of gaining informed consent. I decided against using consent forms 
(Fine et al., 2000) as I was concerned that their formality could interfere with the interview: as 
I had found out in my attempts to set up early interviews, the farming community is a fairly 
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closed one to outsiders and I did not want to risk my access for a largely bureaucratic tool 
(Murphy and Dingwall, 2007). Moreover, I felt that producing papers that needed signing 
would inflate the interview from a friendly chat at the kitchen table to a formal, official affair, 
which would make it more difficult to achieve the conversational style of interviewing that I 
required for my data. While for other actors, such as policy makers and researchers, these 
concerns were less relevant, I did not think that adopting a more formalised system for those 
respondents would add much to the procedure I was following.  
My position as an outsider to farming and as a novice in the organic sector seemed to be 
accepted by my respondents. For my data, it actually provided an advantage as it allowed me 
to ask for clarification and probe deeper when respondents narrated technical details of how 
they were enacting organic standards. The ensuing explanations usually provided rich and 
detailed insight into how certain aspects of ‘doing’ organic are organised which I otherwise 
would not have been able to access. However, after a number of interviews, I started to get 
used to some of the arrangements and problems that arise from organic farming. In later 
interviews, I could mobilise specific terms and examples to explore particular aspects of how 
practices were configured. Moreover, I knew in more detail what roles different actors played 
in the organic sector, and more importantly, I knew the names of individuals in key positions. 
This meant that I was no longer a complete outsider to this world I was trying to study, which 
helped build up some trust with respondents—in fact, all bar one respondents offered that I 
could contact them if I had further questions. 
Archival data and publicly available documentation 
During my visits to the SACL office, I was given unrestricted access to the databases 
which the certification officers and inspectors use in their daily work. In particular, I searched 
the database with cases presented to the Certification Committee—the authority on how 
standards are to be interpreted in practice—for detailed cases representing conflicts or 
interpretive uncertainty over how certain rules in organic standards should be enacted. 
However, the documents embodying these cases are not mere ‘containers of content’ (Prior, 
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2004: 77)—they are products of social interaction, which in turn are active in shaping 
practices. Thus, the documents in the database provided not only further insights into the 
‘doing’ of organic in farming practice, but also data about how interpretations were 
established and negotiated and conflicts resolved between licensees and SACL. Moreover, as 
‘social facts’ (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004: 58) they are shared and used in the practices of 
certifying licensees, and therefore provided data about how explicit knowledge is shared 
between actors within and outside of SACL. This implies that documents were not used as 
‘secondary’ but as a ‘primary’ data source. 
My sample of archival data was taken from the period I was carrying out my 
observations at SACL (September to December 2009), reflecting the prominent issues for the 
certification officers at that time. In total, I selected 174 cases in which the Certification 
Committee could not refer to a previous decision or otherwise established explicit 
interpretation of a rule. This included, inter alia, queries from certification officers, requests 
for permission by licensees, appeals against previous decisions, and serious non-compliances 
and disciplinary cases which had to be examined by the Committee. In all of these cases, 
different kinds of knowledge were mobilised to take a decision; many cases contained a 
number of different documents and extracts thereof. Subsequently, I categorised the selected 
cases into different categories based on who submitted the case to the Committee (e.g. 
certification officer), the type of case (e.g. query) and the substantive area of organic 
standards (e.g. poultry) to allow analysis. 
Also, I examined publicly available documents from a variety of sources such as various 
pieces of EU legislation, DEFRA guidance on the legislation on organic farming, policy 
documents and reports by public and private actors in the organic sector. 
Access to various fields 
To generate the data with which I could construct an account of the different practices 
organised by standards for organic agriculture, I had to negotiate access with different groups 
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of actors. This meant developing different strategies for those groups: I established contact 
with a director in the Soil Association charity, who provided an introduction to the Managing 
Director of SACL. Following a presentation to the Management Board of SACL about half a 
year after the initial contact, I received permission to conduct observations of and interviews 
with certification officers and inspectors. The practicalities of this were organised by the 
certification managers heading the two teams of certification officers, and the director of 
inspections. After explanations of the daily activities of certification officers by individuals 
from the producer team and the processor team, I concluded that the activities of the team 
dealing with producers (farmers) would provide more insights into the interpretations and 
negotiations required to make organic standards ‘come alive’. Subsequent arrangements were 
made with the certification manager of the producer team, who was very helpful in organising 
the support of his team as well as access to the databases of SACL. In parallel, the director of 
inspections invited me to observe a training day for inspectors and introduced me to an 
inspector I could accompany; on the training day I set up interviews with two further 
inspectors. The inspector I accompanied to observe an inspection organised access to the 
licensee. 
Table 3.1 contains an overview of SACL employees who I interviewed and whose work I 
observed (all names are fictional; to make identification of their roles in the thesis easier, the 
initial of the respondents reflects their group: inspectors have names starting with I or J, 
certification officers have names starting with C, and technical managers have names starting 
with T). This table includes individuals in a managerial role (three team managers and two 
directors). Revealing this role would make them immediately identifiable to actors outside 
SACL, most notably to other certification bodies, policy makers and researchers. As such, I 
have chosen not to state the managerial component of their position, but their functional 
role—all of these individuals progressed through the ranks of the teams they were heading, 
and therefore they could be considered as primus inter pares. Also, a number of senior 
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certification officers also were qualified as inspector, which meant that their narratives 
contained references to the work of an inspector.  
Name Function Observed 
Cathy Senior Certification Officer Y 
Cerys Certification Officer Y 
Charles Senior Certification Officer N 
Charlotte Certification Officer in training N 
Christine Senior Certification Officer, Inspector N 
Christopher Senior Certification Officer, Inspector Y 
Claire Senior Certification Officer, Inspector Y 
Colin Senior Certification Officer, Inspector Y 
Craig Senior Certification Officer, Inspector N 
   
Ingram Inspector N 
Irene Inspector N 
James Inspector Y 
John Inspector N 
   
Tamsin Technical Manager Y 
Theo Technical Manager N 
Theresa Technical Manager N 
Toby Technical Manager N 
Tom Technical Manager Y 
Table 3.1: Respondents from SACL 
Access to farmers was more difficult to establish: a first round of calling farmers in the 
region I was interested in (East Anglia) resulted in only one interview. However, independent 
from my research I had met a Cambridge academic who introduced me to an ex-student, who 
was an organic farmer and a farm adviser herself and who introduced me to a locally based 
consultant for organic farming (Alistair). On hearing my ideas about sampling, Alistair 
provided useful advice about the sample and provided some contacts for farms fitting my 
sampling strategy. After this, it became easier to access farms as there were some names that I 
could refer to in the initial telephone conversation with new farmers. Also, I had received 
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extracts from the SACL licensee database, separated out by enterprise19. This allowed 
strategic sampling (c.f Mason, 2002) and provided another form of introduction.  
My initial sampling strategy for farms was based on the idea that studying farms in 
conversion to organic production would allow me to discover how farming practices were 
reconfigured as a result of organic standards. From conversations with some farm advisers of 
the Soil Association charity, I concluded that a mixed farm with four or more integrated 
enterprises and a stockless arable farm would allow me to draw out different kinds of 
knowledge specific to organic farming as they provided extreme cases (Flyvbjerg, 2006).  
First, stockless arable farming is the only possible form of organic production that does 
not rely on different enterprises making up a full farm system. In other words, whereas most 
organic farms rely on different farm enterprises to minimise the need for external inputs to the 
farm, a stockless arable farm constitutes a single-enterprise operation. In terms of organic 
principles, this constitutes an innovation on the ecosystems approach underlying the organic 
principles—in which different enterprises are required to make the farm as closed to external 
inputs as possible. The main problem that stockless farms face is how to fertilise the soil: 
some farmers will import farmyard manure from other organic farmers and as such for the 
purpose of my study they would not differ from multi-enterprise farms in how fertility is built. 
However, there are also stockless organic farms that rely solely on green manure, i.e. crops 
that are not harvested but ploughed into the soil for fertility. Farmers that do this need to gain 
specialist knowledge of how to build fertility through crops on top of knowledge of rotations 
for weed and pest control.  
In contrast, farms that are mixed with arable and multiple livestock enterprises are much 
more at the heart of the organic principles as they are closer to an ecosystems approach. They 
require specialist knowledge about how different enterprises connect but also require specific 
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 An enterprise is a recognisable type of farm operation, such as arable, horticulture, beef, dairy or 
lamb production. 
 66
activities to allow the different enterprises to benefit each other. Especially farms where 
enterprises have been added specifically to minimise external inputs makes are relevant for 
my study as they show specific knowledge about systems and connecting enterprises involved 
in making the farm an organic system. Moreover, this type of farm depends on many 
interrelated activities and therefore represents a case in which becoming and remaining 
certified requires particular efforts to maintain the integrity of the system. 
However, as inspector Ingram explained to me during SACL’s training day, there were 
very few, if any, of the types of farms I was looking for in conversion. He indicated that 
stockless arable was a highly specialised form of farming, with only a few practitioners in the 
UK and even fewer converting farms, and that traditional, mixed organic farms were no 
longer established in a single conversion but in a staggered manner—but he also suggested 
that such farm systems were becoming less common as many farmers were specialising in a 
few high value crops. In fact, while doing my fieldwork it became apparent that many of the 
changes towards organic farming are made after conversion is completed (see Chapter 4). As 
such, I switched my attention to licensed farms. 
Moreover, farms differ from each other in many ways due to their specific locations and 
the social, organisational and economic arrangements in which the farm is situated. As I could 
not include farms for each of these aspects, I chose to include different farms based on their 
organisational and economic conditions, thus changing to ‘maximum variation cases’ 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006: 230). This provided insights into how farm configurations and practices can 
be shaped differently based on prevalent notions of profitability and organisational structure. 
To describe this, my cases were drawn from ‘classical’ organic enterprises, e.g. arable and 
livestock enterprises which could form a more or less ‘closed system’; I did not include areas 
which have only recently been covered by standards for organic agriculture, such as woodland 
or aquaculture (fish and seafood farming). Also horticultural enterprises such as fruit and 
vegetable farming were excluded, as the material complexity of their farming is, at least for in 
the context of this thesis, less than for arable farming. 
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In total, I visited one conventional farm, five organic farms and two estates which were 
partially conventional and partially organic; all of them are located in East Anglia. By way of 
introducing the farms, Table 3.2 contains some of their details. I have classified the farms 
either as family or as hobby farm or as estate. Family farms are those where the holding is 
owned by the farming family who derive their main livelihood from the farm. Hobby farms 
are owned by a family whose main source of income is not related to the holding; it does not 
refer to the level of skill or seriousness of the farmer. Some of the enterprises on the estates 
were tenanted out, meaning that they are run by independent businesses with their own 
organic certification (indicated by a ‘t’ in the table below). Again, all names of individuals 
and holdings are fictional. 
Holding Farmer/manager Type Enterprises Organic status 
Acre Farm Fred Family farm Cereals, pigs Demeter 
Brook Farm Felix Family farm Goats, horses, pigs, dairy 
cattle 
n/o 
Clover Farm Frances Hobby farm Cereals OF&G 
Drove Farm Frank Hobby farm Cereals, beef cattle, horses SACL 
Elder Farm Florence Hobby farm Highland cattle SACL 
Field Farm Alistair Experimental/ 
hobby farm 
Cereals, apples In conversion 
with SACL 
Gooseberry Estate Fergus Estate Cereals, pigs (t), sheep (t) SACL; n/o 
Hawthorn Estate Fraser Estate Cereals, beef cattle, deer, 
pigs (t), eggs (t), vegetables 
(t) 
SACL; n/o 
Table 3.2: Some characteristics of the holdings visited during fieldwork. 
Finally, access to other respondents in the organic sector (advisers, policy makers, 
researchers) was negotiated on an individual basis. Policy makers and researchers were easily 
identified due to the small scale of the organic sector; for advisers I differentiated between 
advisers from the Soil Association charity, consultants working for an independent 
consultancy specialised in organic advice, and an organic specialist within a large, mostly 
conventional consultancy and land management agency. I also interviewed a number of 
individuals in relation to other activities of the Soil Association charity, such as standard 
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setting and policy work. For an overview of all of these respondents, please refer to Table 3.3. 
Names are fictional; to make identification of their social group easier throughout the thesis, 
their initial reflects the social group they belong to.  
Most respondents had been involved in the organic sector for a long time (a decade or 
more); several individuals could draw on 25 to 35 years experience to provide detailed 
accounts of the organic sector changed over that period. Rather than ‘factual’ histories of the 
‘doing’ of organic, these often biographical narratives provided valuable data about the 
current organisation of organic practice and sector as they contrasted the past with the present.  
Name Function  Name Function 
Sally SACh farm business adviser  Adrian Adviser, large consultancy 
Scott SACh farm business adviser  Alistair20 Adviser, organic consultancy 
Simon SACh standards team  Allen Adviser, organic consultancy 
Sophie SACh policy team    
Stephen SACh standards team  Roland Researcher 
Susan SACh standards team  Rory Researcher 
   Ruth Researcher 
Paul Policy maker, Natural England    
Peter Retired policy maker  Mike Merchant 
Philip Policy maker    
Pippa Administrator, Natural England  Neil NGO 
Table 3.3: Respondents from the organic sector 
3.4  Analysis 
Alongside the generation of data, I continuously analysed what each new instalment of 
data added to my understanding of how organic standards ‘come alive’ through the practices I 
was studying. In the initial stage (March 2009 to September 2009), I read each completed 
transcript a number of times. The first time, I read them literally, scribbling notes in the 
margin about the topics that had been discussed. Second and further readings were 
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 Alistair features as a farmer and as an adviser; I interviewed him in both capacities on different 
occasions.  
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interpretative and reflexive (Mason, 2002) to draw out themes that these topics related to; I 
read them until no further themes emerged and until I had at least some idea about the agenda 
of the respondent in constructing a certain narrative. In each case, some of the themes that I 
generated seemed relevant to bring up in a next interview to explore with another actor how 
these themes related to his or her narrative. After six interviews, with different types of 
respondent (see above), I wrote a memo (Charmaz, 2000) to examine connections between the 
themes in the narratives of these different actors. This resulted in ten overarching themes 
which seemed relevant to all actors (farmers, standard setters, policy makers, advisers and 
merchants). 
However, these themes were amalgamated from narratives of respondents of all relevant 
groups and as such these themes did not tell a story—yet. A second round of analysis, in 
which elements of different themes were linked on the basis of theoretical concepts derived 
from literature and in which the data from two days of observing SACL employees was 
included, helped tease out two main stories, one having to do with the enactment of organic 
standards through the everyday activities of SACL officers, the other concerning the shaping 
of markets through organic standards. These stories eventually became Chapters 6 and 7 of 
the thesis. To interpret the data and to develop ideas about the underlying mechanisms for the 
practices described, I incorporated theoretical resources to bring into focus particular 
characteristics of these practices which had a direct influence on how organic standards were 
enacted. Moreover, I reorganised my data so that the distinctiveness of different elements of 
the infrastructure became more apparent (contextual data organisation; Mason, 2002). Once 
these two main narratives had emerged, three other themes emerged from the remaining 
material, namely the reconfiguration of farming, the configuration of policy interventions, and 
the quest for a ‘real’ organic. While this latter topic was interesting in showing how the 
‘doing’ of organic can differ, it has less relevance to the constitution of the infrastructure. It 
has a minor role in the thesis, figuring briefly in Chapter 7. 
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Early ideas about these three themes helped focus the last period of data generation. In 
developing my analysis of policy interventions (Chapter 8) I drew on some theoretical notions 
to bring into focus how these interventions relate to the infrastructure constituted by organic 
standards. For the farming chapter, I did not refer to literature beyond that dealing with 
notions of ‘standards at work’ as discussed in Chapter 2. However, in analysing and 
simultaneously writing about farming it became apparent that there were two stories that 
needed to be told. As such, Chapters 4 and 5 both deal with how standards for organic 
agriculture shape farming practices, but from different, complementary angles.  
Once all of the empirical themes were clear, a reflection of their analytical points in 
relation to the literature on ‘standards at work’ and on orders and co-produced disorders 
helped to tease out the interrelations between the different sets of practices. Thus, the 
infrastructure constituted by standards for organic agriculture came into view by considering 
how the practices through which organic standards are enacted ‘hang together’ (Schatzki, 
1996). The final element of the analysis was to find an appropriate sequence for the empirical 
chapters; as I documented a web of practices, there were a number of possibilities. In the end, 
I chose to more or less follow the trajectory of organic ‘stuff’ as I originally intended with the 
flapjack. However, I would like to emphasise that the actual sequence is heuristic rather than 
reflecting a theoretical model of the structure of the web of practices (Star and Griesemer, 
1989): there is no primacy of any of the practices described here over others; they are all 
required to be enacted simultaneously and continuously for the infrastructure to be transparent 
and ‘ready to hand’ (Star and Ruhleder, 1996). 
As will be clear, in the analysis I have drawn interchangeably on different sources of data 
and theoretical resources, considering them as equally valid but providing different 
perspectives on my research problem. With them, I have constructed an exploratory account 
akin to a praxiography (Mol, 2002) which I hope reflects the multi-layered nature of the 
infrastructure encountered by the actors involved in its constitution, as well as the multiplicity 
of ‘doing’ organic in many of its facets in a particular country at a particular point in time. If I 
 71
had done this study in another country, or five years ago, or if I were to revisit my respondents 
in five years, their narratives, and therefore the thesis that flows from it, would be different. 
As such, while the aim of this thesis is to develop theory about how voluntary product 
standards ‘come alive’, it is also a document of how organic was ‘done’ in England in 2009.  
Or, to be more precise: it is my, necessarily partial, account of how organic was done in 
England in 2009. This is reflected in a number of ways, of which the most prominent is my 
starting point of framing of organic farming as a mode of farming which does not rely on the 
input of synthetic chemicals (see next chapter)—this perspective is a construction based on 
my own, long standing interests in environmental protection growing up in the 1980s and 
1990s. From my current knowledge of organic farming, other framings would be possible, for 
example as a mode of farming which minimises reliance on external inputs and an emphasis 
on closed loops. This latter framing would probably relate more to the position adopted by 
some of my respondents. Yet, while the narrative of this thesis would have been different in 
places (e.g. a focus on how enactments of organic standards enable a system of nutrient 
recycling, etc.), this would not have substantially altered my overall argument. This means 
that my respondents may not quite share the perspective on the enactments of standards for 




Chapter 4 Organic in time and space 
4.1  Introduction 
Friday late afternoon, the pale winter sun is casting long shadows over the flat land in 
East Anglia. It is the end of January 2010, and organic consultant and farmer Alistair drives 
me around in his 4x4 to show me the farm, which is in the final year of conversion to organic 
farming. He drives carefully over the tracks between the fields while his dog accompanies us 
alongside the car. We get out where some of the fields are separated by a ditch, and Alistair 
points out what he has planned for the farm, and what has been done so far. He points to the 
rows of apple trees that have been planted in autumn. Unusual for East Anglia, these trees will 
provide additional income for the farm, act as windbreaks for the arable crops, provide 
wildlife habitats for many different species, and lower disease pressure for many elements of 
the farm. Then, Alistair takes me to the edge of a field, and points to some sprigs of green 
emerging from the rich black fenland soil, which he had explained is grade 1 soil21 with 23% 
organic matter. The green that is just starting to show is the winter wheat which he had sown 
in autumn. Alistair’s plan is to farm these fields using a permanent clover sward which will 
suppress weeds, and into which the cash crops, such as wheat or triticale is sown. While the 
clover sward is already established in the soil, it is not yet visible: the plants will only come 
up in spring and quickly shield the weeds, which will emerge around the same time, from the 
sunlight that they need to grow. Having the permanent clover stand will also be good for the 
fertility of the land, as nutrient levels in the ground will no longer be depleted by cash crops to 
the extent that these levels need to be rebuilt by two years of growing clover. Instead, the 
clover will maintain the fertility of the land by providing nutrients and making available 
nutrients in the soil for the cash crops every time these crops are grown. This will allow cash 
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 This is according to the Agricultural Land Classification of England and Wales. Grade 1 is the 
highest quality of land: “Grade 1 - excellent quality agricultural land. Land with no or very minor 
limitations to agricultural use. A very wide range of agricultural and horticultural crops can be grown 
and commonly includes top fruit, soft fruit, salad crops and winter harvested vegetables. Yields are high 
and less variable than on land of lower quality.” (MAFF, 1988) 
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crops to be grown every year, albeit at a lower annual yield than usual. It will be a minimum-
till farm, which means that the soil will not be ploughed or cultivated if it can be avoided so as 
to minimise weeds and to maintain nutrients and organic matter in the soil. In fact, Alistair is 
trying to establish a profitable arable organic farm which can be run by doing as little as 
possible.  
This is Alistair’s own farm, where he is experimenting with some of the insights he 
gained from his extensive experience in organic farming as a consultant to many farm 
businesses22. Everything Alistair plans to do makes his farm unusual in conventional as well 
as organic terms. While the conventional neighbours of the farm will not recognise much 
beyond the annual cash cropping (although being puzzled by the purposeful reduction in 
yield) and the sowing of winter wheat, for organic farmers the permanent clover sward, the 
absence of a rotation, the annual cropping and the sowing of winter wheat will be unfamiliar. 
And the presence of fruit trees in arable fields will be strange to both types of farmers. So if 
this is an idiosyncratic example, what would be a typical example of a farmer ‘doing’ organic? 
While doing my fieldwork, it became apparent that there is no ‘typical’ organic farm: 
even archetypal organic farms (family-run, where arable fields, pasture and various kinds of 
livestock form a closed system so that the outputs of one ‘enterprise’ feed into one or more of 
the others) differ from each other in many ways due to the geographic, social, physical, 
organisational and economic arrangements in which the farm is situated. Furthermore, organic 
standards do not only govern the practices and material ‘stuff’ of these mixed farms, they 
apply to any farm wishing to sell their produce as organic. So what is standardised by 
standards for organic agriculture? What does ‘doing’ organic mean for farmers in their 
everyday activities? How do organic standards shape these activities, and the objects thereof? 
How does the doing of organic shape its standards? In this chapter and the next, I will explore 
these questions by exploring the enactment of organic standards through farming practice. 
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 Alistair’s main occupation still is adviser/consultant, and therefore I have classified him as an adviser 
rather than a farmer—although in this introduction he talked to me as a farmer. 
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In this chapter, I focus on the way in which activities, materials and tools23 are arranged 
in particular ways as a direct result of individual rules in standards for organic agriculture. I 
start by arguing that these rules turn into process injunctions which produce locally situated 
frameworks for action. I then examine how these injunctions shape how organic stuff is 
produced, firstly through the configuration of arable farming through a temporal and 
sometimes a spatial rotation (section 4.3), and secondly through the reshaping of physical and 
hygiene-related boundaries around livestock (section 4.4). In both cases I suggest that the 
elements which constitute these configurations (actions, materials, tools) are in fact standard 
and packaged through different standardisation processes, which are mobilised in specific 
ways and which require ongoing tinkering so that organic can be ‘done’ in economic, social 
and material terms. I argue that these injunctions result in a mode of farming which is 
preventative rather than reactive (section 4.5). In the final section I conclude that, unlike the 
ways in which protocols interfere with or structure work practices, the scripts for the farming 
practices on a particular farm are written on that farm using pre-existing elements resulting in 
the local, contextual enactment—the localised universality—of organic standards. I suggest 
that notions of compliance and deviance do not refer to how a script is performed, but to the 
inclusion of particular rules in the constitution of the configurations that make up the farm-
specific script—although there is an underlying script pre-scribing the mode of farming that is 
required to do organic. I conclude that the ‘doing’ of organic is characterised by multiplicity: 
each enactment of standards for organic agriculture is unique. I argue that this is irrelevant for 
the organicness of products: as long as all relevant rules were complied with, each 
configuration is a permitted way of organising a farm.  
In what follows, the labour involved in farming (e.g. harvesting, rearing livestock, etc.) is 
mostly absent: my respondents only rarely commented on these activities, and then mainly to 
indicate that these were part of general farming practice rather than specific to either 
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 Tools are mobilised in the enactment of a practice to perform certain activities, and can be material 
artefacts (like tractors, ploughs and medicines) or objects (like farming economics and soil maps). 
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conventional or organic farming. This implies that how they are performed does not 
significantly change between conventional and organic forms of farming even if, as activities 
in farming practice, they are arranged in different ways. These aspects of farming therefore 
are not part of this particular story.  
Also, I have drawn my examples of rules for organic farming from the Soil Association 
standards. I have done this for three reasons: firstly, the Soil Association standards are 
presented in a format which makes them particularly suited to this approach in that each rule 
has been given its own clause (other certification bodies use standards which have compound 
clauses which would make my narrative less clear). Secondly, most of the farmers I 
interviewed were licensees of the Soil Association, and therefore the Soil Association 
standards were those that were being enacted in practice. Thirdly, I became very familiar with 
the Soil Association standards through my observations of SACL officers. However, this does 
not mean that my account is biased towards the occasionally stricter Soil Association 
standards (see chapter 7). 
4.2  Organic standards at work 
In their current form, the Soil Association standards are published in two volumes and 
two appendices (Soil Association, 2010b, c, d, e). Jointly, they fill over 600 pages (albeit with 
some duplications) with rules, guidelines, and instructions for a wide range of farming 
practices. In sections devoted to enterprises, they define what is allowed and what is 
prohibited, specify when licensees need to inform SACL, and provide guidance about what 
would constitute ‘best practice’. To do this, the text is divided into numbered clauses 
containing provisions and, if applicable, particulars about the conditions under which these 
provisions apply. The guidelines for best practice are not binding, but indicate what would be 
desirable for the operation of enterprises. To set these apart from the rules, they are printed in 
a different colour. The four clauses in Figure 4.1 show the different types of rules and 
guidelines that are present in the Soil Association standards. This example is taken from the 
section on arable and horticultural crop rotations (Soil Association, 2010c: section 5), and 
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deals with the properties of seed and propagation material used in rotations (section 5.2). This 
example, while covering material properties, is representative of how activities are 
standardised as well. 
 
Figure 4.1: Example of Soil Association standards 
Each (sub)section starts with some guidelines about how the enterprise should ideally be 
run, and therefore clause 5.2.1 is printed in the sea-green colour reserved for guidelines. Also, 
the text contains the word ‘should’, indicating that this is not a requirement. Clauses 5.2.2 to 
5.2.4 are printed in black, and contain the binding rules of the Soil Association standards. 
Clause 5.2.2 specifies the use of a particular kind of seed, namely organic, and clarifies that 
this rule is not only applicable to seeds, but also to other types of ‘propagation material’ from 
which crop-bearing plants can grow. Clause 5.2.3 specifies the conditions that apply if clause 
5.2.2 cannot be complied with, by allowing non-organic seeds to be used if organic material is 
not available. This requires a written request which needs to be approved by SACL before the 
non-organic seed can be used. The clause also contains guidance how this can be done, and 
about where to check the availability of organic material. While the latter part appears to be 
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guidance, it actually is a requirement: organicxseeds is, at least for SACL, the authoritative 
reference for what material for planting is available organically. Clause 5.2.4 contains a rule 
excluding material which has been treated in a certain way, which applies to all propagation 
material—but as organic seeds may not be treated chemically, this is a specific requirement 
for non-organic material. In subsequent clauses in this section, the Soil Association standards 
continue to define how planting material becomes organic, including some specific 
requirements for transplant material and pot plants.  
In this manner, standards for organic agriculture set many rules for what products or 
practices are allowed, and what is explicitly prohibited. In fact, the first section of the Soil 
Association standards explicitly states: “Generally, if we do not mention a product or practice, 
it means we do not allow it so you must not use it. Please ask us if you are in doubt.” (section 
1.1). This means that organic farming does not exist in a vacuum, but is in many ways closely 
related to other forms of farming. Indeed, many practices, objects, tools, classifications and 
standards are mobilised in identical ways to conventional farming. For instance, a dairy 
farmer going organic (switching from conventional to organic management of a dairy herd) 
will not change the way in which he or she will milk the cows, store their milk, treat acute 
mastitis (udder infection), dispose of milk containing antibiotics, attend to nutritional needs, 
wean calves, etc. Indeed, these elements will be exactly the same for conventional and organic 
farmers alike.  
However, depending on what conventional dairy system the farmer is converting, there 
are substantial changes in how the cattle are managed. Namely, the National Farmers’ Union 
distinguishes three main types of dairy systems in the UK: grass systems in which the cattle 
grazes pasture for about six months of the year, and is housed for the remainder of the year; 
housed systems in which the cattle is mostly held indoors, and extensively grazed systems in 
which the cattle is mostly outdoors (NFU, 2010). Farms based on either grazed system would 
not require vast changes, but housed systems are not permitted under organic standards and so 
the changes would be substantial to comply with the rules which require access to pasture (see 
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also below). Moreover, problems like acute mastitis will be treated in the same way on 
conventional and organic farms, but there are marked differences in how mastitis is managed 
more generally: for example, organic standards prohibit the use of antibiotics to prevent 
mastitis from occurring (Soil Association, 2010c: cl. 10.10.24). Instead, farmers need to 
manage the cattle in such a way that the occurrence of mastitis is minimised by reducing the 
number of bacteria through which cows can be infected. This includes a number of different 
things, such as changing bedding frequently, additional udder cleaning before and after 
milking, adjusting how cows are managed during their ‘dry’ period (when they do not produce 
milk), controlling flies during the summer, and maybe even culling cows that have 
consistently high counts of infected cells (FWI, 2009). Therefore, even if not prescribed as 
such, to manage a practice (welfare of cattle) without recourse to a conventionally common 
element (prophylactic use of drugs), tinkering with other elements (managing hygiene in 
various ways24), and the adoption of new strategies (e.g. culling) is required.  
This means that differently organised farming practices emerge from the rules in 
standards for organic farming. As the example of mastitis management shows, a single rule 
preventing the prophylactic use of antibiotics results in a different pattern of activities for 
managing cattle, a pattern which integrates material artefacts in particular ways. Yet, this 
pattern will be, in part, dependent on the local conditions of a farm: only some farmers may 
consider culling, whereas others may not need to do as much as the disease pressure is 
generally low. Thus, this rule becomes a framework for action: by embodying assumptions 
about how mastitis can be managed and prevented without the need for antibiotics, the 
enactment of the rule requires a farmer to assemble activities and artefacts in a way that 
mastitis can be managed in the specific setting of that farm. As such, the rules in organic 
standards are not just simple prohibitions or statements of allowed practices: in their local 
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 This is not to say that conventional farmers would not employ similar techniques. Indeed, some 
elements are considered ‘best practice’ also in conventional dairy herd management. However, in 
organic farming they are essential to reduce chronic occurrences of mastitis, whereas in conventional 
farming these adjustments are desirable but not critical to control chronic mastitis. 
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enactment they become process injunctions (Kaufmann, 1998) which produce a framework 
for how a particular aspect of farming practice should be performed or managed. This is a 
local framework: it depends on the local conditions of the farm which activities and artefacts 
need to be assembled in a way that practices are compliant with the rules.  
For a farmer converting to organic farming—‘going’ organic—this means that these 
injunctions are made visible: conventional farming practices are challenged by and change as 
a result of organic standards. However, as mentioned above, many activities and artefacts are 
shared with other forms of farming. A new injunction does not introduce an entirely new 
practice; rather, existing assemblies of actors, activities, objects, artefacts and meanings are 
rearranged into new, more or less stable assemblies. This process of making the injunction 
visible and rearranging different elements of practice is captured by the term reconfiguration 
(Shove, 2003). But injunctions are not only made visible in ‘going’ organic: changing 
conditions in the setting of an organic farm may challenge established configurations. In more 
general terms, then, ‘doing’ organic requires finding configurations which allow farming 
based on the injunctions to proceed while enacting rules in organic standards, and doing so in 
the local setting of the farm.  
This implies that unlike protocols (as described by Timmermans and Berg, 1997, 2003), 
the rules in organic standards shape practice not by interfering directly with work practices 
and sequences of activity. Instead, organic standards structure work practices more loosely: 
they specify which elements (activities, materials, tools) can be used. Which elements a farmer 
mobilises in a local, specific context (depending on geographic, social, physical, 
organisational and economic arrangements) and how these elements are assembled is not in 
itself scripted in the narrative of organic standards. Rather, this depends on the injunctions 
which emerge from the rules in a local setting, which in turn produce frameworks for action. 
This mechanism means that the enactment of organic standards can occur in a near infinite 
variety of potential social, economic and material contexts: what configurations underpin local 
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enactments follow from locally constructed frameworks for action rather than direct 
prescriptions of practices in those standards. 
Yet, while the injunctions are locally situated, this does not imply that they are 
independent or disconnected from other ‘doings’ of organic: in fact, as I will argue in the 
remainder of this chapter, they constitute a particular mode of farming. To examine this mode, 
I explore the temporal and spatial dimensions of these (re)configurations in the next two 
sections, after which I argue that these injunctions constitute and reflect a preventative mode 
of organising farming practice. 
4.3  Temporal configurations 
To examine how organic standards configure the temporal dimension of farming practice, 
it is necessary to first consider some of the properties of the main class of artefacts which is 
excluded by standards for organic agriculture—the synthetic chemical compounds 
(agrochemicals) designed to manage the production of crops, e.g. herbicides, pesticides, 
insecticides, artificial fertilisers, pH adjusting agents, antibiotics, growth hormones, etc. As 
technological solutions for the management of crop and livestock production, these 
industrially manufactured substances provide effective ways to boost yields and control pests: 
their effect can be noticed soon after application, and often one application is sufficient to 
achieve the desired effect. They can be used routinely to manage production processes and to 
prevent problems from occurring, but many of them can also be applied to control problems 
once they have been identified. Moreover, they are portable as they can be taken to the site 
where their effect is required, and applied locally or across an entire farm depending on what 
needs to be managed. As such, agrochemicals provide highly homogeneous solutions for 
farmers in the sense that while required dosages may vary between local settings, their effect 
is mostly predictable and can be calculated to an optimum yield/cost ratio. Furthermore, they 
can be applied widely across settings, and many of the agrochemicals are designed to manage 
a broad spectrum of related problems (e.g. a herbicide such as Roundup is not species-
specific: any plant will be killed when its leaves come into contact with it). This means that 
 81
agrochemicals not only provide technological solutions for many farming problems, they also 
standardise farming practice by reducing the complexity of managing and disciplining nature: 
agrochemicals package the management of yields and the control of undesirable organisms 
into technologically advanced substances which can be routinely sprayed on fields or 
administered to livestock.  
Prohibiting their use, therefore, means that producing crops and livestock cannot be 
achieved through a limited number of highly uniform, packaged materials and practices. 
Consequently, the injunction for organic farmers is to configure alternative ways to manage 
the growth of crops and to keep undesirable organisms under control. The options for straight 
substitutions are limited indeed: to achieve the desired effects, the farming practices on an 
organic farm entail extended assemblies of sets of activities and the use of certain materials 
and tools. For many of these elements (activities, use of artefacts, mobilisation of tools) there 
are various options and different ways of managing a particular aspect of production. For 
example, weed control can be achieved in many different ways, such as through the removal 
of weeds by hand, by letting them grow before ploughing them under, purposefully 
germinating and hoeing out weeds a few weeks before the crop seeds need to be sown, 
through the choice of highly competitive crop species, by splitting the root of certain weeds 
again and again so that the rhizome (growth kernel) of each root section is exhausted, timing 
the drilling (sowing) of the crop seed so that the emerging crop shades out weeds quickly after 
germination, by managing weeds so that no single species of weed becomes dominant, or by 
simply accepting that the field in which the crop grows contains weeds. Often, a farmer will 
use a combination of these methods to control the specific weeds that are growing on a field 
depending on the crop that is to be produced.  
Such sets of practices therefore do not substitute prohibited agrochemicals by emulating 
their effects: they form altogether different arrangements of managing yields and controlling 
weeds, pests and diseases, the assembly of which fulfils the specific requirements for crop 
production and the welfare of livestock. The core arrangement for almost all organic arable 
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enterprises is a rotation of crops for each field: it constitutes the central method of managing 
soil fertility and controlling weeds and pests in a way that ensures the financial viability of a 
farm (Lampkin, 1990).  
To understand how this is achieved, it is necessary to briefly consider some agronomic25 
aspects of farming. In order to grow and to reproduce, plants need large quantities of nutrients 
such as carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen and potassium, to a lesser extent phosphorus, 
calcium and magnesium, and even smaller quantities of other elements (trace elements). 
Carbon and oxygen are synthesised from carbon dioxide absorbed from the air; any other 
nutrient is absorbed through the plant’s roots in the soil. This means that the soil26 is depleted 
of these elements, reducing its fertility and consequently the yields of successive crops. As 
such, an important part of farming practice is to fertilise the soil in relation to the nutritional 
needs of the crop to be grown. To make these soil-based nutrients available to crops without 
applying prohibited artificial, inorganic fertilisers such as ammonium nitrate, farmers can 
apply manure from farm animals (farmyard manure) as a source of nitrogen and potassium. 
However, this might not always be readily available, and does not cater for the introduction of 
other nutrients. Therefore, the rotation includes plants to manage the fertility of the soil by 
growing crops with different agronomic properties in a sequence which balances the 
nutritional needs to all of these crops.  
For example, legumes such as clover, peas and beans are able to capture atmospheric 
nitrogen and fix it in their roots. Potassium, phosphorus and other elements can be returned by 
ploughing plant residues (straw and/or roots) of legumes, cereals and grasses into the soil as a 
‘green manure’. Furthermore, some legume species have very deep roots which can make 
nutrients available from soil unreachable by other species. This means that while some crops 
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 Agronomy is the science of land management and crop production. 
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 I refer here to soil as if this would be a uniform entity. However, soils types vary widely in structure 
(important for rooting) and a number of factors which influence the availability of nutrients for plants. 
While some of these aspects can be improved through soil management, others cannot be changed and 
therefore affect the plants that can be grown on a 
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deplete the soil of nutrients, other plants can be used to fertilise the soil again. Growing a 
sequence of different plants on the same field—a rotation—can balance the nutrient off-take 
and input in the soil. A rotation also helps in the management of undesirable organisms, as it 
will lead to different cultivations (ploughing, tilling, planting, etc.) at different times of the 
year so that weed species cannot become dominant. Moreover, some competitive crops 
suppress weeds by shading them out, while others act as natural herbicides through the 
biochemical residues they leave in the soil. Finally, a rotation reduces the build up and 
survival of soil-borne pests and diseases as host crops are alternated with non-host crops (for 
more details of rotations please refer to Blake, 1990; Lampkin, 1990; Lampkin et al., 2008). It 
is important to note that most rotations are temporal rotations: they define the sequence of 
crops to be grown on a field.  
The Soil Association standards specify that “[w]here rotation is possible, the annual 
rotation you use for each area of land must: balance the use of fertility building and fertility 
depleting crops; include crops with various root systems; include a legume crop (for example 
clover or beans), and; leave enough time between crops with similar pests and disease risks” 
(Soil Association, 2010c: cl. 5.1.10). Additionally, some species can only be grown every 
three seasons on the same piece of land. While the Soil Association standards do provide 
some guidelines about what a rotation should achieve, they do not specify anything in more 
detail: there are few constraints on how farmers and farm managers design the rotations for 
their farms. So how do individuals figure this out in practice? 
“So, where do you start, what are the considerations to put in such a rotation?” 
(Maarten) 
“Fertility is probably the most important consideration; getting a balance between 
nutrient off-take and nutrient input. Also, something that is economic because part 
of this farm is non-organic and because the directors of the farm are accountants 
and bankers and advisers, they’re always comparing the profitability of organic 
and non-organic. [...] so what I have to do is I have to balance the rotation and the 
practicality of maintaining fertility, controlling weeds and making enough money 
to keep the directors focused on organic farming. So, there’s quite a lot of pressure. 
So that’s how the rotation is basically based around getting that as well as possible, 
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bearing in mind long term considerations and short term profitability.” (Farm 
manager Fergus)27 
As Fergus indicates, a rotation is designed to balance tensions between the management 
of fertility, weeds and profitability in organic farming over time. In fact, the temporal 
patterning of organic production is directly related to the income that specific fields generate: 
while cereals such as wheat, barley and oats, and legumes such as peas and beans can be sold, 
some leguminous crops such as clover and mustard are ploughed in (unless they are grown for 
seed, which is rare). This means that when such green manures are grown on a field, there will 
be no revenue for that crop year. Thus, the profitability that Fergus mentions is intricately 
linked with the way in which he plans the rotation: while there are potentially countless ways 
of designing a rotation, there will be only a few that are applicable at a given moment in time 
due to the material, agronomic, social and economic conditions of a farm (I will discuss 
farming economics in more detail in the next chapter).  
To spread the financial risk, a rotation is staggered temporally over different fields on the 
farm: different cash crops provide different marketing opportunities, and the sale of some 
fields of cash crops can cover the costs and lack of income from other fields in a fertility 
building stage. This means that each field is managed as a separate entity with its own pattern 
of weeding, ploughing, sowing and harvesting (different crops are seeded and harvested at 
different times).  
But the individual management of fields goes further than that: farmers usually calculate 
a theoretical nutrient budget for each field which balances the off-take of nutrients by cash 
crops and the input provided by (green) manures. This budget is based on scientific data about 
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 This section is mostly based on Fergus’s account of the rotations on the Gooseberry estate; we 
generated an exceptionally detailed narrative of the intricacies of how the rotations were established 
and maintained. This was possible due to the scale and particularities of Gooseberry’s operations as a 
large, almost entirely arable estate which is only partially organic, and Fergus’s record keeping. While I 
discussed rotations with other farmers whose narratives showed similar considerations, their accounts 
did not provide such rich understandings of how a rotation organises farming practices. 
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the agronomic properties of various crops, which then is related to the way in which a 
particular soil type fixes nutrients: 
“[...] if you look at nitrogen, phosphate, and potash, as far as nitrogen is concerned 
it’s much more predictable. You can say two years of clover will fix 200kg [per 
hectare], shall we say, of nitrogen. That will feed one wheat and one triticale and 
one oats at reasonable yields. You can predict that. The nitrogen is a much more 
mobile nutrient, readily leached, readily taken up, predictably fixed. As far as 
phosphate and potash are concerned that’s a much more difficult thing [but] you 
can predict the input of the P and K28 and you can predict the off-take of the P and 
K.” (Fergus)  
But Fergus went on to explain that there are substantial differences in how individual 
fields will hold different nutrients, especially potassium and phosphorus. Therefore, he had 
mapped each field for these nutrients through soil samples, on the basis of which he tried to 
even out the levels of fixed nutrients in the soil, for example by splitting a field into three 
separate fields, each with their own soil characteristics and nutrient stores. This would make 
management easier, and would likely result in slightly different rotations for each of the new 
fields—a further localisation of farming practice. But Fergus also commented that especially 
for phosphate, another method is required to map the availability in the soil: 
“But what I’ve recently concluded is that it’s wrong just to rely on soil samples of 
phosphate availability. You also need to back that up with plant samples. Sampling 
of plants when they’re at their most vigorous in about May, take samples of plants 
and get them analysed for the amount of [phosphate] in the plant fibre, plant tissue, 
against set standards for optimum yields and then relate that back to the actual 
amount of phosphate recorded in the soil.” (Fergus) 
Thus, relying on one scientific measurement of nutrient availability may not provide 
conclusive data through which soil fertility can be managed, requiring different kinds of 
samples which allow a more detailed agronomic analysis of how a rotation should be 
designed. 
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 Nitrogen, potassium or potash and phosphorus or phosphate are commonly referred to as N, K and P, 
respectively. 
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Apart from nutrient budgets and soil and plant sampling, other agronomic aspects such as 
the physical characteristics of the soil of a field and the specific ways in which different plants 
grow in that soil are considered in designing a rotation. This means that while the rotation is 
often field specific, the elements with which it is designed are standardised in the sense that 
there are several bodies of literature in which the nutrient requirements and growth patterns of 
the plant species which are commercially available are documented in relation to standard soil 
types, the soil and plant sampling is based on laboratory-based scientific analyses of 
individual nutrient elements, and there are studies and reports of different non-chemical weed 
management techniques, including rotational methods (e.g. Bond et al., 2003). Therefore, 
whereas the rotation itself is a simple sequence of different crops for a field, it embodies 
extensive performances of scientific and technological elements through which nature is made 
manageable, each with their own temporality. 
Once established, a rotation does not become static: the farmers I spoke to all mentioned 
how their rotation evolves, as each year there the circumstances of the farm change slightly. 
For example, some fields suffer more from weeds than expected, other fields do not have 
sufficient fertility left for the cash crop which was planned previously, and sometimes there is 
a change in the anticipated demand for a specific crop. For instance, the year before I 
conducted my interviews, the two major buyers of organic oats had stockpiled oats at a high 
price in connection with the volatility in prices on the cereal markets. This meant that the 
likely demand for oats after the 2009 harvest would be much lower than previous years, and 
that the buyers would no longer buy oats before it was produced. According to Fergus, this led 
to a number of farmers reducing the area of oats or even deleting oats from their rotation. 
However, he suggested that it would be unlikely that demand would collapse altogether, and 
as oats are very good agronomically in a rotation, it would make sense to keep growing the 
oats. Furthermore, rotations evolve as farmers introduce new crops for their agronomic 
properties. For instance, buckwheat would be very good in a rotation because of its capacity to 
make phosphate available to other plants, and because of its characteristics in suppressing 
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couch grass, which is a highly invasive weed species. While Fergus did not include it in his 
rotation because of the lack of a market for organic buckwheat, Alistair was trialling 
buckwheat as a green manure which would be ploughed in rather than harvested.  
This means that ‘the rotation’ for a farm is not a fixed entity: it evolves annually with the 
agronomic and economic situation, with the presence of new agronomic insights, and with 
trials to test a new variety of a particular crop or green manure (I will discuss the details of 
different varieties in the next chapter). Moreover, ‘the rotation’ is usually a guide for all of the 
fields on a farm, but for individual fields it is tinkered with to address specific problems: 
perhaps add a catch crop (a rapidly growing crop which is grown in a short time frame 
between regular crops), or an undersown crop to balance out some nutritional needs or to 
control a weed problem. Further tinkering may be required if next to the temporal rotation, 
there is another rotation—a spatial rotation of livestock which is used for agronomic purposes. 
Some animal species eat specific weeds, or their behaviour on the field has beneficial effects 
for crops grown after the livestock has visited the field. Yet, not all fields are equally suitable 
to the agronomic use of livestock, and therefore farmers may need to establish two parallel 
rotations. 
So far, I have described how rotations are assembled from standard elements and tinkered 
with to manage yields, deal with undesirable organisms and ensure some financial returns for 
the farm. However, the labour involved in managing fields occasionally needs to be tinkered 
with too:  
“... we tend to plough a little bit earlier for spring cropping in the non-organic 
system because we realise that the longer you can keep the stubble there and the 
weeds growing in the organic system the more fertility you’ll have in the spring. 
We’re much more conscious of moisture content of the soil when we’re cultivating 
in the organic system because the compaction in the organic system, or smearing 
of the soil has much more of an effect on the crop than it does in the non-organic 
system because the roots may be restricted and therefore it gets short of nutrients. 
If that happens in the non-organic system it doesn’t matter too much because you 
can apply bagged fertiliser to it.” (Fergus) 
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Fergus’s comment suggests that soil and weather conditions are monitored more closely 
in an organic farming system, resulting in slight shifts in when particular activities are carried 
out.  
As such, the temporal configuration of organic production is organised through a 
structuring of agronomic, economic and labour aspects of farming into a simple sequence of 
crops for each field. This sequence is established through the mobilisation of a number of 
standard elements which perform and configure knowledge about each field. Subsequently, 
each rotation is made field specific by tinkering to accommodate the highly local conditions of 
individual fields: for a rotation to be enacted successfully, each sequence needs to be adjusted 
according to the interrelations between different aspects of the rotation and the field on which 
this sequence is performed. The process injunction following from the rules about rotations in 
standards for organic agriculture therefore not only produces a framework for calculating and 
performing rotations, but also a framework for incorporating past experience and an ongoing 
adjusting of different practices to suit the changing conditions of the farm (rather than to 
adjust these conditions through agrochemicals). This echoes the remarks of farmers and 
advisers alike that even after a long time farming organically, they still learn every year about 
things that work and things that do not—but from their stories, the things they learn is not 
about what organic standards require or the basics of working with a rotation, but about the 
ways in which the rotational elements are interrelated and how these relationships can be 
adjusted.  
4.4  Spatial configurations 
Similar to the temporal configuration of organic production, the spatial configuration can 
be best understood by comparing it with conventional practices—this time of managing 
livestock. Especially in intensive livestock industries, conventional farmers can choose to 
employ packaged solutions. Many conventional farmers will routinely use agrochemicals to 
vaccinate livestock as a precaution, not as treatment. Furthermore, they have access to other 
highly packaged solutions for the management of livestock. These solutions provide a site 
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where workers interact with the livestock in a spatially compact area such as a building or set 
of buildings where the supply of feed, the removal of manure, the capture of produce (e.g. 
eggs, milk, animals headed for slaughter), and the medical treatment of animals can be 
organised efficiently. While organic standards do not directly prohibit the use of such 
compounds for livestock, their potential use within organic systems is limited. For instance, 
they require pigs to rotate over a farm, and therefore they require mobile housing. For poultry, 
the number of birds per square metre permitted in organic standards is significantly lower than 
common conventional stocking rates. Also, conventionally acceptable practices to manage 
aggressive behaviour in densely packed groups of birds or animals, such as tail docking, teeth 
grinding, beak tipping, etc., are not permitted. Furthermore, standards for organic agriculture 
require that creatures have access to outdoor areas where they have sufficient space to exhibit 
natural behaviour (e.g. pigs rootling, chickens ranging) without damaging the area beyond 
repair. In fact, for most enterprises this means that organic standards prohibit livestock to 
permanently range on the same piece of land. Hence, the fixed barns used in the conventional 
industry have too little suitable outdoor space available adjacent to the buildings, and 
therefore their use is, as a spatially packaged solution, not possible.  
This suggests that enacting organic standards results in a reshaping of two sets of 
boundaries around livestock: firstly, the spatial requirements—and therefore the material 
barriers required to keep livestock contained—follow from the requirement that animals must 
be able to exhibit natural behaviour. The maximum stocking density for ranges and housings 
stipulated in organic standards define how physical space relates to the potential for livestock 
to act in this way. While in most cases it will be relatively straightforward for farmers to 
adjust their stocking rate according to pre-existing infrastructures, for especially the poultry 
industry this often leads farmers to construct (or commission) new housings in the form of 
polytunnels, which are temporary structures made out of polyethylene plastic sheets stretched 
over semi-circular arches. These housings can be placed anywhere on a field serving as the 
range for the birds, solving the problems of access to a sufficient range and of needing to 
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rotate the birds. In either case (reducing numbers held in existing housing or constructing new 
housing), the maximum number of birds/animals is determined either by the size of the range 
and the size of the housing. Consequently, livestock enterprises are reconfigured through the 
material boundaries through which creatures are contained—not so much by increasing 
material boundaries but by reshaping the space within those boundaries.  
However, this does not always solve the problem of stocking density: in the poultry 
industry it is common that suppliers of brooding eggs and hatched chicks send up to ten 
percent more birds than ordered to cover any losses that may occur during transport. For 
conventional farmers this usually is not a problem, but for organic farmers this might mean 
that the stocking rate is too high—there are too many birds for the bounded living space 
(housing and range). As this constitutes an animal welfare issue, this would automatically 
become at least a major non-compliance during an inspection. Ordering fewer birds would 
solve this, but could lead to reduced profitability if only the reduced number of birds would 
arrive. As such, compliance with the rules in organic standards requires a further 
reconfiguration of how the routines of the livestock supply industry are integrated in the 
‘doing’ of organic poultry enterprises; the reshaping of spatial boundaries reconfigures only 
part of livestock enterprises, and additional elements—including decisions about stocking—
are required to comply with organic standards. 
Secondly, certain boundaries are reshaped as a result of medical considerations: as the 
example in section 4.2 shows, to organise the management of mastitis without the 
prophylactic use of antibiotics requires additional hygiene measures to prevent bacteria from 
spreading. This means doing additional things to keep udders and bedding clean. However, 
there are other instances where such additional activities have little effect. For instance, 
external parasites such as the mites causing scab in sheep, or internal parasites such as worms, 
cannot be eradicated by keeping the livestock clean. While acute instances of parasites can be 
treated after permission by the certification body, systemic treatment is not allowed. Instead, 
the solution is to minimise the possibility for the livestock to pick up the parasites. This 
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requires a rotation of animals around different fields across the farm, and leaving sufficient 
space between successive visits of stock to a particular field—so-called clean grazing—so that 
the parasites die in the time in between visits. While clean grazing is considered good practice 
in conventional animal husbandry, in organic farming it is necessary as there are few 
alternatives for controlling parasites. The management of potential medical problems 
therefore is organised by introducing boundaries between the livestock and undesirable 
organisms, either physically (removing pathogens) or temporally (longer than the lifespan of 
parasites in a field). However, this is not always possible: 
“[...] If you manage your animals differently you shouldn’t need to do [worming] 
year in year out. But there might be exceptions to that and again I suppose this is 
open to interpretation because there are instances, particularly in the north of 
England in the areas where there’s very heavy rainfall and the ground soil 
conditions are not right and so on, where they’re running flocks of hill sheep but 
only have a very small area of [...] land that they can bring the animals onto in 
winter.” (Allen) 
“So that land will be ...” (Maarten) 
“Used year in year out because they have no choice. So what do you do there? So I 
think maybe you might have to say ‘yes, it’s a hill flock and he’s got nowhere else 
he can put them’. The only thing you can do there is to go for breeds which are 
more resistant to internal parasites, and there is a big difference across the breeds, 
and do what you can.” (Allen) 
This suggests that reshaping some of the boundaries involves managing a multiplicity of 
hygiene strategies to prevent routine treatments with antibiotics and other medicines: these 
include attending to the hygiene of specific body parts, of entire bodies, and of specific 
aspects of the soil. But if some aspects of an enterprise do not allow the reshaping of hygiene-
related boundaries as required by the rules in organic standards, being organic could require a 
reshaping of the livestock enterprise by changing the breed. Put differently, such a 
reconfiguration—the substitution of one standard element (breed) for another—stems from an 
injunction which requires the use of appropriate breeds in a local context; a reconfiguration of 
this kind is required to make an organic livestock enterprise possible in that particular context. 
These two examples show how organic standards potentially require a reshaping of some 
spatial boundaries through which livestock is contained: the process injunctions relating to 
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some specific sets of rules in organic standards may also reshape the material and hygiene-
related spaces in which livestock is kept. The boundaries of these spaces are local and context 
specific as they depend on infrastructures and material conditions present on a farm. However, 
the reshaping is achieved by mobilising standard and packaged elements, which are partially 
external to the context (physiological, agronomic and medical knowledge), and the 
reconfiguration of local physical entities and agronomic conditions.  
4.5  The prevention of problems 
As the examples in the previous two sections show, the management of yield and animal 
welfare and the control of weeds, pests and diseases depends on the mobilisation of a number 
of different methods which are temporally and spatially configured to fulfil the specific 
requirements for crop production and the welfare of livestock. This does not mean that these 
sets of practices substitute packaged solutions by emulating their effects. This is partially 
because one of the premises of organic farming is to interfere with biological and 
physiological processes as little as possible and to utilise and cultivate natural processes which 
help the growth of crops and the welfare of livestock and partially because this often would 
not even be possible. For example, a conventional farmer would be able to spray additional 
chemical fertilisers during specific growth stages if the fertility of the soil would be 
insufficient, and apply herbicides and pesticides when weeds or diseases occur. An organic 
farmer does not have these options. Instead, as various respondents pointed out, an organic 
seedbed needs to be organised before the crop seeds germinate. If an organic farmer has made 
a mistake with this, the consequences can extend well beyond the production of the current 
crop: 
“Once it’s in and you’ve made a mistake then you’ve lost and next year try again.” 
(Maarten) 
“Yes, and that mistake can be if you ended up with too thin a population you get a 
weed problem, that mistake can live with you through the rotation, just as if you 
find you’ve got a poor clover take in the fertility building phase then that will give 
you a poor rotation right the way through to the next fertility building.” (Adviser 
Adrian) 
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Adrian’s comment indicates that, because of the agronomic interrelations between 
different crops in a sequence, little errors in the management of one phase can have a knock 
on effect which affects subsequent crops and therefore farm income. Something similar 
applies to the management of livestock: while livestock health problems can still be cured 
when they arise through the permitted use of agrochemicals, this can only be incidental; 
recurring treatments are not allowed if livestock is to keep its organic status and therefore 
require problems to be resolved and prevented29.  
In fact, Adrian suggested that the ability of organic farmers to tinker with their ecological 
system is much lower. This means that, instead of remediating emerging problems, the sets of 
practices through which crops are grown, livestock managed and weeds, pests and diseases 
are controlled in an organic system are structured differently: 
“Conventional, it seems to me, is very much a case of waiting until the problem 
arises and then fixing that problem with whatever happens to be available, whether 
it’s fertiliser, whether it’s a spray or whether it’s an antibiotic treatment for 
animals and so on. Whereas, organic [is] trying to anticipate what might go wrong 
and trying to avoid problems in the first place.” (Adviser Allen) 
“I think [organic farming] comes back to the basic premise is that you’re trying to 
work with nature rather than manipulate it. So, it’s a mindset of capturing the 
natural advantages and minimising the natural disadvantages.” (Adviser Adrian) 
The comments of these two advisers signal that the sets of activities to manage organic 
production are intended to prevent problems from occurring through natural processes, or to 
minimise the impact of emerging problems on current as well as future crops and livestock. 
Allen’s quote is very specific in suggesting that this is a different mode of farming compared 
to conventional farming. Rather than reactively responding to problems, he (and other 
respondents like him) indicates that organic farming is based on a proactive prevention of 
problems. The habitual, routinised performance of ‘doing’ organic, then, is based on 
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 Certification bodies will never prohibit the use of medical interventions if the welfare of an animal is 
compromised. However, they may decide that certain animals or herds lose organic status if too many 
identical interventions have been administered in a brief period. 
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injunctions, derived from the rules in organic standards, which provide a framework for the 
anticipation of problems and their resolution before they occur. In other words, individual 
rules embody assumptions about how organic farming practices can be shaped around the 
prevention of problems; and the locally contingent construction of frameworks for action by 
individual farmers realises this mode of farming. 
This requires regular planning activities to anticipate how the growth of crops, livestock 
and undesirable organisms are interrelated in the specific material (ecological, biological, 
chemical, physical, geographic) setting of their farm in relation to a range of permitted 
farming practices. As different interventions have different consequences for the productivity 
of an enterprise, this is intricately linked to the social and economic context in which 
enterprises are set and therefore their mobilisation as part of a farming system is directly 
related to the social requirements and the financial performance of a farm: 
“Every ... the challenge is every farming business and every farmer is different 
because they all have different requirements. Some farmers will want a modest 
level of productivity and a modest level of profitability and income because maybe 
they’re owner occupiers and they don’t have mortgages to pay; maybe they have 
other business interests and other sources of income; whereas other farmers will 
want to maximise production and productivity because they need it. So your 
response to that scenario is going to be different for every farm, added to which 
you’ve then got the complexities of different climatic locations and also different 
soil types. So, it’s a 3D jigsaw, with a blindfold on, all the time.” (Alistair) 
The particular form of this 3D jigsaw of farming mode, profitability and farm setting 
shapes how different elements of farming practice are assembled to manage fields, crops and 
livestock on a day to day basis—indeed, it is constitutive of the injunctions through which 
actions are structured.  
This suggests that, in comparison with conventional farming, organic farming practices 
are more differentiated and contingent on the specific material, social and economic setting of 
a particular farm—the enactment of individual rules in organic standards, through the 
construction of locally situated injunctions, results in an arrangement of activities, tools and 
materials which is unique to the specific context in which it is constituted. However, the 
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absence of highly packaged solutions and practices does not mean that organic farming 
practices are not standardised: while the farm-specific arrangement of practices is configured 
uniquely for every farm, the sets of activities and material entities which make up these 
practices are often standardised in a different sense—partly through rules in standards for 
organic agriculture, partly through other rules and guidelines. 
4.6  Packaging practice 
Summarising the above sections, I started by arguing that rules in organic standards turn 
into process injunctions which produce locally situated frameworks for action. I then 
examined how these injunctions shape the organic production, firstly through the 
configuration of arable farming by means of a temporal and sometimes a spatial rotation, and 
secondly through the reshaping of physical and hygiene-related boundaries around livestock. I 
argued that these injunctions result in a mode of farming which is preventative rather than 
reactive. In both cases I suggested that the elements which constitute these configurations 
(actions, materials, tools) are in fact standard and packaged but which require ongoing 
tinkering so that organic can be ‘done’ in economic, social and material terms. 
In effect, standards reconfigure practices by acting as process injunctions: the site-
specific assembling of permitted elements through which a farmer does, or plans to do, 
organic in a local context is dependent on sets of specific rules in standards for organic 
agriculture—but for each farm this set of rules will be different depending on its material, 
economic and social characteristics. This suggests that product standards do not contain 
specific scripts of the type that characterise protocols (Timmermans and Berg, 1997, 2003), 
but that the site-specific configuration elements through which organic is done—are written 
on that farm using pre-existing elements. This implies that notions of compliance and 
deviance do not refer to how a script is performed, but to the inclusion of particular rules in 
the constitution of the configurations that make up the farm-specific script. It is important to 
note that for rules which can be interpreted in multiple ways, interpretations of compliance 
and deviance depend on how these rules have been mobilised. Thus, standards for organic 
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agriculture contain rules about which elements can or must be used, nothing more but also 
nothing less than that. For farmers this means that their toolkit has been changed: some 
options and strategies have been removed. It also means that the remaining tools in the toolkit 
have been made explicit. 
Moreover, farmers transform themselves in a process of active submission (Timmermans 
and Berg, 2003): in going organic, they change orientation, switching from a reactive to a 
preventative mode of farming. Finally, and again in contrast to the enactment of protocols, 
adaptation to organic standards is achieved through the construction of process injunctions 
which inform configurations of farming practice. Enacting standards requires extensive 
knowledge of the local agronomic, economic and social conditions of a farm, but there is no 
scope for tinkering with the rules themselves. Rather, improvising and tinkering is done with 
each of the elements that jointly constitute the local, contextual enactment—the localised 
universality—of organic standards. 
These points underscore the multiplicity of ‘doing’ organic: each enactment of organic 
standards is unique. Yet, organic ‘stuff’, once produced, circulates in a manner made possible 
by the fact that it belongs into this one category: it is ‘organic’ (see chapters 6 and 7). While 
the details of how this produce was grown or reared are important for the farmer in that they 
determine the profitability of the enterprises on his or her farm, this is irrelevant as far as the 
subsequent circulation of the produce is concerned. What matters for the organicness of 
products is that all relevant rules were complied with, not which configuration was used to 
organise the farm from which the produce came. 
In this chapter, I have discussed methods of farming which follow from enacting the 
rules enshrined in standards for organic agriculture. However, doing organic requires 
additional changes beyond those required in organic standards—these are not directly related 
to organic standards but are a result of the fact that doing organic has knock-on consequences 
for other aspects of farming practice. These are the subject of the next chapter.  
 97
Chapter 5 Organic valuations 
5.1  Introduction 
In the previous chapter I described how organic standards are enacted. However, these 
enactments in themselves are not sufficient to constitute organic agriculture: to have effect 
they need to be supported by a number of tools and practices which perform further elements 
of ‘doing’ organic. For example, and as hinted at already, the economics of organic farming 
exist and are compared and defined in relation to the economics of conventional farming. As I 
go on to show, ‘doing organic’ also represents a shift of priorities—different valuations come 
into play. These demand and generate different forms and trails of recording, measurement 
and calculation. In this chapter I show how these three aspects of farming practice are 
configured by and around being and ‘doing’ organic. In the next section, I discuss how a 
dedicated form or farm economics provides a calculative device for organic farming, followed 
by an account of how the integration of enterprises based on agronomic properties is 
constitutive of organic farm systems, and I consider how a prioritisation of certain qualities of 
plant varieties and livestock breeds is required for the enactment of organic farm systems. In 
section 5.3 I show how the maintenance of paperwork is constitutive of ‘doing’ organic and 
argue that it results in an extension of farming practice. In the final section I argue that these 
practices, in all of their necessarily multiple performances, enact a specific mode of farming. I 
conclude that they are not required by organic standards but they are required to make the 
enactment of those standards possible.  
5.2  Organic configurations 
Configuring farming economics 
As I discussed in the previous chapter, the profitability of an organic farm is intricately 
linked with the design of a rotation system. Indeed, farm manager Fergus indicated that 
profitability frames his temporal configuration of ‘doing’ organic (see quote on page 83): the 
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choices Fergus makes about growing oats, wheat or barley, or building fertility have an impact 
on this figure. In his case, the directors overseeing the management of the farm on behalf of 
the owners compare the profitability of the organic with the conventional part of the 
operation. If the performance of the organic part of the farm—as expressed through 
profitability as a single number—would systematically be lower than the conventional part, 
the directors could decide to reduce the area allocated to organic farming or even to instruct 
Fergus to manage the farm as an entirely conventional entity. Profitability, therefore, is the 
established indicator to measure performance, and to make the performances of different 
farms and farm systems commensurable. Thus, it is a calculative device (Callon, 1998) which 
enables farming economics through a function of forecast commodity prices, crop yields and 
livestock prices, production costs and subsidies for certain practices.  
In this equation, subsidies usually form a predictable source of income for a farm (a more 
detailed discussion of subsidies will follow in chapter 8); commodity prices fluctuate beyond 
the control of an individual farmer—although in livestock production farmers can influence 
the price they will get for an animal depending on its condition at slaughter. As such, the two 
main variables through which the profitability of a farm can be influenced are the yields and 
the costs of production. In a conventional system, yields usually depend on the use of 
agrochemicals, and farmers need to find the point where the difference between the cost of 
various agrochemicals and other inputs (e.g. cost of feed for livestock) and increased yields is 
at its largest. What makes this equation difficult to calculate is that the cost of agrochemicals 
is directly linked to oil prices (most agrochemicals are oil-based substances), and the cost of 
feed is related to the cost of the agrochemicals used it its production, as well as the weather: a 
bad harvest will push up the prices of feed (e.g. cereals, maize, soya) considerably. While this 
is good news for arable farmers (they will receive more for their crops), for the meat, dairy 
and egg industry this means that costs of production can skyrocket, as happened after the 2007 
and 2010 harvests. For farmers producing on a contract in which carcass, dairy or egg prices 
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have been determined in advance, this can mean that their profitability can be negative: they 
incur losses because of the increased costs.  
The economics of organic farming are different. Firstly, the cost of inputs is much lower 
for an organic farm as expensive agrochemicals are not used: Alistair suggested that organic 
farmers would need between £80-£100 per acre working capital, compared to £250-£260 per 
acre for conventional farmers. However, yields are also lower: a field of organic wheat will 
generally produce around 6 tonnes per hectare, whereas in a conventional system this will be 
around 8 tonnes. While this difference is more than offset by the premium for organic cereals 
(£227 per tonne ex-farm compared to £166 per tonne ex-farm for feed wheat, prices 
November 201030), due to the fertility building phase required in organic farming (as 
explained in the previous chapter), each field will only produce crops for an average two out 
of three years, whereas a conventional farm will produce crops almost every year for all of its 
fields. 
As such, doing organic is based on a different form of doing farming economics: the 
standard methods to determine the profitability of a conventional farm are insufficient to 
analyse the financial conditions of an organic farm in the sense that the aspects of production 
required to manage fertility and control undesirable organisms introduce economic elements 
which are not included in conventional production economics. Therefore, a method is required 
which takes into consideration the specific configurations in which farm-economic aspects are 
structured for an organic farm. This method necessarily accommodates a wide range of 
possibilities through which organic can be enacted in a given context: the multitude of 
arrangements of permitted elements is vast, each with its own economic implications. 
Furthermore, not all organic farms work towards an optimisation of profitability through 
maximum productivity: farmers can choose to produce less intensively, reducing the cost of 
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 Sources:  
http://www.soilassociation.org/Farmersgrowers/Marketinformation/Pricedata/Arable/tabid/168/Default.
aspx, accessed 18/11/2010; http://www.farming.co.uk/, accessed 18/11/2010. 
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production (see for example Alistair’s farm presented at the start of the previous chapter). 
While the reduced costs of inputs for the ‘self sufficient’ farmer would offset some of the lost 
revenues, the profitability of his/her farm would be lower than for the more intensive farm:  
“Yes. Because immediately you can think of systems, how profitable would you 
expect it to be, for example, if you have a beef producer who’s on appropriate land 
you might choose to out-winter those animals. If he does that he [...] might want a 
small building to house them if they were sick or when they’re calving but he 
wouldn’t need a building to house them all during the winter. He doesn’t need to 
make and conserve forage because they would be grazing for most of the time, 
well he might make some conserved forage but a relatively small amount 
compared with a producer who chose to house his animals for a larger part of the 
winter. Now, the amount of money that those two farmers make might be the same 
but the level of profitability is going to be vastly different. Who’s to say which is 
right?” (Allen) 
As Allen indicates, there is no single answer to what the profitability of a farm could or 
should be—it depends on the social and economic conditions of the owners or the tenants of 
the farm. Returning to the examples of Alistair’s Field Farm and Fergus’s Gooseberry Estate, 
Field Farm is configured to provide additional income for Alistair without requiring much 
manpower. In contrast, the organic part of the Gooseberry Estate is in constant competition 
with the conventional part, meaning that Fergus has to manage it to achieve maximum 
profitability. A third example is Frank’s Drove Farm, which is a hobby farm which had not 
made any profits since Frank bought the farm and started converting it—Frank enjoyed the 
process of becoming a self-taught farmer and was able to put in additional investments to 
cover for losses made in the process. 
Despite these multiple enactments of profitability, all calculations reflected the mode of 
organic farming in that the cost of fertilising land was accounted for as a reduction in 
productivity: in established organic farms about a third of the total area of the farm does not 
provide any farm income as it is in a fertility building phase. Moreover, business risks are 
included differently: on the one hand, the lower cost of inputs (especially oil-based inputs) 
changes the cash flow of organic farms, which in turn reduces the risk that financial 
obligations cannot be met (Warren, 1997). On the other hand, the inherent uncertainty of 
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knowing whether preventative measures will be sufficient to manage fertility and weeds, the 
inability to modify emerging crop problems and a greater dependence on the weather 
increases the risk that yields are lower than calculated:  
“Yes, yes because it’s quite a risky weather dependent operation. [...] [which] 
plays a huge role. I mean, people forget that farming, even conventional farming is 
a high risk business and I would say organic farming is an even higher risk 
business. In fact, I would go so far as to say that one way or the other I budget for 
10% less yield or 10% higher costs, whatever way you like to put it, or 10% 
increase in crop failure in the organic side, and budget for that.” (Fergus) 
Fergus indicates that the uncertainties about his farm’s agronomic performance (yield) 
are included as a standard reduction of the forecast economic performance. This contrasts with 
the assessment of cash flow as a theoretical calculation of how increased costs and reduced 
incomes affect the liquidity of a business at any point in time. This means that not only the 
method of calculating profitability is configured differently, also the way in which certain 
business and agronomic risks are accounted for are included in a different way. Moreover, 
when organic farms consist of multiple enterprises, establishing profitability can become an 
intricate set of calculations (see for example Lampkin et al., 2008: section 5): outputs of one 
enterprise are inputs to another, and therefore these enterprises are agronomically and 
economically linked (in the next section I examine how these linkages are achieved). As such, 
the methods of calculating profitability for organic farms enact the ‘doing’ of organic by 
accounting for fertility through reduced income, and by explicitly including agronomic and 
weather-related risks.  
Integrating enterprises 
As mentioned above and in the previous chapter, when organic farms comprise multiple 
enterprises, these are usually linked agronomically. In this section I examine how enterprises 
are integrated into one farm system; one of the estates I visited provided a good example of 
how integration works in practice.  
The Hawthorn Estate is a very large estate in Norfolk, its grounds overlooked by a stately 
18th century mansion. On behalf of the owners, an old aristocratic family, farm manager 
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Fraser oversees the running of 1300 hectares of land. Conversion of some of the land 
started in 1999—a result of the owner’s personal interest—and over the years more land 
was added so that currently a bit over half the estate is managed organically. Fraser 
explained that the lighter soils were converted, as these are “readily suitable for all sorts of 
mixed cropping” and best suited to accommodate the livestock enterprises which were 
established in phases (the heavier soils with a lot of clay are still used to produce 
conventional arable crops). Once the initial plot of land reached organic status some of it 
was tenanted out to an organic pig herd, and later to an organic egg laying unit and a 
vegetable grower. Then Fraser established a longhorn cattle enterprise and two flocks of 
sheep as part of the Estate’s certificate, and at the time of my interview the existing deer 
enterprise was in conversion. Fraser explained that the aim was to establish a fully 
integrated mixed organic system on the estate. Thus, the land is partly pasture for the 
livestock, and partly arable to produce crops for feed and for income. The pigs are used 
agronomically for cleaning weeds, and their manure is used as fertiliser. The laying hens 
produce “rocket fuel fertiliser”, i.e. very concentrated manure which can help address 
substantial fertility problems. The different types of livestock, spatially rotated in sequence 
with vegetables and crops, each graze differently thereby reducing weeds—and their 
manure during grazing is additional fertiliser for the pastureland. Apart from cereals, the 
estate produces lamb, beef and venison, and the tenants produce vegetables, pork and eggs.  
As Fraser explained, this arrangement not only fits the wishes of the owners, but also 
generates different streams of income. Analogous to the planning of an arable rotation, the 
enterprises of a mixed farm are put in sequence so that nutrients are kept on the farm as much 
as possible, and so that weeds are managed through different grazing methods31. While 
standards for organic agriculture do not contain any rules about the organisation of a mixed 
farm—except for some rules about the temporal separation between certain species on the 
same field, and the general rule that manure generated on an organic holding cannot be put 
onto non-organic land32—the planning of the mixed rotation (temporal and spatial) depends 
on the agronomic properties of different species: 
“So, it’s trying to get [farmers] to work from a basic philosophy that you need to 
manage the farm in ... I hate the word ... in an holistic way; that you can’t just look 
at one particular aspect of it. You’ve got to look at all the various aspects and 
consider how they interact with one another when you’re trying to put a plan 
together. It’s fairly clear that from an organic point of view, a mixed farm set up 
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 In this sense, the setup of the Hawthorn Estate is an embodiment of an archetypal organic farm, albeit 
at a much larger scale than what would be possible on a family farm. 
32
 Organic standards prohibit the spreading of organic manure onto non-organic land so that nutrient 
loss from organic systems is prevented; surplus manure must be spread onto other organic holdings. 
These rules are based on the principle of organic farming as a closed system, see Soil Association, 
2010c: cl. 4.7. In reverse, as can be expected, non-organic manure may not be spread onto organic land. 
 103
works better than trying to work with mono-cultures, and it’s how you integrate 
the mixture.” (Allen) 
However, this might not always work as planned, leading to a revised rotation. For 
instance, the vegetable grower on the Hawthorn Estate had a pest problem with his carrots, 
and to break this up the temporal boundary between vegetables grown on the same field had to 
be increased to control the pest. This meant that the entire rotation had to be adapted, as the 
relations in the sequence had to be reorganised. But rather than changing the rotation 
completely, sometimes a reconfiguration of one enterprise may help with the management of 
another. For example, on the other estate in my sample, the Gooseberry Estate, pigs were used 
to control docks33, but they did not quite remove the docks to the extent that Fergus would 
have wanted. As he explained, he should have cultivated the soil first so that the dock roots 
would be easier for the pigs to uproot, and that he should have reduced the food rations of the 
sows so that they would be hungrier and therefore be more vigorous in uprooting the docks. 
This meant that he could only use ‘dry’ sows, as reduced food rations would affect milk 
production in lactating sows and by extension, their piglets. This example suggests that the 
agronomic properties of one enterprise are being adjusted to the specific, local mixed farm 
system. In other words, the different elements of the mixed farm (enterprises) are not made 
operational as separate entities, but they are purposefully interrelated through a process of 
mutual adaptation.  
Yet, in practice this does not mean that all of the enterprises need to be managed 
centrally. As indicated above, the Hawthorn Estate accommodates several tenants, who lease 
land for their own operation. In fact, the decision to have tenants for the vegetables, eggs and 
pork was taken because of the competence required to run those enterprises: 
“The reason being, they’re growing organic vegetables is highly specialist and not 
something we want to try to do. To do pigs similarly they’re similarly highly 
specialist, as are chicken’s eggs. We’d rather leave that to someone else’s expertise 
who has got the expertise and bring it in and then rotate round and we’ll just do the 
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 A dock is a hardy, invasive weed with a long and strong root. 
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relatively simple bits of the clover lays and the cereals that go between them.” 
(Fraser) 
As Fraser explained, day-to-day adjustments and adaptations required to manage 
problems in an individual enterprise would be done by the owner of that enterprise. However, 
he also described a willingness on the part of others to advise how something might be 
managed, and to share equipment. More formally, everyone involved in the organic 
enterprises would regularly meet to discuss the running of the organic part of the estate and to 
agree on certain practices and solutions to problems. As such, although the pig, egg and 
vegetable enterprises are formally separate entities, their agronomic properties are, through 
negotiation, fully integrated in the system of the estate.  
But this integration can even stretch beyond the boundaries of the farm: on the 
Gooseberry Estate in Suffolk, the pigs are managed by a tenant on estate land; but the pigs 
themselves are property of a company whose main business is to produce pig feed rations. Just 
prior to my interview with Fergus, he had been to speak with the feed producer about the 
possibility of including not only wheat, barley and soya but also other crops which are part of 
an organic rotation. Lorries delivering pig feed could return to the mill with cereals grown on 
the land which also accommodated the pigs. This would mean that some of the activities of 
three organisationally separate entities would be coordinated (economically as well as 
materially) through the agronomic context of the Gooseberry Estate. 
These examples suggest that the integration of different enterprises introduces additional 
considerations in the structuring of the temporal and spatial configurations of a farm, and in 
how profitability is calculated. Coordinating and managing the interrelations between 
enterprises requires careful planning, tinkering and negotiation. In return, the farming system 
is economically less dependent on single streams of income, and the control of weeds can be 
organised in different complementary ways. Finally, the integration of enterprises provides an 
important additional, flexible way of managing fertility: 
“[...] The thing about manure is that it’s portable fertility. One ... I was mentioning, 
but with conventional farmers if they’ve got a problem well they can get a bag out 
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and they can partially fix it, maybe not totally but they can do something about it. 
At least with some farmyard manure you’ve got some portable facility you can say 
‘well, that field’s not doing so well, we’ll put it on there.’” (Frank) 
The integration of different enterprises does not provide farmers with an organic 
equivalent to conventional agrochemicals; the active mobilisation of agronomic properties of 
farm-generated outputs as inputs into interrelated enterprises provides local arrangements with 
multiple ways of organising how problems in individual enterprises can be dealt with.  
Choosing varieties and breeds 
As will be clear from the previous section and the discussion of planning rotations and 
managing livestock (in the previous chapter), the agronomic properties of plants and livestock 
are important considerations in planning how individual enterprises are arranged and 
integrated. As I show in this section, similar considerations apply in selecting varieties of 
crops and breeds of livestock.  
Crop varieties 
“So, what sort of seeds do you use?” (Maarten) 
“I save my own mostly. This spring I’m changing variety of barley, I’m changing 
from Dandy which has become outclassed to Westminster. So, I will be buying C2 
organic Westminster. [...]” (Fergus) 
“What does that mean, the Dandy got outclassed?” (Maarten) 
“Its yield, comparatively, is not as good as the newer varieties so it pays me to buy 
in seed at a higher cost in anticipation of getting a yield which will more than pay 
for the extra seed cost.” (Fergus) 
As Fergus explained, the potential yield of a crop depends on the variety of plant that is 
used. Dandy and Westminster are varieties of barley that have different properties which 
affect a number of different agronomic aspects of growing them as a crop. Some varieties of 
crops are better than others at accessing nutrients, or they are more resilient, or they can 
function with a higher disease pressure or they are better at competing with weeds. Moreover, 
they produce different qualities of crop: some with more protein content, some with a higher 
specific weight or other aspects which affect the market into which a specific variety can be 
sold. For example, in the bread industry different qualities of wheat are important than in the 
 106
feed or biscuit industry. Thus, the choice of variety of crop is important not only for the 
agronomic consequences of yield, disease and soil management but also for the markets that 
can be accessed.  
Commercial seed merchants produce large catalogues in which these properties are 
indicated for each variety. However, organic farmers want different information, and varieties 
with different properties. As Alistair explains,  
“the breeding programs and the varieties available, and even the framework of 
approval and legislation is geared to conventional farming. The approval [by 
DEFRA] is based on being ... I forget what they call it ... it’s distinct, uniform and 
better yielding. So, to get on to the approved list it has to be high yielding and of a 
distinct advantage in terms of pest and disease performance whereas it might be 
completely different traits from what you want organically. So, organically what 
we basically have to put up with is all the varieties that are commercially available 
for conventional farming we have to make a best selection from that group of 
what’s available for what we want to use, which isn’t ideal.” (Alistair) 
Readily available varieties have been designed, through conventional breeding 
programmes, to produce their maximum yield in an environment which can be controlled 
through agrochemicals. In other words, the highly standardised solutions to farming provided 
by agrochemicals require equally standardised and compatible crop varieties. For example, 
most cereal varieties have been bred to have shallow root systems to access the fertilisers that 
are sprayed on the land—deeper roots would reduce the efficacy of the fertilisers. A shallow 
root system results in a plant which is less stable as it is more susceptible to being blown over 
by wind. Therefore, these varieties have been bred short (semi dwarf) so that this problem is 
mitigated. In an organic system this is undesirable, firstly as the shallow root system cannot 
access nutrients located deeper in the soil. Secondly, the short varieties are not as competitive 
as taller varieties, and therefore not as good in suppressing weeds. This means that the yield of 
the same variety in an organic system is usually lower compared to when used in a 
conventional system. 
Selecting a suitable variety for a particular agronomic setting requires that organic 
farmers need to test different varieties—for each of the crops they grow. However, as Alistair 
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explained, many farmers will only test a few cereal species, but not any of the other crops that 
they will use in their rotation. Yet, he argued that for each species of plant grown, the choice 
should reflect the geographic and agronomic conditions and the growth season for each single 
crop. As such, the absence of arable crop varieties specially bred for a variety of organic 
production settings requires a reshaping of the expected yield. Moreover, optimising 
production at a specific site requires a testing regime through which available varieties are 
grown in situ so that what is grown can be adjusted to the local agronomic and economic 
conditions of a farm. Thus, the rotation is made even more specific through the choice of 
variety. However, as Fergus’s comment shows, this is not a fixed entity: sometimes a variety 
becomes outclassed by another, around which the farming system is reshaped. 
Livestock breeds 
In livestock production the tension between breeds used in intensive conventional 
farming systems and the conditions of organic farming systems is resolved differently: 
conventional livestock industries generally rely on breeds which are efficient in converting 
feed into meat, milk or eggs of consistent quality. Especially for dairy and beef cattle this has 
resulted in breeds which are at odds with the requirements in standards for organic 
agriculture34. To achieve their maximum productivity conventional breeds require high levels 
of concentrated feed, such as cereals and other sources of protein. Concentrated feed also 
helps farmers supplying the meat industry with ‘finished’ animals that meet the standard 
specifications for slaughter conditions (weight, fat content and carcass shape) in a predictable 
time frame, independent of age (most calves are born in spring, but are finished throughout 
                                                     
34
 I only focus on cattle here. There is a notable issue in the poultry industry: poultry produced for meat 
(table birds) has been bred in intensive conventional systems to produce fast-growing birds with large 
breasts and small legs. This means that these birds have difficulty moving and often health problems 
related to their sedentary life (e.g. hock burns; for more details refer to e.g. Lawrence, 2004), which 
have to be avoided according to organic standards. As such, the organic poultry industry uses different 
breeds, mostly of slow-growing strains. Although there are some market implications, the substitution 
of breeds does not affect the configuration of the poultry industry. 
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the year from 14-20 months (animals35 coming from a dairy herd) or from 18-30 months 
(animals coming from a beef herd). As standards for organic agriculture set limits to the 
amount of concentrated feed can be used (maximum 40%, at least 60% must come from 
forage, i.e. grass, hay, straw, etc.; Soil Association, 2010c: cl. 10.13.11), this means that the 
nutritional needs of the breeds used in conventional systems are difficult to meet. For 
example, to meet the feed needs of the Holstein breed commonly used in the conventional 
dairy sector would require “very consistent high quality forage every year but this is largely 
dependent on the weather so cannot be guaranteed” (Allen). Allen therefore argued that if the 
quality of forage cannot be guaranteed in a specific organic system, the Holstein would not be 
a suitable choice of breed for that system: 
I mean, the Holstein does have certain characteristics which are actually difficult to 
manage in organic systems.” (Allen) 
“Such as?” (Maarten) 
“Well, the difficulty with Holstein, particularly pure bred Holstein is that it will 
tend to milk to its genetic potential regardless of how you feed it.” (Allen) 
“So if you don’t feed it properly you will deplete the animal.” (Maarten) 
“Yes, deplete the animal’s reserves very quickly.” (Allen) 
As Allen explains, Holstein cattle has been bred specifically to yield extraordinary 
amounts of milk under conditions which can be maintained in conventional dairy systems by 
feeding almost solely highly concentrated feed. As Holstein cows do not respond to different 
feed patterns by reducing yields, they would become exhausted. In contrast, other breeds, such 
as the British Friesian or the Ayrshire, are capable of producing “quite high levels of milk” 
(Allen) under the conditions set by standards for organic agriculture. 
Also in the beef industry the nutritional requirements of conventionally used breeds are 
an issue as they are ‘double muscled’, a genetic condition which leads to additional muscle 
growth. To accommodate this growth, these animals require a high protein diet, and cannot be 
                                                     
35
 At a year old, a calf becomes a heifer (young female cow) or a bull or a steer (castrated bull). In dairy 
herds, heifers are usually kept to expand the herd or to replace old cows, steers are sold into the beef 
industry. However, dairy steers provide a lesser quality of beef compared to animals from a beef herd. 
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finished on grass or forage. This means that for organic beef enterprises, these breeds are not 
suitable as they would not produce the desired quality of meat. The main factor influencing 
the price a farmer receives for a slaughter animal is its condition at slaughter (see above), 
regardless of whether the animal is organic. This means that organic farmers tend to choose 
breeds for beef production which are adapted to the conditions of British farms, namely 
traditional36 British breeds such as the Hereford or the Aberdeen Angus. 
However, organic farmers have another option: they can choose a so-called dual purpose 
breed, such as the Red Poll or Lincoln Red, which produces good quality beef as well as 
relatively large quantities of milk. A British Friesian dairy herd would produce less milk 
compared to a herd of pure-bred Holstein cattle, but it would not substantially improve the 
potential quality of finished steers. In contrast, dual purpose breeds provide an alternative way 
of organising farming practice: 
“Yes, you’re never going to be the highest milk producer and you’re never going 
to win the Smithfield Beef Prize, but you can make a pretty good fist of both if you 
go about it the right way.” (Allen) 
This suggests a reconfiguration of farming practice where a dairy and a beef enterprise 
are merged, and integrated in a grass-finishing system. This arrangement is not a direct result 
of a rule in organic standards (no breed is prohibited), but it follows as a sensible consequence 
of adhering to these rules. In contrast to the arable crop varieties available for farming, 
organic livestock enterprises adopt breeds that suit the ways in which organic farms are 
organised. 
These examples of crops and livestock selection show that ‘doing’ organic requires 
prioritising certain qualities particular to organic farming: as local settings cannot be managed 
to suit the requirements of certain breeds (as is usual in conventional farming), varieties and 
                                                     
36
 Traditional is relative: for instance, the oldest of traditional breeds, the Hereford, originated in the 
middle of the 17th century, but breeding pedigree lines only started in the early 19th century. Its herd 
book (record of pedigree lines) was closed in 1886, meaning that any animal born after that point was/is 
offspring of the animals already recorded in the book.  
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breeds are chosen to suit the specific, but changing, economic and agronomic conditions and 
requirements of a specific site. 
5.3  Maintaining paperwork 
‘Doing’ organic means finding spatial and temporal configurations through which the 
rules in organic standards can be locally enacted (see previous chapter), calculating 
profitability in a certain way, often integrating enterprises into an interrelated farming system, 
and choosing particular crop varieties and livestock breeds. ‘Doing’ organic also requires the 
maintenance of documentation to enable the independent verification of compliance by a 
certification body such as the Soil Association. Trajectories of products and inputs—organic 
‘stuff’—and the organic status of these inputs, must be made visible by recording what was 
done where and when. For instance, organic livestock cannot be kept on non-organic land, but 
when livestock is on the move this needs to be made explicit in a tangible form so that an 
inspector can verify that this was the case, i.e. by a piece of paper which describes the 
movement of the livestock and refers to the fields on which the animals were kept.  
In other words, ‘stuff’ is only organic when it was and is kept in the right place (e.g. on 
organic land or in separate storage areas dedicated to organic substances). This means tracing 
the movements of stuff around the farm and between farms, and demonstrating that inputs are 
verifiably organic. If no organic inputs are available, a derogation must be requested and 
approved before a non-organic input can be used. This requires an adaptation of existing ways 
of doing things. For instance, ordering a type of seed is not just placing an order with a seed 
company: 
“[...] if you ring up [and] a seed supplier says this seed is only available in non-
organic seed [...] you can’t say there and then ‘ok, I’ll buy it.’ I then have to put the 
phone down to him and then you have to go on to organicxseeds which is pretty 
useless because it’s never kept up to date [...] as a result you see that the last entry 
is quite a long time ago so you think ‘right, well I’d better ring up my certification 
officer to talk to him about it.’ He says ‘have you tried ringing so and so, they 
might have some.’ So you ring them and they say ‘well we haven’t but we’ve got 
this genre, [...] but we’ve only got this tonnage.’ So then you go back to your 
original supplier and say ‘well they can supply this and you say you can supply it 
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and there’s nothing on organicxseeds’ it’s not a straightforward ... it’s not picking 
up the phone and saying ‘please send me two tons of such and such’. And then you 
have to get the derogation sorted out officially before you buy it [...]” (Fergus) 
As Fergus explains, to comply with certain rules in standards for organic agriculture, 
simple administrative activities expand to ensure that there is documentation to prove the 
organicness of stuff or the permission to use non-organic stuff—which is dependent on the 
outcomes of a search for organic stuff. This means that farming practices are extended, 
through these administrative practices, to include formalising the organicness of stuff. Put 
differently, the enactment of organic standards requires the inclusion of specific 
administrative activities designed to record how activities were carried out and what materials 
and tools were used. What form these records take varies; the organicness of inputs is 
established through the documents that follow from the ordering process, namely the purchase 
order, delivery note and organic certificate of the supplier, and if required, an approved 
derogation request.  
However, merely recording what happened on a farm is not sufficient. For a number of 
key elements, organic standards require that farmers draw up plans which describe how these 
elements are configured to prevent systemic problems from occurring. In particular, farmers 
should produce a conversion plan in which they describe how the changes in farm 
arrangements will be managed (certification bodies could request a financial plan for the 
conversion process if there are concerns that the conversion will be difficult to implement), 
how livestock is managed, the format of the rotation, and, if the farm will remain partly 
conventional, and how the organic part (enterprises, practices, tools) will be separated from 
the conventional part. There is no prescribed template for these plans, but their presence is 
required and their content should describe how a number of key aspects is organised. For 
instance, the Livestock Management Plan (LMP) should address how a farmer will meet 
organic standards in the following areas: sourcing and converting; health and welfare; feeding 
and grazing (including stocking density and rotation); housing; handling and transporting, 
and; slaughter (Soil Association, 2010c: cl. 10.3.1). The health plan in the LMP should 
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describe how a farmer “will build health and reduce disease” with the aim of minimising the 
use of veterinary medicines (2010c: cl. 10.3.3) and therefore must include “how you will 
manage the health of your animals, both during and after conversion; how you will monitor 
and diagnose disease; the disease control measures you will apply, and how you will reduce 
any health problems your animals already have” (2010c: cl. 10.3.3). These required aspects 
clearly point to the preventative character of organic farming practices.  
As such, merely reconfiguring elements and enterprises to an organic mode of farming 
which suits the particular material, social and economic setting of a farm is not enough: 
‘doing’ organic includes documenting the arrangement of elements to make external 
verification of the specific organic system of the farm possible. Thus, enacting organic 
standards through practice is, on the one hand, the assembly of permitted elements and the 
tinkering with those elements into an arrangement through which organic can be done on a 
farm—the mobilisation of particular sets of rules in a local setting—and, on the other hand, a 
translation of some aspects of the resulting farming system into standardised formats to make 
verification possible and to make stuff traceable. Indeed, maintaining paperwork is as 
constitutive of ‘doing’ organic as are the farming practices through which standards for 
organic agriculture ‘come alive’ in local settings37. 
5.4  Conclusion 
In this chapter I have discussed a number of practices which are required to ‘do’ organic, 
beyond arranging and managing the farm in ways that comply with organic standards. I first 
discussed methods of calculating profitability and argued that these shape the ‘doing’ of 
organic. I then showed how the integration of enterprises provides farmers with multiple ways 
of managing a total organic system. Subsequently, I suggested that ‘doing’ organic requires 
selecting varieties and breeds which are particular to organic farming. Finally, I examined the 
                                                     
37
 For some of my respondents, this is controversial: they were long-standing organic practitioners, and 
they indicated that the relatively recent emphasis on the bureaucratic aspect of ‘doing’ organic detracted 
from attention to the farming systems and practices. 
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administrative practices which are required to make external verification of the specific 
organic system of a farm possible, and argued that this results in an extension of farming 
practice.  
This suggests that ‘doing’ organic reconfigures the doing of farming on a number of 
counts including methods of calculation, integration, selection and administration. Put 
differently, these practices, in combination, constitute the enactment of a specific mode of 
farming. As the examples show, there is no standard outcome or template: doing organic is 
internally differentiated depending on the local settings of farms and how they are managed. 
In other words, ‘ordinary’ artefacts become ‘organic’ artefacts through several kinds of 
reconfiguration. Merely not using pesticides or letting livestock range in conditions permitted 
by organic standards is not enough to ‘do’ organic and therefore to produce organic stuff: 
doing organic requires that the interrelationship between a number of elements is made 
explicit, and that stuff is traced. However, the organicness of stuff still needs to be formalised; 
in the next chapter I examine how this is done by the certification bodies involved. 
 
 114
Chapter 6 Certifying licensees 
6.1  Introduction 
Every Tuesday morning at 10 am, a number of senior employees of Soil Association 
Certification Limited (SACL) convene in one of the meeting rooms in their offices in Bristol 
to form the Certification Committee. During the subsequent couple of hours the committee 
deals with issues and problems that have arisen during the certification process of individual 
licensees. Each separate case is at or beyond the boundaries of organic standards: some are 
about requests by licensees to temporarily allow products or practices that are ordinarily not 
permitted by organic standards. Others are about inspection findings where licensees 
overstepped the boundaries of organic standards in such a way that the organic status of their 
products may be compromised. Again others are about how SACL employees should interpret 
certain standards to assess the compliance of practices, or about practices for which there are 
no explicit standards. Finally, some are about appeals raised by licensees about earlier 
committee decisions. For each of these cases, the committee decides, in very practical terms, 
how these issues are to be resolved. These decisions have direct consequences for licensees as 
they include disciplinary sanctions for serious non-compliances (such as the suspension or 
termination of an enterprise or even an entire licence), and for licensees and SACL officers as 
they provide binding guidance for how specific standards should be interpreted. As such, each 
case presents a defining moment, not only for the way in which the licensee in question ‘does’ 
organic, but also for the certification organisation and indeed organic standards themselves38. 
Consequently, the weekly meeting of the committee is central to the certification process as it 
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 All cases are recorded in a database that can be searched by SACL employees to inform how other 
licensees’ cases may be dealt with; sometimes the way in which the committee decides to resolve an 
issue can result in the formalisation of a precedent which explicitly informs employees how subsequent 
cases should be resolved. And when a specific issue has come up several times indicating that the 
standards are difficult or impossible to implement, the committee suggests a change to the standard 
setter. I will describe these processes in more detail in section 6.4. 
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provides the space in which boundaries of organic standards are contested in relation to 
practice.  
But only a fraction of certification decisions end up as an agenda item for the committee. 
Mostly, the employees of SACL assess compliance of licensees’ practices without referring 
their assessments to the committee: the boundaries involved are not contested and therefore 
require no authoritative guidance from the expert panel. This does not mean that uncontested 
boundaries remain invisible. Indeed, assessing compliance can only be done by referring to 
the rules codified by standards. As such, the everyday activities of the officers are aimed at 
delineating and making explicit the practical meaning of organic standards in relation to how 
licensees practise organic—for each single relevant activity or set of activities.  
This implies that the officers of SACL enact a version of organic standards and the 
certification thereof. In this chapter I explore this way of enacting organic standards by 
concentrating on the following questions: What are the characteristics of this enactment? How 
do the everyday activities of SACL officers shape different aspects of the certification 
process? What are the processes through which the knowledge required to certify licensees is 
constituted? How do organisational efforts to manage these processes affect the way in which 
‘organic’ is enacted by SACL and hence by its licensees? 
To answer these questions, the chapter is structured as follows: in the next section I 
describe the procedures through which licensees are certified, and identify three distinct 
groups of officers involved in the certification process. I argue that the activities of 
certification officers, inspectors and technical managers constitute a continuous process of 
interpreting standards and practice in the context of each other. I suggest that inspectors and 
certification officers are not mere external observers trying to reveal how a licensee enacts 
certain standards, but that they are active participants in shaping this object and in defining 
how a particular form of ‘organic’ farming is enacted by a licensee. In section 6.3 I argue that 
the licensee-specific knowledge object underpinning this process can be characterised as 
having partial epistemic properties (drawing on Knorr Cetina, 2001) which need to be 
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managed through a standardised process to avoid paralysis or arbitrariness in the certification 
of licensees. I argue that the systemic absence of potentially relevant knowledge in the 
certification process makes the work of SACL officers paradoxical in that they are caught 
between the necessity of being thorough and the impossibility of doing so: they need to assess 
how licensees enact a particular version of organic standards, but many elements of organic 
farming practice remain invisible for the SACL officers throughout the certification process. I 
suggest that this results in an inherent uncertainty in the process which cannot be resolved but 
which also cannot lead to paralysis (inability to take decisions) or to arbitrary decision making 
when dealing with licensees. In section 6.4 I explore how the procedures of SACL officers are 
standardised so that inability to take decisions is avoided and how this reduces the potential 
for arbitrariness in the process. I illustrate how enactment of SACL procedures reproduces a 
particular form of certification process which is standardised and auditable by external parties. 
In the final section I conclude that standards for organic agriculture are not only written by the 
standard setter, but that they are continually rewritten—re-produced—in the certification 
process. As such, they are alive: with each new interpretation and with each new instantiation 
they subtly change and reconfigure how a particular form of farming is and can be enacted. 
6.2  Procedures for certifying licensees 
The task of verifying whether a licensee conforms to organic standards is carried out by 
two actors who have distinctly different activities: an inspector who visits the licensee to 
assess and reports on the operations of the licensee, and a certification officer who reviews the 
inspection report and supporting paperwork before issuing a certificate of conformity and who 
also maintains a relationship with the licensee throughout the year. In fact, the person carrying 
out the inspection is by law not allowed to decide whether the inspected licensee is 
(re)certified to avoid conflicts of interest or the possibility of coercion towards certification 
(CEN, 1998: cl. 4.2.f). Thus, inspectors and certification officers constitute two markedly 
different groups: inspectors are trained and qualified as auditors and spend most of their time 
inspecting licensees, certification officers are office based and trained by the certification 
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body without the need to for formal professional qualifications. According to the European 
legislation, organic licensees should be inspected at a minimum once every calendar year. As 
familiarity with the circumstances of individual licensees might colour the reporting of an 
inspector, the Soil Association allows inspectors to inspect the same licensee only three times 
in a row, after which another inspector will take over the inspections. In contrast, certification 
officers (at least at the Soil Association) are encouraged to build up relations with their 
licensees, and act as account holders for an average of 250 licensees per officer.  
This section describes the routine activities through which licensees are certified, starting 
with an outline of the annual inspection cycle, followed by a description of how an inspection 
of an organic licensee is organised. After this, I describe the procedures that characterise the 
work of certification officers, elaborating on how interpreting standards and practices form a 
core aspect of the daily work of certification officers and inspectors. I finish the section with a 
description of how the relation between them is shaped. 
The annual certification cycle 
The annual cycle (see Figure 6.1) starts with the task of inspecting a licensee which is 
allocated to an inspector. The inspector sends a letter or email to the licensee confirming to 
him or her when the inspection will take place. Attached to this letter is a document called the 
Annual Questionnaire (AQ) which the licensee has to complete with up-to-date figures about 
certain aspects of the operations that will be assessed (e.g. enterprises, livestock numbers, 
etc.). During the inspection the inspector generates a report which is printed so that the farmer 
can sign, indicating his or her agreement with what the inspector found. Once the licensee has 
read and signed the report, the inspector generates and prints an Action Summary Form (ASF) 
which contains a list of non-compliances found during the inspection as well as comments and 
any requests for further information. The licensee has to respond to each item on this list by 
stating the actions that will be undertaken to resolve the non-compliance or to supplement 
information. The ASF needs to be returned to the certification officer within thirty days from 
the inspection. On receipt of the ASF, the account-holding certification officer assesses the 
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information in the report, the ASF and other relevant documents (and may request further 
actions and/or information) to decide whether the licensee has fulfilled all requirements and 
can therefore be (re)certified for another year. If there are no further questions about how the 
operation meets standards for organic agriculture, the report is signed off and the licensee is 
sent a letter confirming ongoing certification and an updated trading schedule if required. This 
latter document lists the enterprises that are certified, and states the specific crops, livestock 




This completes the annual cycle, but during the remainder of the year the licensee will 
send the certification officer certain bits of information, request permissions and seek 
approval for inputs and treatments, and raise queries about what might be permitted within 
organic standards (this will be described in more detail below). Furthermore, the certification 
body may decide to do a spot inspection, which is a smaller inspection focussed on a specific 
aspect of an operation. Spot inspections fall into three categories: the first includes follow-up 
inspections intended to monitor an aspect which was deemed unsatisfactory at a previous 
inspection. Second, there are unannounced inspections which may be connected to a previous 










Figure 6.1: Annual certification cycle 
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elements of practice that can be easily remedied. Third, SACL has its own annual planned 
programme of spot inspections for issues which could potentially be systemic. As Inspector 
Irene explained, the theme in a given year may be determined by a drive to benchmark how a 
specific aspect of an enterprise is performed. In other years the agenda will be set by a 
problem found at one licensee, after which other licensees will be sampled to investigate the 
extent to which the problem is endemic to that part of the industry. 
As will be clear, the annual certification cycle is started by an inspection. In the next 
section I explore what is involved in doing an inspection. But before doing so, I briefly 
describe the terminology and the system of the different non-compliances so that subsequent 
references to ‘minors’, ‘majors’ and ‘criticals’ can be placed in context. If an inspector finds a 
practice which does not accord with what is permitted in organic standards, there are three 
levels of non-compliance that can be issued. The lowest level is a minor non-compliance, 
which is usually given for issues that do not directly compromise the organic integrity of a 
product, e.g. errors in record keeping. Major non-compliances are given for practices which 
may end up affecting the integrity of a product if they are not corrected. Critical non-
compliances are given for practices in which the integrity of a product may have been 
affected: 
“Sometimes if it’s like a straight forward record keeping error like with these two 
examples it would start off as a minor, go to major and then go to critical and be 
suspended probably. If it’s something that’s more of an integrity issue like say it 
was a welfare issue, there was no bedding, the inspector went there and the cattle 
were all caked in ... that would be at least a major or a critical. If it’s a critical then 
it goes to certification committee and they decide whether it’s good enough to 
suspend their licence. So, use of prohibitive input for example, say an inspector 
turned up there and they’d used [the prohibited chemical herbicide] Roundup on 
all their fields. That would immediately be a critical non-compliance, there would 
be a loss of [organic] status on the land and then it again goes to certification 
committee. So you’re looking for a corrective action and your sanction is that the 
land has to restart its conversion.” (Certification officer Christopher) 
If an issue for which a non-compliance was given during the previous inspection is found 
non-compliant during the following inspection, the severity is increased—‘ratcheted up’—a 
level. So this is what Christopher refers to at the start of the quote: a minor non-compliance 
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will become a major during the following inspection, and a critical at the third annual 
inspection39. There is one more level, the manifest infringement, which would be issued if 
there is a major breach of the integrity of the entire organic system within the operations of 
the licensee: this would lead to immediate termination of the licence. As certification officer 
Colin explained, if for instance a product is kept to standards but if there is no paperwork to 
back this status up this would be a critical non-compliance. If however a licensee would 
commit fraud, such as selling conventional produce as organic (as was the case in 2009 by 
processor One Foods Limited), this would constitute a manifest infringement. 
The inspection process 
As Irene explained, inspectors prepare for an inspection by looking at what was found 
during the previous inspection, noting past non-compliances and critical areas to consider. By 
going through the communication history between the licensee and the certification officer, 
they note what treatments were approved as well as the inputs that were permitted. Moreover, 
they have access to technical bulletins that describe in detail how certain standards are to be 
interpreted, and to briefing sheets on the specifics of enterprises and production processes in 
case they need to brush up on their knowledge of where there potentially critical issues lie for 
any given agricultural or food manufacturing process.  
The inspection itself usually consists of a visual check of the licensee’s operations to 
assess the way in which organic standards are put into practice by the licensee, and to spot 
irregularities or non-compliances: 
“[...] while they’re out on the farm they will walk in, if the licensee is going [this] 
way and there is a shed that way then they’ll be going that way to look at the shed. 
So, they’re looking in all storage areas and looking at all the housing and they look 
at all the stock. It doesn’t matter, all the stock. The only occasion when they might 
look at a portion of stock is when they’re on common grazing and they’re over 500 
hectares up on a hill in which case they do need to go and look at some of them but 
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 A note about language use: certification officers and inspectors would usually talk about ‘minors’, 
‘majors’ and ‘criticals’, and not explicitly add ‘non-compliance’. 
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they’re never going to see them all, but just to get a feel, but generally speaking we 
don’t require that they look at every field.” (Irene) 
Instead, fields are sampled, as inspectors are required to look at a minimum of one third 
of all crop types and a third of pastureland. The farm walk is followed by several checks on 
documentation and records kept by the licensee to ensure that no prohibited inputs were used, 
that activities were compliant with the standard, that the inputs (such as seed and animal feed) 
correspond with the production record (outputs) and current stock levels of the licensee, and 
that the trajectory of individual ingredients, crops and livestock can be traced. As such, 
inspectors check records for consistency between the administrative and material organisation 
(e.g. which enterprises are present on a farm and in the records), look at general invoices for 
the purchase of prohibited substances, and a mass balance. This is a calculation to assess 
whether sold quantities of produce or livestock equate with the production record and the 
purchase of inputs (e.g. seed), and the stock that a farmer still has left. 
As various respondents explained, the paperwork is sampled: an inspector picks one or 
two ingredients or crops more or less at random and performs a traceability audit on them. 
This means establishing the mass balance, but also verifying that the required inputs were 
organic, when they entered the licensee’s system, where they were stored, and after 
production where the crops or products were stored and how they were sold. The assumption 
is that, if there is evidence that the licensee has a system through which trajectories of crops 
and products are recorded, a check on one or two items is representative of this system. I will 
discuss some of the implications of this assumption is detail in section 6.3. 
Inspectors take a laptop and a small printer to an inspection, and compose the inspection 
report on their laptops while doing the inspection. All relevant information for a licensee is 
downloaded from a central database before the inspection, and during the inspection an 
inspector can generate the report by confirming which enterprises are part of the inspection. 
The reports are descriptive as the software creates a separate line for each relevant standard or 
group of standards. Each line is split into three fields, the first of which contains a brief hint of 
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what the standard is about. The second field states the observed level of compliance with the 
standard (to standards; minor, major or critical non-compliance, manifest infringement), and 
the third field contains a description of what was seen and any issues that may have arisen (for 
an example see Figure 6.2). A new report can be populated with the entries of the previous 
inspection, so that the most of the information is already available. Despite this, various 
respondents commented that it is time consuming to compose the report. As certification 
officer Colin, who is a qualified inspector himself, explained there are a number of repetitions 
in the reports. He suggested that experienced inspectors know where they are and therefore 
spend less time early on in the report as they know they will have to enter the same 
information somewhere else, but novice inspectors are usually very slow in their inspections 
as they enter the same information in multiple places.  
 
Figure 6.2: Entry in inspection report of a minor non-compliance found at inspection. 
For each entry the inspector can choose from a set of relevant standard sentences to 
describe what was found but where specifics still need to be added. Certification officer 
Christopher described this as “a bit old fashioned” compared to reports that would consist of 
questions and tick boxes. However, he said that the certification officers preferred the 
descriptive approach as this “[...] gives us a much, much better understanding of what’s going 
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on as well. So, it allows the inspector to put things in which might otherwise not be put in. 
Then from our point of view reading the report we wouldn’t know”. 
But Christopher also explained that it relies on the inspector to “write things in a way, in 
a format that can’t be misconstrued or confused”. He further mentioned that inspectors might 
introduce points that might not be relevant or necessary. This has become more prominent 
since inspectors issue their reports and the Action Summary Form on the day: until the start of 
2009 inspectors would write a compliance report which would be sent to the certification 
officer along with all relevant documentation. Certification officer Claire explained that this 
meant sifting through all the information to verify the inspection findings and where necessary 
edit the report before it would be made available to the licensee. The new scheme reduces 
work for the certification officers and the time between the inspection and the completion of 
follow-up actions, but as Christopher commented there is “a potential for messiness” if 
inspectors do not “get things right”. But he quickly added that this happens rarely. Various 
respondents commented that the new scheme benefits licensees as they have a more direct 
relation with the inspection, the report and the required actions: the report and the request for 
remedial actions are no longer detached from the inspection itself. 
As such, the activities of an inspector visiting a licensee involve inspecting key areas by 
walking around, tracing of paper trails of products and processes, composing a descriptive 
report from standard sentences and licensee-specific information, and informing the licensee 
of what was found. Irene estimated that the time on a farm is split in half between looking 
around and doing paperwork, while an inspection of a processing plant involves more 
paperwork: 
“So, that’s now the time on the farm is probably spent 50/50. We would like to 
improve that. We would like to be more like 65/35. So 65 out looking around 35 
actually looking at records. Processors are probably even slightly more unbalanced 
but there isn’t so much to look at the processors. So there are more records to look 
at the processor and less production area.” (Irene) 
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Once the report has been uploaded in the database and any other relevant documents sent 
to the office, the inspection is in principle over. All findings have been made available to the 
second actor in the certification cycle: the certification officer. 
Daily procedures of certification officers 
Once the report has been uploaded, the responsible certification officer is notified. 
Usually though, certification officers wait with their review of the report (and therefore the 
licensee) until the Action Summary Form and Annual Questionnaire have been returned to the 
office by the licensee. On receipt, all documents are scanned in and made available as pdf 
documents, and as such certification officers access and review all relevant information 
electronically. Once all information is available, a certification officer will ‘do’40 a report. 
This involves reviewing the report, checking progress on actions that the inspector has agreed 
with the farmer during the inspection, assessing how non-compliances have been dealt with 
(corrective actions), taking action where an inspector has missed something or where an 
inspection report is unclear, and grading each inspection report to feed back on inspector 
performance. 
In doing this, they use last year’s reports in parallel to compare how the producer has 
changed enterprises on the farm and how he or she has dealt with problems found during a 
previous inspection. This points to areas where the officer has to pay particular attention. 
Certification officers therefore switch between the two inspection reports as well as any 
relevant communication between officers and farmers and/or inspectors that might help with 
points that need to be assessed. This is supplemented with information from the Annual 
Questionnaire, the responses of the licensee on the Action Summary Form, and the mandatory 
plans that the licensee submitted to indicate how specific aspects of an enterprise are 
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 This is the terminology of the certification officers themselves. 
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managed41. Depending on the specifics of a licensee, further information comes from the 
requests for permissions, approvals and/or derogations made by the licensee, grazing records, 
seed records, field maps, ingredient lists, and other documents that record part of an item’s 
trajectory through the system of the licensee.  
In some cases, the review of the inspection report and the related documents provides 
sufficient information for (re)certification. However, in most cases certification officers 
decide to follow up on something—from requesting some additional information or 
management plan from a farmer to chasing up actions from the ASF, and from contacting an 
inspector about an aspect of the inspection to preparing a case for the committee that deals 
with problematic and ambiguous certification issues. If an officer is not entirely sure of how a 
particular standard should be interpreted, and therefore how an inspection finding should be 
assessed, he or she relies on colleagues for expertise and experience in particular areas such as 
dairy or pig enterprises, knowledge of rearing practices and vet treatments, and specific 
information or about a general requirement that follows from the standard but that is not part 
of the standard itself (such as the legal requirements and technical procedure for salmonella 
testing for a farm of a given size). Also, officers use a select set of trusted websites and 
handbooks to find specific technical information about certain issues such as details of 
diseases and their treatments, and current market information. Most SACL employees 
contribute to and work with three electronic repositories of knowledge: electronic copies of 
the Soil Association standards and EU regulations, interpretation notes that are signed off by 
the Soil Association charity standards department and lists of other interpretations, and the 
database of Certification Committee meetings in which a large number (if not all) cases have 
been recorded with their history, deliberations and the decision reached. 
                                                     
41
 For example, each livestock farmer will submit a Livestock Management Plan which contains an 
overview of how the animals are cared for and where they are housed, the feed that they will get, the 
veterinary treatments that will be used, and the practices through which diseases are prevented from 
spreading. Other plans will deal with how the rotation of arable crops is managed, how a licensee plans 
to carry out a conversion of an enterprise to organic, or how a separation will be maintained between 
organic and conventional crops or livestock if a licensee has both. See also Chapter 5 for more details. 
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This means that ‘doing a report’ usually takes a few hours—reading the report, finding 
relevant information, contacting licensees and inspectors, and sometimes finding out what an 
interpretation should be. Once an officer signs off a report, it is sent to a colleague whose role 
it is to check that all actions have been completed, and who then issues the certificate and 
trading schedule. The certification officer then has to manually enter the latest inspection 
report into the database so as to make it available for the next inspection. 
This formally concludes the certification process, but maintaining contact with licensees 
involves other routine work such as answering the farmers, and inspectors calling for 
information or to ask approval for something. This occurs regularly, and all correspondence 
with licensees is logged electronically and so after calls officers immediately write a note of 
what was discussed. These notes are attached to the licensee’s records in the database, making 
the information available for other certification officers and inspectors. 
When serious problems arise from an inspection, such as critical non-compliances and 
major non-compliances missed during an inspection but found during the review of the report, 
these are put to the certification committee (as described in the introduction to this chapter). 
Certification officers submit an agenda item by outlining the problem, stating the standards it 
relates to, adding similar cases from the committee’s database, posing the questions that this 
raises, and where possible stating what the officer would advise the committee to decide. Only 
the Certification Committee has the authority to suspend and terminate licences, and in 
general can take decisions that individual officers cannot or might not want to take on their 
own. The committee also decides what the interpretation of a standard should be if there are 
ambiguities in a standard. As such, officers also use the committee for (binding) guidance of 
how to assess certain practices. Finally, the committee deals with appeals to certification 
decisions, thus providing a formal way of escalating an issue for both SACL employees and 
licensees. Whereas this is a highly formalised way of establishing interpretations, the 
everyday activities of inspectors and certification officers contain continuous processes of 
interpretation. 
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Interpretation and the ‘human element’ in the certification process 
As is clear from the above, licensees are certified based on an inspection and subsequent 
administrative activities. But while this process relies on standard procedures, several officers 
and inspectors pointed out that each individual licensee represents a unique case. Certification 
officer Christopher is explicit about how this shapes the everyday activities of certification 
officers: 
“Yes, there has to be a pretty good human element in the certification process 
because each farm is different. There are so many different scenarios, and when I 
first started here I almost thought that book, those standards were just way too big, 
you don’t have to be here very long to realise actually it’s not anywhere near big 
enough. There’s a lot of judgments you take as a certification officer to balance the 
licensee’s needs against the needs of the standards. So it’s quite an important role 
in that respect, there’s quite a lot of responsibility there. Going through things like 
management plans, what you will allow, what you don’t allow; how can you move 
forward to get to a situation maybe where if something is not quite right how do 
you make some progress to make sure it does fit into the standards. That’s what 
makes this job really interesting, actually.” (Christopher) 
“Solving the problems.” (Maarten) 
“Yes, and everyone is different. It’s very rare you get two things the same. Which 
is why those standards will never cater for everything because it’s just not 
possible.” (Christopher) 
In suggesting that there is a space between the codified standards and farming practice, 
and that certification officers operate in this space, Christopher indicates that the procedures 
of certifying licensees require two types of interpretation: firstly interpreting actual farming 
practices in the context of organic standards, i.e. assessing the extent to which practices are 
allowed according to the codified standards. Secondly, as he points out, interpreting organic 
standards in the context of possible practice, i.e. assessing the extent to which the rules 
codified by organic standards can be practically enacted by an individual licensee. Both types 
of interpretation need to be resolved on a daily basis, and apart from the formal and informal 
ways of finding information that can help do this (as described below), SACL employs a 
number of Technical Managers, whose main role is to support the certification officers and 
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inspectors by coordinating how individual standards should be interpreted and how actual 
farming practices may affect these interpretations42.  
But certification officers have to carry out another type of interpretation when assessing 
inspection reports. The choice for a descriptive approach to reporting means that, despite the 
availability of many standard entries, inspectors have to add remarks and data which are 
specific to a licensee. Since inspectors have their own styles in doing this, their reports vary 
widely in the amount of information that is made available to the certification officers: 
“[...] So, as you can see this inspector’s ... there’s far more detail than the other 
inspector.” (Colin)  
“So that is again where you come down to the issue of interpretation. How do you 
work with that, where you’ve got those two different more or less style of 
reportings and how do you manage to try and balance what you see?” (Maarten) 
“I suppose it comes down to knowing the inspector in some ways [...] and knowing 
how they pick up issues, and that comes over time, I guess. And learning their 
style, I would say. Because [Imogen], here, on this side is very factual, there’s very 
little amounts of information but it’s quite relevant in what she’s saying. [Jason] 
might put in some more information but ...” (Colin) 
“It might not always be as relevant to your job.” (Maarten) 
“Yeah, it could be it’s more of a descriptive second scene almost, I suppose [...]” 
(Colin) 
Moreover, Colin and inspector John both explained how inspectors might not always 
want or be able to report on issues that they find, because of the potentially problematic 
interaction with a licensee who might react aggressively to an inspection finding, or because 
the inspector might decide to use discretion in certain cases (see below), or because an 
inspector might miss a non-compliance. However, in either case the relevant entries in the 
report will contain traces of the issue and Colin explained how certification officers need to 
‘read between the lines’, i.e. interpret the entries in a report based on the knowledge they have 
about the individual styles of inspectors. Sometimes an inspector will provide subtle 
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 Usually, Technical Managers have had a long career as certification officers/managers and are 
qualified inspectors. In their coordinative capacity they are the formal connection between SACL and 
the standards department of SACh, as well as between SACL and the other certification bodies (through 
the Technical Working Group of these bodies, CBTWG). Their role will be clarified in 6.4. 
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indicators (in for instance an opening statement for a section, where inspectors set out 
particular issues which they find important to note) which may convey a feeling that the 
inspector did not explicitly address a specific topic during an inspection, framed such that the 
certification officer could derive that there might be a problem that needs looking into. 
 Interpretive processes also play a role in carrying out inspections, although on site 
judgements are of a different order. John, who had a long career in organic farming and 
inspecting, indicated that inspectors exercise varying degrees of ‘inspector discretion’ when 
inspecting. He suggested that this difference had implications for the roles of inspectors and 
certification officers: 
“Slightly tongue in cheek, if you pursue that route far enough you could have 
trained monkeys going round visiting the farms and the thing is entirely driven 
from the office. On the other hand I tend to think that the person on the farm, or in 
the factory, seeing what’s going on and relating to the individual doing it is in a 
much better position to form a judgment than people in the office, so to some 
extent who is in charge, the inspector, or the certification officer? I feel there is 
potential tension there. [...]” (John) 
By flagging up a controversy around how the activities of certifying licensees are 
distributed between inspectors and certification officers, John suggests that the directionality 
of the interpretive process during inspections depends on individual inspectors. This has 
organisational consequences: the different styles of interpretation are tied to the way in which 
the inspection process is managed and the types of inspectors that are employed. 
Summarising the above, the activities of certification officers, inspectors and technical 
managers constitute a continuous process of interpreting standards and practice in the context 
of each other. Through this, knowledge is generated on the basis of which a decision can be 
taken about the status of a licensee’s operations with regard to organic standards. As noted 
above, procedures and organisational factors shape these activities, but within them each case 
is unique and needs to be assessed in its own context vis-à-vis organic standards. In other 
words, the knowledge processes are routinised, but the content of the knowledge object 
created by these processes changes for each licensee. So how is this knowledge constituted? 
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What are its characteristics? How can the knowledge object be conceptualised? These 
questions form the core of the next section. 
6.3  Inferring the unknown 
The object of the certification process 
A good starting point to answer the questions posed in the previous section is to consider 
what the object of the certification process is. The role of the activities in the certification 
process as described above is to check “that products, materials, services, systems or people 
measure up to the specifications of a relevant standard” (ISO, 2010). In other words, a 
licensee is responsible for compliance with organic standards in order to qualify for 
certification, and inspectors, certification officers and technical managers carry out their 
specific procedures to verify this compliance: they check that the specific way in which a 
licensee enacts organic standards is compliant with those standards. The object of the 
certification process therefore is the set of agricultural systems, activities, material artefacts 
and knowledge that is mobilised by a licensee in a specific context to produce food (or farmed 
commodities) according to organic standards: its configuration is different for each and every 
licensee. 
The procedures of the certification process are intended to reveal this object for each 
individual licensee. But many of its elements are not directly accessible: the practices through 
which organic standards are enacted are temporally (and in many cases spatially) distributed. 
Furthermore, elements of ‘organic’ practice are also socially distributed: for example, as 
described in Chapters 4 and 5, establishing a crop rotation relies on soil sampling and 
specialist agronomic advice which most farmers need to buy in; treatments of livestock are 
usually prescribed and carried out by a vet rather than the licensee; etc. This implies that even 
the licensee him- or herself would not be able to grasp and reveal the object in all of its 
details. Instead, aspects of it are made visible through specific representations of systems, 
activities, material movements and transformations, and knowledge. For instance, a note on a 
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wall calendar indicating on which date a farmer is planning to mow the hay meadows 
provides a trace of practice (according to organic standards this cannot be before a certain 
date); a livestock management plan contains, in a very condensed form, a representation of the 
conditions of a livestock enterprise and its management practices; a purchase order, goods-in 
record and a valid organic certificate for the inputs, stock records, production records and sale 
records jointly provide a representation of how material objects entered and moved around the 
farm and how they transformed during that time; the Action Summary Form contains brief 
remarks about how certain aspects will be reshaped; etc. 
It is important to note that many of these representations are more than just that: they are 
simultaneously enactments of ‘organic’ practice. For example, by a providing representation 
of material movements and transformations, the document trail makes those materials 
traceable, which is one way in which the integrity of the organic system is maintained. Put 
differently, the representative function of records and documents is also performative43: their 
presence is required in order for ‘organic’ practice to exist; their presence is as important as 
the trajectory that their content describes. To capture the representative and performative 
aspects of these entities, I will refer to them as instantiations (Knorr Cetina, 2001) of ‘organic’ 
practice.  
However, not all aspects of the object ‘organic practice’ are instantiated through records 
and documents as some are revealed through material entities on the farm. For example, the 
presence of weeds and the absence of ‘tram rails’ (tractor tracks) in an arable field indicates 
that the crops have not been sprayed with fertilisers or pesticides. Thus, the organisation and 
condition of material entities discloses aspects of how organic standards are enacted as they 
represent a trace of past activities. While most of these embodied traces are visible and 
therefore directly accessible to a trained inspector, some can only be detected in laboratories. 
For these instances, inspectors carry a test kit with them to take leaf tissue and grain samples 
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 In this thesis, I use the adjective performative to denote an instantiation of performation. 
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if they suspect that prohibited substances were used, or as part of a routine crop check. Once 
collected, samples are sent to a laboratory where they are tested for residue levels for a 
number of common agro-chemicals.  
Besides these instantiations and embodied traces of enactments, inspectors create another 
instantiation of this object when composing a report. This instantiation draws together some of 
the elements as it provides information about all the agricultural systems through which the 
licensee is enacting organic standards. For each system, the entries describe different elements 
of practice in the context of organic standards—a particular way of doing is either ‘to 
standards’ or is non-compliant in one of three degrees at which point details of the non-
compliance are provided and framed by organic standards. Many entries require only 
documentary traces, but others consist of observations of material entities and again others are 
composed of a combination of the two types. But the report also contains references to other 
sorts of representations: for instance, Colin explained that inspectors have a tool to assess 
welfare so that they can ‘more objectively’ compare and report on the condition of livestock. 
Based on photos of livestock in different conditions (from emaciated to fat in five grades; 
classification by Bristol University), this yardstick has helped in making the work of an 
inspector ‘more black and white’, ‘more factual’ which is useful in the report but also in 
discussions with farmers about what constitutes a welfare issue. 
“So there’s a standard assessment, or standardised assessment tool to be able to 
have a look at cattle and ... (Maarten) 
“And sheep, yes. So that’s what we do. I’m just going to have a look at [Jason]’s 
and see what he’s put last year. Yes, there we go. So, on [Jason]’s he has actually 
rated them in the condition score. So, 2.75 – 3[44], which, at the time of year if you 
think an inspector actually went ... similar time of year, then that’s not bad 
condition to go to the tup [ram]. You want them into the 3s so that when they go 
they’ve got plenty of energy, they’ll hold their lamb and they’ll have enough 
energy to go through the winter.” (Colin) 
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 The specificity of the entry is interesting to note, as there is no photo of sheep in a 2.75 condition. 
This implies that the tool requires interpretation of intermediate stages, both on the farm and in the 
office, about what a given condition could be. 
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By including such references, more general notions of farming practice are added to the 
object—beyond the specifically organic aspects. 
However, while the report is intended to represent a verified and accurate depiction of the 
practices on a site, many elements are in fact inaccessible to an inspector (and as noted above, 
most likely to the licensee as well). Furthermore, the scope of reporting is necessarily limited 
by temporal, spatial, technological and resource constraints and therefore only a few elements 
of practice are traced per inspection. Hence, the inspection report constitutes a partial 
instantiation based on the items chosen by the inspector and by the material entities that were 
observed and that triggered questions about their history. In addition, the instantiation 
depends on the individual reporting style and the extent of inspector discretion that was 
exercised. 
In brief, the object of the certification process cannot be revealed in its entirety. Instead, 
partial instantiations show specific aspects of the object—but the assembly of these still does 
not reveal the object in all of its details: the object can never be complete. This suggests that 
there is a systemic absence of knowledge within the certification process, as there are always 
more things to probe, more documents to see, more questions to ask and more details to 
report. Thus, inspectors and certification officers have to make do with a limited amount of 
information to determine how to proceed, raising questions and then trying to resolve what the 
answers might have been. But the three examples below illustrate how answers to questions 
often raise new questions that require further investigation: 
While ‘doing’ a report, Colin picked up on two lines that were strange: in one the inspector 
mentioned the use of a broad vaccination programme (the vaccine used contains ten strains 
of diseases whereas the Soil Association standards prefer no interventions or targeted 
vaccines). Colin checked the communication records to see whether the farmers had asked 
for permission to do so, and did not find any information about this in the history. He 
checked the latest version of the Livestock Management Plan but could not find anything 
about this treatment there either. As such, he considered that this probably would constitute 
a missed major non-compliance but that before issuing this he would first contact the 
licensee to see on what basis the treatment was given (as in previous years the treatment 
was not given he did not suspect that the was a licensee who had continued conventional 
treatments and therefore thought to speak to the farmer first). The second point he picked 
out was that the inspector wrote that ‘a few ewes’ had died due to a disease, but as this 
constituted a welfare issue Colin wanted to have specific numbers about how many ewes 
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had died and whether they had all occurred together or spread over the year. He contacted 
both the inspector and the licensee to discuss the problem areas, and found out that the loss 
of ewes and the vaccination programme were related to the same problem: this licensee 
owns several farms, and that livestock is rotated annually so that build up of worms is 
avoided. Over the past year, the sheep had been housed on a markedly dirtier field 
compared to the other sites, and to protect the sheep against some microbial diseases 
present in the soil the farmer had used a multi-acting vaccination. Colin decided that the 
vaccinations were acceptable under these conditions. But he delved deeper into the issue as 
the use of single-acting vaccines is preferred (they cause the animals less stress) and that 
the multi-acting vaccine, which vaccinates against ten different diseases, is in most cases 
not necessary. The licensee had given these vaccinations without asking prior permission, 
which normally would constitute a minor non-compliance. However, Colin discovered that 
in a much older version of the livestock management plan the use of this particular vaccine 
had been approved because of this particular site. Over the past four years the treatment 
was not necessary and therefore was not included in newer versions of the LMP. On this 
basis Colin did not raise this as a missed non-compliance. 
Christopher found a remark in a report drawn up in spring that a licensee had some welfare 
issues and that a follow up inspection would be required after the licensee had sought 
veterinary advice. In a different place in the report he found that the livestock in question 
suffered from several types of parasites: firstly lice, which have a relation to stocking rate 
in the winter accommodation. To check this, he searched for the livestock management 
plan and manually calculated the stocking density for the herd in the given 
accommodation. Secondly, the cattle suffered from worms and fluke, two problems 
associated with outdoor grazing. As the inspection was carried out just before the herd was 
about to go out into the fields, Christopher found it strange that these problems had not 
been dealt with over the winter. Looking in detail at the LMP, he found that it did not 
include any details of how the parasites were dealt with. Also, Christopher did not receive 
any information about the veterinary treatments that the licensee should have provided him 
with (each of the parasites would require treatment for which prior approval would need to 
be given). From these points he concluded that something went wrong in how the animals 
were looked after and prepared a case for the Certification Committee to decide what level 
of non-compliance this would be and how this would need to be resolved.  
One of Claire’s licensees was a seasonal turkey producer producing organic turkeys for 
Christmas and Easter. This licensee had had many recurring non-compliances over its 
history, but this did not result in the regular ratcheting up of the level since the licensee 
each year contracted different farms to do the rearing for them. Furthermore the 
management of the licensee had changed three times over the last three years and therefore 
continuity in dealing with issues had been a problem. In an effort to avoid issues arising in 
the first place, Claire had requested a detailed livestock management plan before the 
production for Christmas 2009 as she wanted to be “extra, extra careful with going through 
everything in terms of the management plans and everything” (Claire). The LMP went 
through a number of iterations, but even the third version raised eight questions that 
required answers and details that needed filling in. Two of them required permission by the 
certification committee, and Claire composed an agenda item for the committee outlining 
the issues. In this, she searched the database of committee decisions and the precedence 
register for similar cases where the committee had already decided on an interpretation that 
could inform how these cases could be decided. For the first item, which concerned the 
extent of range available to the birds within 50m of a fixed barn, Claire found a number of 
previous decisions where the committee had already decided on an interpretation that could 
inform how this case could be decided. She made those available in the agenda item, and 
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added her recommendation to allow the limited space for the current production only. For 
the second item, which concerned the amount of time some of the birds would have access 
to the range before slaughter, she found no suitable items. As such, the committee had to 
assess how the standards could be interpreted, and on what basis permission might be given 
to allow this to happen. 
The example of Claire’s questioning illustrates how the involvement of the certification 
committee results in other elements becoming part of an object by drawing on previous 
committee decisions, cases from the precedent register and official standards interpretations. 
While this knowledge is not made available to the licensee in question, it does shape how the 
licensee will enact organic standards as the certification committee decides (in part) on this 
knowledge what will be appropriate measures for the licensee to implement. This equally 
applies for non-compliances and queries to the committee to decide on how to interpret a 
standard. Hence, this knowledge helps shape the way in which organic standards will be 
enacted by connecting the context and conditions of the current licensee to those of other 
licensees, or by questioning how certain contexts and conditions relate to organic standards (if 
there is no reference to previous cases). In fact, through this mechanism the enactments of 
different licensees become connected as the objects of different licensees become embedded 
in the object of another licensee. 
It is important to note that inspectors and certification officers therefore are not mere 
external observers trying to reveal how a licensee enacts organic standards. As outlined 
earlier, their procedures generate the knowledge on the basis of which a decision can be taken 
about whether a licence will be issued. But it goes further than that: due to their activities of 
producing an instantiation of and subsequent questioning of the object, they—and the 
certification committee—are active participants in shaping the object and consequently how 
‘organic’ is enacted by a licensee. 
Epistemic objects and their properties 
To develop a conceptual understanding of the object of the certification process and its 
multiple dimensions I draw on two related conceptualisations of knowledge objects and 
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knowledge-centred practice which have features closely resembling those as outlined in the 
previous section. Rooted in laboratory studies, Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (1997) introduced the 
concept of epistemic thing (as a thing embodying concepts) to denote the material entities or 
processes that constitute the objects of inquiry. As they embody what the researcher does not 
know, they present themselves in an irreducible vagueness: as scientific objects they are 
absent in their experimental presence. Therefore, epistemic things should be thought of as 
open-ended, question-generating and a complexity that is not reduced but increased by 
observation and inquiry. The concept of epistemic things was developed by Karin Knorr 
Cetina (1999, 2001) into the notion of epistemic objects which play a constitutive role in what 
she terms epistemic practice45. She developed this concept of practice out of the observation 
that scientific and expert practice cannot be captured by previous conceptualisations of 
practice as skill or routine.  
Instead, Knorr Cetina (2001) argues that a relational rather than a performative 
conceptualisation of practice can account for creative and constructive practice, the practice 
which comes to the fore when actors encounter non-routine problems. She suggests that this 
notion of practice “is internally more differentiated than current conceptions of practice as 
skill or habitual task-performance suggest” (Knorr Cetina, 2001: 175-176). Based on 
Heidegger’s (1962) work on how objects become ‘ready-to-hand’ and transparent while they 
are mobilised in practice, Knorr Cetina argues that in performative notions of practice, objects 
are indistinguishable elements of an activity script; they are instruments which are absorbed in 
the practice, becoming invisible and transparent while they are being used—just like the 
subject enacting the practice becomes invisible and absorbed in the practice. But in 
“knowledge-creating and -validating practice or ‘epistemic practice’” (2001: 176), this is not 
an adequate account (except for its procedural routines) as subject and the epistemic object 
become dissociated—its object is no longer invisible; rather, it is being investigated, explored, 
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 Knorr Cetina also uses the terms object-oriented or objectual practice. 
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probed: “Instead, it becomes enhanced and in fact enlarged through the researcher’s strategy 
of visualizing it and its behavior under various circumstances” (2001: 179). 
Epistemic practice, then, is based on a differentiation of subject and object which is held 
together by the relationship between the two. This relationship is shaped by the characteristics 
of the epistemic object: they contain a ‘lack in completeness of being’ and therefore have the 
capacity of unfolding indefinitively: 
“They are more like open drawers filled with folders extending indefinitively into 
the depth of a dark closet. Since epistemic objects are always in the process of 
being materially defined, they continually acquire new properties and change the 
ones they have. But this also means that objects of knowledge can never be fully 
attained, that they are, if you wish, never quite themselves. What we encounter in 
the research process are representations or stand-ins for a more basic lack of 
object.” (2001: 181)  
Knorr Cetina suggests that although objects of knowledge exist in a variety of 
instantiations (representations and material realisations), they simultaneously constitute 
unfolding, temporal structures of absences. The instantiations therefore are always partial: 
they do not represent “another object, ‘the real thing’. It is ‘the real thing’ itself that has the 
changing ontology which the partial objects unfold” (2001: 182). Instead, the partial objects 
display the lack and provide suggestions for further unfolding. In other words, partial 
epistemic objects constitute complex links in a sequence of unfolding, which when unfolded 
lead to equally complex sublinks. 
Returning to the mutual relationship between subject and object in epistemic practice (or 
object-oriented or objectual practice), Knorr Cetina suggests that this is sustained by a 
‘structure of wanting’ which is ‘uniquely’ matched by the open, unfolding character of 
epistemic objects: 
“... wants are always directed at an empirical object mediated by representations – 
through signifiers, which identify the object and render it significant. But these 
representations never quite catch up with the empirical object; they always in some 
aspects fail (misrepresent) the thing they articulate. They thereby reiterate the lack 
rather than eliminate it” (2001: 185) 
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Thus, the mutuality of the relationship is constituted by the structuring of what is still 
missing by partial objects, and the provision that their unfolding can continue by the subject. 
Put differently, scientists and experts involved in knowledge centred activities act on the lack 
of a partial epistemic object by unfolding it, which leads to another partial object which 
presents a different lack on which the experts can act again, etc. Knorr Cetina argues that the 
structure (or chain) of wantings “brings into view whole series of moves and their underlying 
dynamic rather than isolated reasons, as the traditional vocabulary of motives, incentives and 
actions does” (2001: 186). As such, she suggests that this conceptualisation can account for 
the emotional basis of knowledge-centred work, and that it can account for the lateral and 
angular branching off of strands of practice that occur when wants transfer from one chain of 
wantings to another. Therefore, she concludes, the proposed approach may become relevant to 
object-centred practice outside scientific and expert knowledge contexts. 
The object of the certification process as described in the previous section certainly 
shares many characteristics with the concept of an epistemic object: it is an object of 
knowledge which is not directly accessible but which can only be described by partial 
instantiations which fail to render the object in its entirety. These simultaneously represent 
and enact elements of ‘organic’ practice—and with each instantiation the object changes. 
These instantiations could display a lack that warrants further investigation (even if an 
inspector or certification officer decides not to pursue this); especially the inspection report 
constitutes a multi-layered partial object which frequently prompts a chain of questioning that 
could, in principle, go on indefinitely. On the other hand, many of the instantiations of the 
object of the certification process do not ‘explode’ into equally complex subsystems—their 
answers bring specific elements of the object in focus and complete the query. Only some 
elements prompt further questioning: these elements render the object partially epistemic.  
Although this echoes how scientific practice “shifts back and forth between the 
performance of ‘packaged’ routine procedures and differentiated practice...” (Knorr Cetina, 
2001: 187), the difference is that certification processes attempt to bring the object into 
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sufficient focus so that a decision can be taken to (re)certify a licensee. In other words, the 
epistemic qualities of the object are actively curtailed at the stage where sufficient knowledge 
is available for a practical decision to be taken. Even if theoretically the object of the 
certification process could remain indefinitely epistemic, practically this is not the case. Time 
and resource constraints dictate that at some point it is enough; in very practical terms the 
object has unfolded to the extent that there is sufficient information to conclude an enactment 
falls within organic standards. This is different from scientific practice, which according to 
Knorr Cetina (1999) is constrained by social, political, economic and technological 
dimensions but which is not terminated. 
However, it is important to note that in the procedures of certifying licensees the 
knowledge object cannot remain invisible since it is the explicit aim of the certification 
process to make it visible so that it can be probed and investigated further. This corresponds 
with the proposal by Miettinen and Virkkunen (2005) to use the construct of an epistemic 
object to analyse how a practice “can be made into an object of enquiry in order to produce 
novel and alternative ways of acting” (2005: 438). According to them, practices would 
become epistemic objects when a social actor would analyse the practice with the purpose of 
improving it. At the time where the actor (e.g. a manager analysing ways of assembling) starts 
this process, the epistemic object is open-ended as the outcome cannot be foreseen. This 
suggests that practices themselves can be made the centre of objectual practice—at least on a 
temporary basis, until the practice under study has been transformed as a result of a 
reorientation of practice initiated by the designer-manager (but carried by other actors). But 
the knowledge-centred work of certification officers and inspectors does not necessarily lead 
to a transformation of how a licensee enacts ‘organic’. Only if elements are found non-
compliant will they require changes; enactments of organic production which fall within 
organic standards are not changed (in fact, officers of SACL are not allowed to give advice 
about how a practice could be shaped). As such I argue that the notion of epistemic practice 
could be extended to include those activities that routinely question (potentially) available sets 
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of knowledge—objectual practice centred on instantiations of sociomaterial practice—without 
the explicit intention to change them. 
To allow for this extension however, the ‘structure of wantings’ needs to be developed so 
as to include an account of how epistemic trajectories are truncated. To accommodate the 
active termination of the epistemic properties of the object in the certification process, the 
structure of wantings takes a different shape than that implied in Knorr Cetina’s notion: the 
unfolding is constrained in its directionality, and interrupted instead of being continued. The 
mutuality of the relationship between the subject and object suggests that this can stem from 
the object as much as from the subject. The subject (certification officer, inspector, scientist, 
expert) can stop acting on the incompleteness of the partial object, for instance when inferring 
from other partial instantiations that an unfolding the object is not likely to provide a 
substantially different instantiation (enactment) of the practice. Or the object ceases to be 
epistemic as it has yielded an answer which is sufficient—it has reverted back to a technical 
entity which is ready-to-hand and transparent, invisible in the performance of a packaged 
routine procedure. In suppressing or removing the epistemic conditions of an object, then, 
either process also eliminates the emotional, affective dimension of scientific epistemic 
practice, as well as the possibility for lateral or angular branching off as described by Knorr 
Cetina. 
So for short time spans the procedural routines of SACL officers are punctuated by 
epistemic processes to resolve lacks in the epistemic object to the extent that a practical 
decision can be taken. While the object of the certification process always has epistemic 
properties, these are only investigated at set times and within specific time and resource 
constraints. Furthermore, the assembly of (partial) instantiations of the object is produced 
anew each year, incorporating knowledge from previous years and accounting for recent 
changes in how a licensee enacts organic. But the knowledge object of the certification 
process does not unfold like scientific epistemic objects: although there is an accumulation of 
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knowledge from successive years through previous instantiations and records46, the object is 
truncated each year at a similar stage in its unfolding, i.e. as soon as there is sufficient 
knowledge available to infer that the licensee enacts organic in accordance with organic 
standards (or more precisely with authoritative interpretations which were established by the 
certification committee through similar epistemic processes).  
The process of inferring is complex as there are no formal rules about what constitutes 
‘sufficient’ knowledge. Some senior certification officers and inspectors commented that, 
based on their experience, they were able to focus on critical areas of organic practice, such as 
specific animal welfare issues and other areas where the integrity of a licensee’s organic 
system could be compromised. If an unfolding of those areas, combined with the checks on 
paperwork and a ‘feel’ for how a licensee operates, does not raise questions suggests that the 
overall way of doing organic of a licensee is compliant with organic standards. This process 
therefore relies on the professional skills, knowledge and interpretation of the certification 
officers. Yet, as I will discuss in the next section, it is more difficult for the officers to know 
when they can truncate the epistemic trajectory of the object—the point at which they decide 
that a licensee can be (re)certified—as the process of inferring is essentially uncertain.  
The necessity of being thorough and the impossibility of doing so 
As suggested above, in the certification process many of the aspects of its object are 
simply not accessible to SACL officers. The temporal, spatial and social distribution of 
elements of organic practice, combined with the time and resource constraints of the officers, 
excludes many aspects that could warrant investigation and that could unfold if they were not 
invisible, not necessarily relevant or beyond resource boundaries. To address this lack of the 
overall object, the system of certifying licensees is built on the assumption that at least for 
certain elements of practice (e.g. the traceability of materials and livestock) the unfolding of 
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 Various certification officers indicated that over time they get to know the specific context of a 
licensee better so that certain findings can be put into context. 
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one empirical case of an instantiation is sufficient to represent the way in which a licensee 
enacts an element of doing organic. In other words, the investigated case comes to represent a 
particular system of organising practice. This assumption, then, provides at least one 
mechanism through which certification officers and inspectors can stop acting on the 
incompleteness of the overall object: unknowns are inferred from the elements that are 
available.  
Capturing the (administrative) system of a licensee therefore involves an assessment of 
the extent to which an audit case relates to an entire system. Inspectors and certification 
officers need let the chosen case unfold to reveal whether or not there is a system, e.g. by 
concluding from other documents that it is in place, or by tracing the trajectories of other 
materials. This can be helped by strategically choosing the (not so) random case through 
which to investigate the system: 
“... I probably find these [audits] the most interesting part because it’s a real 
chance for you to test and probe their system and see if they are as good as they 
are.” (Christopher) 
“Yeah, because that’s the checksum on their operation.” (Maarten) 
“Yes, you pick something completely at random, me as an inspector I look through 
and see what other inspectors have looked at in the past, see what could be 
potentially areas of risk to integrity and I choose something. So, for example if 
previous reports have been about bedding levels not been very good or something 
about animal welfare, I would do an audit on straw purchases, things like that. So, 
I think it’s a really good test of the licensee’s system. [...]” (Christopher) 
Christopher’s remark suggests that the audit tests the entire system of producing 
organically, i.e. not only the administrative system but all of the instantiations through which 
a licensee enacts organic. However, there is a substantial element of chance in this as not all 
cases relate to the presence or absence of a system through which the administrative element 
of organic practice is organised. For example, the absence of a system may be obscured by the 
presence of documents (which are routinely provided by other actors, such as suppliers), or by 
material traces which are the result of natural processes which are not managed as part of the 
organic husbandry system. In reverse, the presence of a system may be obscured by an 
administrative error (e.g. an employee forgetting to record certain batch numbers in a ledger). 
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Also, a system could contain idiosyncrasies in the form of some exceptions which cannot be 
managed through the system (e.g. a supplier whose order process requires manual 
management of paperwork, potentially leading to errors in the particulars that are recorded). 
Finally, inspectors as well as certification officers may not spot non-compliances indicating an 
absent or compromised system.  
These examples47 suggest that the assumption that a check on one or two items is 
representative of the rigour of the systems that a licensee has in place to account for organic 
production creates a tension for the officers: they are caught between the necessity of being 
thorough and the impossibility of doing so. Yet this uncertainty need not lead to paralysis of 
the certification process (the inability to take decisions) or to arbitrary decision making. 
Rather, the process must be managed so that practical decisions can be taken—decisions that 
ideally should be independent from the person who inspected or who certified, and that are 
open to scrutiny. While the uncertainty cannot be resolved, the epistemic elements of practice 
are embedded in and managed through procedures: the unfolding of a few randomly chosen 
items is required for the certification process to function as it provides the knowledge through 
which a certification decision is taken. But the procedural routines define not so much what 
should be unfolded in what manner, but rather shape the overall certification process so that 
the uncertainty cannot lead to arbitrariness in how decisions are made; they standardise the 
process through which these decisions are taken. How this is achieved is the topic of the next 
section. 
6.4  Controlling paperwork: performing certification 
Within SACL, the certification process is standardised on several different levels and 
through different mechanisms: actors are controlled, activities are verified, knowledge is 
codified, etc. Some of these controls are clearly visible in the procedures of the SACL officers 
as described in section 6.2, others are less visible but they still shape those procedures. In this 
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section I will explore a number of these controls, but before doing so it is important to note 
that a number of controls to standardise the certification process extend beyond the boundaries 
of SACL. There are certain requirements set by other actors (DEFRA, Soil Association 
charity) who want to ensure that the certification of licensees is done in accordance with 
organic standards and in a harmonised way. More broadly, attempts to standardise the 
certification process enact a particular form of doing certifying, which can itself be assessed. 
In describing how this works I start by considering how the enactment of different 
mechanisms of control organises the certification process, and then explore two specific 
routes through which aspects of the uncertainty are managed. 
Tracing the certification process 
As described in section 6.2, the annual certification cycle includes a number of checks 
and balances that are performed by different SACL officers: there are various levels of control 
through which a report is signed off, through which internal corrective actions are followed up 
and through which complaints can be escalated. Thus, there are many mechanisms of checks 
and balances that are in place to ensure that each action has been verified and checked again. 
Moreover, the work of inspectors and certification officers are assessed in various ways: 
inspector managers accompany each inspector for a certain number of inspections per year, 
and certification officers grade each report for clarity and content which is fed back to the 
inspection director; certification managers check how certification officers have assessed 
reports by ‘doing’ a number of randomly chosen reports of each officer to verify that no issues 
were missed and that the decision to certify was appropriate. To accommodate this, a large 
structure of data and labour has been created. All communications with licensees are logged, 
and all the paperwork is made available through IT. Assessments by managers are not made 
available but discussed with the relevant SACL officer and noted in their files so that there are 
traces of their performance. 
Some of these mechanisms, such as the logging of all communications and documents, 
make available the details of each licensee so that any queries or problems can be picked up 
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by any officer. Other elements, such as the quality assessments, coordinate how SACL 
officers go about certifying licensees—not in the sense of prescribing how an inspection 
should be conducted or how a report should be done, but by controlling the outcomes of the 
activities that were performed. In principle, this should remove the potential for preferential 
treatment of licensees, as the outcomes should be similar no matter which inspector or officer 
dealt with a licensee. However, from the comments of John and Christopher quoted earlier it 
is clear that there still is considerable scope—and indeed a need for—flexible interpretations 
of how a licensee enacts organic. The various checks and balances therefore introduce a 
procedural mechanism through which the certification process is homogenised for each 
licensee: they affirm that a particular stage of the process has been completed by an officer 
with an appropriate level of authority.  
These efforts of standardising the certification process are important not only for SACL 
licensees, who pay for and expect an independent and impartial service, but also for the 
organisation itself. In fact, without these processes SACL would not be able to offer 
certification services at all: the EU regulation on organic farming stipulates that any 
certification body must prove that it “(i) has the expertise, equipment and infrastructure 
required to carry out the tasks delegated to it; (ii) has a sufficient number of suitable qualified 
and experienced staff; and (iii) is impartial and free from any conflict of interest as regards the 
exercise of the tasks delegated to it” (EC, 2007: art. 27.5). The regulation also defines the way 
in which this should be achieved: certification bodies must be “accredited to the most recently 
notified version [...] of European Standard EN 45011 or ISO Guide 65 (General requirements 
for bodies operating product certification systems), and [...] approved by the competent 
authorities” (EC, 2007: art. 27.5). In other words, the way in which the organic certification 
process is organised is governed by another set of standards containing rules for how general 
certification processes should be shaped—it does not offer any substantive guidance on how 
the subject of the certification process (in this case organic farming) should be shaped. 
Certification bodies are accredited (inspected in similar ways to how SACL licensees are 
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certified) based on the systems which are in place to ensure that the certification process is 
performed in a consistent manner in accordance with EN 45011. Thus, the processes of 
different certification bodies are based on the same, enforced rules relating to the way in 
which their work is organised, matched by quality control systems48.  
This means that the processes through which SACL organises the certification process 
are instantiations49 of a different standardisation process. Analogous to how instantiations in 
organic farming are both representative and performative, these processes organise the 
certification process and simultaneously enact a specific way of ‘doing’ certification—as 
specified in standard EN 45011. Inspecting licensees, doing and grading reports, assessing 
SACL officers, logging communications, checking stages of the process, and all of the other 
processes jointly enact the EN 45011 standard. It is important to note that the epistemic 
unfolding of items is, in this context, performative too: the traces of the unfolding as logged as 
requests for information, queries at the certification committee, etc., show that the unfolding 
took place and therefore that licensees’ practices were investigated, and the extent to which 
this was done. As the United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) accompanies a few 
inspections and assesses several reports at random to verify the way in which EN 45011 is 
implements, tracing the certification process is essential not only for internal coordination but 
also to allow this external verification to take place: the records, reports, processes and 
procedures make traceable how certifying licensees is done and consequently allow for 
accreditation. 
In summary, the enactment of different mechanisms of control organises the certification 
process so that it becomes auditable itself and thereby simultaneously reproduces both a 
specific, standardised and codified form of certification process and a separation between 
different corporate actors. Put differently, these processes coordinate ‘doing certification’ 
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 While they are specific to its organisation, this is not to say that other certification bodies may not 
employ identical or similar processes to manage how they certify licensees. 
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between SACL officers, between SACL and other certification bodies within and beyond the 
UK, and demarcate a boundary between certification bodies and other actors in the organic 
movement. It is important to note that this does not address the inherent uncertainty in the 
certification process: rather, the enactment organises how the accessible elements of organic 
practice are assessed. But to manage at least some aspects of the uncertainty, SACL officers 
employ two additional processes which coordinate knowledge and resources so that the 
absence of knowledge is minimised within the context of the standardised certification 
process. In the next two sections I describe them, starting with how knowledge is coordinated. 
Coordinating knowledge 
Within SACL there are several mechanisms through which knowledge about how to 
interpret standards is generated, verified and shared. As outlined in the introduction of the 
chapter, the Certification Committee plays a central role in determining how particular 
standards should be interpreted. Its decisions contain descriptions of how the enactment of a 
standard could be problematic, and what interpretations would be allowed. For instance, a 
standards amendment in 2009 caused some confusion about the requirements for lambs born 
on a farm converting to organic production. Previous standards required sheep to be kept to 
full organic standards from the moment they mated for their offspring to have organic status, 
which included being kept on organic land. To accommodate farmers in conversion, the 
amendment was introduced to allow the mating to take place on land in conversion rather than 
on organic land. However, the way in which the amendment was written was ambiguous, 
leaving open the status of the land onto which the lambs would need to be born so that they 
would have organic status—it was unclear whether the land would need to be organic or could 
be in conversion. The committee agenda item for this issue sets out the issue and the three 
options that could apply, and raises the question about which option would be a valid 
interpretation. The recorded decision on this is clear that the “requirements or sheep and lamb 
production should be consistent with other livestock categories”, and therefore the committee 
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states which of the three options applies (ewes can be mated and lambs can be born on land in 
the second year of conversion).  
The consequence of such decisions is that the interpretations are coordinated among 
SACL officers as in any subsequent case the decision informs how inspectors and certification 
officers will decide those cases. But the decision does more than that: the choice of one of the 
three specified options reduces the way in which a practice can be assessed. The descriptions 
of the three options contain pointers about what would be critical in assessing compliance. In 
this case, the deciding factor is the status of the land onto which the lambs are born and 
reared. Thus, it is clear that inspectors and certification officers carrying out a verification of 
the organic status of lambs need to consider the land status (amongst other things: feed and 
welfare practices will be other important aspects to consider). Consequently, the certification 
decision explicitly defines some of the specific points which need to be verified to assess 
compliance. This means that the uncertainty about a practice is reduced, perhaps marginally, 
by providing guidance on what very practical checks to include in the certification process. 
However, the certification committee is not the only site where interpretations are 
established: to coordinate how different certification bodies ‘do’ certification, DEFRA 
supports the Certification Bodies Technical Working Group (CBTWG) in which all 
certification bodies participate to coordinate interpretations for the EU regulations (see also 
Chapter 8). In CBTWG, SACL is represented by Technical Manager Tom, who acts as the 
liaison between the certification committee and the other certification bodies. While 
discussing the way in which the certification bodies work together in CBTWG, Tom points 
out that the coordination of interpretations might lead to harmonised as well as coexisting 
interpretations: 
“Sometimes we ... at the end of the day we have to be as diplomatic as possible 
and must be able to work with them because we’re not going to go away, they’re 
not going to go away and it just creates problems but saying that at the same time 
where we do disagree we tell them we disagree and they might disagree with us. 
Sometimes we agree to disagree, or we agree one of us is wrong and we go with it. 
But generally we get on, really. [...]” (Tom) 
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In passing it became clear that while the working group coordinates interpretations, it is 
also a site where political and economic interests make this coordination a precarious activity. 
Tom mentioned that the workload of determining valid interpretations was often not 
distributed fairly and that this made the sharing of knowledge sometimes difficult: 
“[...] So why should they who haven’t obviously put any time or effort into it say 
‘oh you’ve decided that, thanks very much, job done.’ We have to be really careful 
of that because otherwise you start subsidising other companies.” (Tom) 
Tom relates the discussions of CBTWG back to the certification committee, where any 
proposed re-interpretations are reviewed and codified by the regular committee processes.  
A similar, if less precarious, process is involved in coordinating interpretations of the 
additional Soil Association standards. SACL is the only certification body ‘licensed’ to 
administer the Soil Association logo. This means that while SACL might want to be flexible 
towards their licensees and support them as much as possible, they also need to uphold the 
integrity of the Soil Association standards so as not to lose their ‘licence’. As Theo made 
clear, DEFRA and UKAS required SACL to disentangle from the Soil Association, and so 
there is no formal audit of SACL’s manner of administering the Soil Association standards by 
Soil Association employees. But as Technical Manager Tamsin described, some control is 
exercised as the Soil Association has the final sign-off on interpretations of standards that 
have been developed by SACL. The technical managers meet regularly with employees from 
the Soil Association charity to discuss issues that emerged from certifying against organic 
standards. This can range from spelling mistakes to omissions and standards that do not work 
well in practice: 
“So [during] our bi-monthly meetings I would ask how they’re going to deal with 
it. If they say ... well if it’s been one way and they say “we don’t agree with you”, 
so I say fair enough. So if they don’t agree with me we have to then deal with the 
interpretation that’s in there and find our own way of interpreting it without doing 
something in the interpretation which they don’t agree with.” (Tom) 
During my observations, Tamsin, Tom and other technical managers were in the process 
of writing interpretation notes for each standard so that it would be easier for inspectors and 
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certification officers to assess practice, and these notes would be signed off by the standards 
department of the Soil Association charity: 
“What is the problem with a CO having a different interpretation from the 
standards department? [...]” (Maarten) 
“[...] it can be very easy to have a basic standard and then suddenly it just goes 
‘pouf’ and it just becomes a huge mass of interpretation ‘what about this, what 
about that, what about this, what about that’ [...] There was about, probably six 
years ago, a few examples where [...] we were referring too much to them and they 
said ‘look, they’re written in here, you need to interpret them as you see fit.’ [...] 
Then there were one or two incidents a couple of years later where they went to 
CC and said ‘how are you interpreting like that? That’s not the meaning of this 
standard.’ And then they were concerned that we’d gone off on this tangent.” 
(Tom) 
Tom’s comment that basic rules can explode into many different interpretations is 
interesting as it suggests that the process of coordinating interpretations—the knowledge 
which helps contain the uncertainty in the certification process—also codifies how SACL 
officers relate to and certify licensees. By describing the specific characteristics of the 
accessible traces of compliant ways of ‘doing’ organic, the unfolding is directed. This reduces 
the need for SACL officers to investigate all aspects of an instantiation: codified 
interpretations define trajectories of unfolding. If an officer finds something which is not 
described by following this path, this is put forward to the certification committee for 
guidance. Thus, the differentiated practice of unfolding is organised through these standard 
procedures.  
Managing risk 
The second process which is aimed at reducing uncertainty in the certification process 
concerns risk management. Various SACL employees mentioned that some practices—and 
indeed types of licensees—were low risk, and that there was a very small chance of them 
being non-compliant. Other practices and licensees were deemed to be high risk as they were 
more often non-compliant: 
“[...] If you counted 2000 farmers against a particular standard and said ‘we 
haven’t had a non-compliance against that particular standard for five years’, you 
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could probably hide that question to appear only every second year. You could 
argue you could have done that. That would be a risk based on that thing. I don’t 
think that should actually rely on ... but your inspector, if he sees a problem could 
open it up again and say ‘actually I have seen this.’ But you could avoid asking 
that question.” (Craig, Senior Certification Officer) 
“So it’s trying to streamline the process of inspection, what you’re thinking about. 
(Maarten) 
“Yes, and then just agree that [when] one particular standard’s never a problem, 
we’ll check that every seven years, but these ones on livestock welfare, all those 
questions, will be answered every year and thoroughly.” (Craig) 
There had been various attempts at trying to capture this in tools which would signal to 
inspectors and certification officers what to look out for. For instance, one such method 
involved certification officers composing a list of a licensee’s critical points prior to an 
inspection based on available knowledge from previous years. However, this was never rolled 
out as it ended up being very resource-intensive for the certification officers while not saving 
the inspectors much time. 
Yet, the idea that a tool would be able to point to those licensees and practices that would 
require specific attention prompted the technical managers to periodically suggest new ways 
of tackling this issue. During my observations, Tom was working on a tool with which 
officers might be able to assess the risk level of individual licensees. The tool consisted of a 
matrix in which different types of licensees were given points according to their history such 
as the number of minor, major and critical non-compliances in previous inspections, and the 
risk to a particular industry. Tom indicated that this was the first and very rough version, and 
that for the tool to be effective it would need fewer categories so that it would be easier to use. 
Tom explained that the idea of risk-based inspections was that the organisation could then 
focus on high risk licensees but that there was a need for some kind of way to quantify the risk 
so that SACL would be able to justify why some licensees were inspected more often. He 
suggested that this would help to remove the human element and that this could be seen as a 
positive thing as it would lead to more consistent treatment of licensees. Moreover, this would 
allow a more efficient use of SACL’s resources (inspector and certification officer time).  
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Thus, the risk-based tools allow critical items to be identified, which then could be 
assessed in more detail to investigate the integrity of a licensee’s systems in more detail—or 
the reduced attention to low risk elements could reduce the resources required to certify a 
licensee without compromising the overall certification process. The point is that these tools 
reduce the uncertainty of the certification process, again making explicit which elements need 
to be assessed and in what way in order to provide a consistent certification process. In other 
words, they attempt to define which trajectories of unfolding are likely to uncover non-
compliant practices and which ones are likely to explore elements which are only in 
exceptional cases non-compliant. 
It is important to note that the processes of coordinating knowledge (as described in the 
previous section) and managing risk are also performative: the presence of codified 
trajectories of unfolding, the process of establishing them, and of classifying risk categories, 
contributes to the enactment of a certification process in which there are verifiable 
mechanisms through which uncertainties in the process are contained, i.e. a process through 
which certification decisions are based on codified, externally verified interpretations and 
which can be further justified through the presence of rational decision making tools. 
Procedures like these reproduce a certification process in which its uncertainty is managed 
through the adoption of standard methods. While this does not mean that uncertainty is 
removed, this process allows SACL officers to cope effectively with the impossibility of being 
thorough: by following the agreed method, they are as thorough as they can be given the time 
and resource constraints.  
6.5  Conclusion 
Every Tuesday around lunchtime, the certification committee meeting ends when all 
agenda items for that week have been dealt with. The committee will have dealt with requests 
for permissions, critical non-compliances found during inspections, missed non-compliances 
found by certification officers ‘doing’ reports, queries on how to interpret standards, and 
appeals against earlier decisions. For each agenda item, the committee will have considered 
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the problem in relation to the Soil Association standards, the context of the issue and the way 
in which a licensee did or did not or intends to do something. And each case will have been 
decided on, often summarily by agreeing with the interpretation proposed by the submitter, 
sometimes explicitly stating the reasoning behind a decision, sometimes requesting more 
information, and sometimes referring an issue back to the standards department of the Soil 
Association charity, to CBTWG or to DEFRA. Having resolved the items that arose over the 
previous week, the committee’s work is done for another week: the boundaries of organic 
standards that were contested through licensees’ practices have been made explicit, delineated 
and sometimes redrawn, thus reproducing organic standards. 
After lunch on Tuesdays, the certification officers who submitted an agenda item but who 
did not attend the meeting (most officers will indicate that they want to be called in for 
certain, complex cases to follow the reasoning of the committee members) access the 
committee database to see what was decided. They then start informing the licensees whose 
cases were discussed about the decision of the committee. Usually, this consists of a telephone 
call to discuss the outcomes of the meeting and the implications for the way in which the 
licensee does something, and to explain the appeal procedure in case the decision was 
negative for the licensee. After those conversations, the officers compose emails to those 
licensees to confirm what was decided, to request any necessary actions and outline the 
timeline for this, and to outline the appeal procedure. Subsequently, one of the technical 
managers checks whether the certification officers have carried out all the agreed actions and 
verifies that the licensees were informed in unambiguous terms about the decision and its 
implications. After having done these checks, the item is signed off, procedurally ending a 
trajectory that was, temporarily, epistemic. The agenda item has turned from an open-ended 
entity into a technical object: it has become ready-to-hand for the certification officer as an 
element in the routine packaged procedure of certifying and maintaining licensee relations. 
But the object is more than that: it has been added to the database so that in any subsequent 
similar case the object can be mobilised to inform the trajectory of the new item.  
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As such, what certification officers and inspectors do in their everyday activities of 
certifying licensees—how they enact organic standards through practice—raises some 
important points about how interpretations of ‘organic’ as applied to food and farmed 
commodities are enacted through the use of voluntary standards and their certification. As 
mentioned before, inspectors and certification officers are not merely external observers trying 
to reveal how a licensee enacts certain standards. While their procedures generate knowledge 
on the basis of which a decision can be taken about whether a licence will be issued, the 
activities of producing an instantiation of and subsequent questioning of the knowledge 
object, are such that inspectors and certification officers—and the certification committee—
figure as active participants in shaping this object and therefore shaping how a particular form 
of farming is enacted by a licensee. 
Second, parts of the knowledge object are generated through past interaction with 
different licensees circulate as inspectors and certification officers refer to previous committee 
decisions and to internally and externally coordinated interpretations of organic standards in 
their daily work. While the knowledge underpinning these interpretations is not made 
available to the licensee in question, it shapes the way in which organic standards are enacted 
by connecting the context and conditions of the current licensee to those of other licensees, or 
by questioning how certain contexts and conditions relate to organic standards (if there is no 
reference to previous cases). In fact, through this mechanism the enactments of different 
licensees become connected. While this does not necessarily mean that the enactments of 
organic standards by different licensees are actually uniform, by these means certain aspects 
of farming practice do become standardised. 
Third, voluntary product standards are not only written by the standard setter (in the case 
of standards for organic agriculture, the EU, the Soil Association and the Biodynamic 
Agriculture Association), but that they are continually rewritten—re-produced—in the 
certification process. As such, they are alive: with each new interpretation and with each new 
instantiation they subtly change and reconfigure how a particular form of farming is and can 
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be enacted. What is more, this reproduction is clearly an accomplishment of different actors: 
inspectors and certification officers delineate and make explicit the practical meaning of 
organic standards in relation to how licensees practise farming for each single relevant activity 
or set of activities; the certification committee resolves contested boundaries by establishing 
interpretations; and the coordination of knowledge (both internally and externally) 
standardises different aspects of the certification process. Indeed, the continuous rewriting of 
organic standards by multiple authors through their everyday practices of certifying licensees 
is required to enact a standardised certification process. 
 
 156
Chapter 7 Making markets for organic farming 
7.1  Introduction50 
Once organic ‘stuff’ has been produced through certified practices, it is marketed and 
sold through a network of different actors (cooperatives, merchants, pack houses and retailers) 
until it eventually reaches consumers. At this point, a particular organic product is often 
situated between a number of different alternatives: not only do organic products compete 
with products that are either conventional or labelled differently ‘sustainable’ (e.g. Fairtrade), 
they also compete with other equally organic products. Substitution of organic products is 
often possible: this can be either like for like (e.g. organic milk of brand a or b), or when 
products that fulfil a similar role in the everyday practice of consuming food (e.g. organic 
carrots can be replaced by a different kind of organic vegetable). While this latter form of 
substitution can be influenced by marketing campaigns pushing a certain foodstuff, this does 
not depend on the presence of a standard, and is therefore not relevant for the way in which 
organic standards are enacted. In contrast, the differentiation of organic from conventional or 
otherwise labelled products does rely on the presence of a standard: an organic product 
competes with a conventional product because of the certified enactment of organic standards 
in its production.  
For this label to have effect, consumers need to be aware of at least some of the 
differences between organic and other products. However, there is no single difference that is 
recognised by all consumers as distinguishing organic from conventional produce; rather, 
different consumers associate organic products with different benefits, including naturalness, 
health, various environmental benefits, animal welfare, absence of pesticides or GM, and/or 
taste (Soil Association, 2010a). In addition, organic means different things to different 
consumers at different points in time. Until recently, the organic sector did not develop any 
                                                     
50
 Central elements of this chapter have been published as part of the proceedings of a workshop (van 
der Kamp, in preparation). 
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concerted action to change its image—the sector grew from £100m in 1993/1994 (Soil 
Association, 2004) to £2.1b in 2008 (Soil Association, 2009) without a large campaign to 
explain what organic farming is in simple terms51. However, the contraction of the organic 
market in 2008 and 2009 as a result of the recession led to three separate major advertising 
campaigns to boost sales. For the sector, the scale, reach and organisation of these campaigns 
was unprecedented: the joint budget of the three separate campaigns topped £8m with two of 
the campaigns featuring TV adverts. Moreover, two of the campaigns involved a collaboration 
between producers and processors to promote the general concept of organic. Running from 
the autumn of 2010 onwards, these initiatives emphasise only some of the differences between 
organic and conventional production, thus strengthening specific messages about how organic 
is different. 
The first campaign ran from 30 September until the end of 2010, and featured a TV 
advert in which computer-animated black and white spots on grazing cows depicted the 
multiple uses of organic milk (see Figure 7.1 for video stills of the advert). The message of the 
advert was that to change to organic milk would cost less than £1 per week for an average 
family, and that this was “a great way to make your day more organic”. Organic equals 
naturalness in this advert: the images of grazing cows, and the jug of milk in the grass at the 
end of the advert, suggest that there have been no further processing steps apart from what 
cows naturally do. The strap line invited consumers to make organic milk a regular purchase: 
“organic milk, go organic every day”. This £1m campaign was funded by the Organic Milk 
Suppliers Cooperative, and did not promote any specific brand of organic milk; it was 
intended to increase demand for the approximately five hundred dairy farmers associated with 
the cooperative. 
 
                                                     
51
 The Soil Association has been active in connecting many of the recognised aspects to the ‘organic 
brand’ through various campaigns. Indeed, as Inspector John commented in 2009: “The only really 
solid organisation promoting the concept of organic is the Soil Association.” 
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Figure 7.1: Stills from OMCSo (left) and Yeo Valley (right) TV adverts 
The second campaign, by Yeo Valley52, was launched on 9 October 2010, with a two-
minute long TV advert in one of the breaks of the popular reality TV show ‘the X-factor’ in 
which contestants compete by singing. The advert was set up as a hiphop-style music video, 
and features four actors posing as farmers rapping a tribute to their work for Yeo Valley and 
their location in the West Country (see Figure 7.1 for stills). In addition, the lyrics contain 
references to the environmental achievements of Yeo Valley, and this positioned the company 
as a ‘real leader by far’ (for the full lyrics and a scene description, please refer to appendix 4). 
The advert is part of a £5m campaign to promote the rebranded Yeo Valley as being a 
premium organic brand (previously Yeo Valley also had non-organic product lines, which 
disappeared due to the rebranding). This campaign is based on the slogan “live in harmony”, 
by which the company means ‘live in harmony with nature’. Besides emphasising the 
environmental achievements, the lyrics construct organic farming as an authentic kind of 
farming. After the first airing, the TV adverts continued but in a regular length (30 seconds)53, 
                                                     
52
 Yeo Valley is one of the largest dairy producers in the UK organic market. 
53
 The full length advert was posted on internet, and went ‘viral’, with over 1.6m views in the middle of 
January 2011. 
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and consumers were also targeted by magazine adverts and a website with video footage of 
the farm and with interviews with some of the staff of Yeo Valley. 
In January 2011, a third advertising campaign was launched to promote not any specific 
product but the organic sector as a whole. The initiators and coordinators of the campaign 
were the Organic Trade Board, representing the interests of producers and processors in the 
organic trade, and Sustain, an alliance of public interest groups promoting sustainable food 
and agriculture policies and practices. They secured £1m of EU funds for an information 
campaign which would respond to the issue identified in the 2003 EU Organic Action Plan 
that “consumers didn’t understand what ‘organic’ means” (DEFRA, 2008). The funds were 
conditional on match funding from the member state in which the campaign was to be held, 
and the OTB and Sustain gained the financial support of over seventy organisations including 
producers, processors, certification bodies, merchants, consultancies, research centres, 
advocacy organisations, a bank and two major retailers. In other words, this campaign is 
supported by the entire organic sector, and aims to increase sales by 15% over the three years 
that it will run.  
This campaign does not run through the medium of TV, but through adverts in some 
women’s magazines and in the magazines of the major supermarkets. It is aimed at increasing 
the consumer base of organic by “[...] help[ing] consumers to discover exactly what it means 
and why it’s worth it, with the ultimate aim of driving sales up. The adverts aim to challenge 
perceptions by featuring everyday individuals who would not normally be associated with 
buying organic” (Huw Bowles, chairman of the Organic Trade Board, quoted in Farmers 
Weekly [FWI, 2011]; see figure 7.2 for the two magazine adverts). What organic means 
according to this campaign is explained by highlighting the benefits of organic food in terms 
of animal welfare, environment, health and taste. This is done through a website associated 
with the campaign, which provides brief explanations of these benefits, and elaborates on the 
theme of the campaign ‘Why I love organic’ by providing a quiz through which consumers 
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can determine their reasons for buying organic. This quiz results in four different profiles 
which relate to the benefits listed above.  
 
Figure 7.2: Magazine adverts of the 'Why I love organic' campaign 
As such, each of the three campaigns emphasises only a few aspects of how organic is 
different from conventional, instead of addressing the multitude of aspects potentially 
recognised by consumers. They do not elaborate on the multitude of ways through which 
organic stuff is produced: organic is represented as a homogeneous entity. Also, none of the 
campaigns refers to the standards that need to be enacted in order to produce organic food. 
While the lyrics of the Yeo Valley advert refer to being with the Soil Association, this is not 
explained—rather, it provides a rhyme word for ‘conservation’ which is brought in to inform 
consumers about the environmental management that is undertaken by Yeo Valley. 
Explaining what organic is towards consumers consequently takes the shape of constructing 
difference with conventional products through a selection of benefits that organic farming 
delivers. 
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Organic standards, therefore, are invisible for consumers. What is visible is an effect of 
organic standards: a label indicating that a product is ‘organic’. Indeed, as mentioned above, 
this visibility is essential for organic products to compete with other products on retailers’ 
shelves. This raises questions about how organic standards structure difference between 
conventional and organic; how do standards relate to the markets that are constituted through 
their presence? In this chapter I specifically focus on how the enactment of standards shapes 
markets, i.e. the specific doings through which new markets are created. This chapter does not 
explicitly describe the everyday activities of market actors, as things like buying, selling and 
marketing are largely the same in organic and conventional markets. What I do focus on is the 
mechanism through which difference between conventional and organic is created and 
maintained, the organisation of the organic ‘space’, and the activities of actors attempting to 
provide additional coordination mechanisms in this newly created space. 
The chapter will proceed as follows. In the next section I will suggest that this dynamic 
can be conceptualised in terms of standards being a market device, a sociotechnical 
arrangement through which a market is constituted, and that the process of singularisation—
making something recognisable for other actors—is useful in conceptualising how boundaries 
between markets are made. I argue that the market device of organic standards fulfils two 
main functions: it establishes a clear difference between conventional markets and organic 
markets, but at the same time ensures that organic markets are compatible with each other. I 
then briefly introduce the setting of organic agriculture in the UK before arguing on the basis 
of my empirical data that the distributed enactment of standards results in a multiplicity of 
‘organics’ the contours of which define a fragmented common space demarcated by 
boundaries that can only be partially maintained. This space and these boundaries do enable 
singularisation of many products (united by the organic label), but this is only possible as a 
result of activities to remove or suppress the multiplicity of organic standards at the final stage 
of marketing. 
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7.2  Standards as market device 
The label ‘organic’ on a product does not tell consumers about how this product was 
produced; as noted above, organic standards remain invisible as consumers are only informed 
about the effects of the ‘standards at work’. The specific trajectories of products that are 
governed by organic standards are folded into the single notion of ‘organic’ on the packaging 
of these products. The organic label is vital in separating markets for ‘sustainable’ and 
conventional products. But as we have seen, this status does not necessarily matter for how 
food is consumed: a consumer may prefer to buy an organic carrot for its ‘sustainable’ 
credentials, but this will not substantially alter the way in which the carrot will be cleaned, 
chopped, cooked and eaten. In short, the effect of an added quality—being organic—is most 
obviously important for how it segments the market. The segmentation of a market depends 
on two specific processes both accomplished by voluntary product standards: the first is to 
coordinate elements in a sociomaterial landscape (see chapters 4, 5 and 6), the result of which 
is (or can be) used to differentiate between products (this chapter). Second, standards specify 
properties of objects and processes, separating them out and making them available as a 
distinct category. Once established, this category can be positioned in relation to others, for 
example in terms of environment, health, welfare or morality. Both processes have been 
theorised within sociology, anthropology, and economics (e.g. Katz and Shapiro, 1985; 
Brunsson et al., 2000; Egan, 2001; Henson and Reardon, 2005).While there are notable 
exceptions, many of these accounts are limited in that the market is conceptualised as a given 
entity, i.e. standards supposedly help organise an economic reality. As such, these accounts 
fail to analyse how markets are made through practice and consequently do not theorise how 
the enactment of standards shapes (aspects of) markets (for a brief overview of a practice 
based approach to markets see for instance Kjellberg and Helgesson, 2006, and Araujo et al., 
2008, or for a longer argument for studying the enactment of markets see MacKenzie, 2009b, 
and Araujo, et al., 2010a). For the purpose of this chapter I mobilise two conceptualisations 
which specifically address the enactment of markets (Callon, 1998).  
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To conceptualise the way in which standards coordinate elements in a sociomaterial 
landscape, I draw on the idea of a market device as proposed by Muniesa et al. (2007). They 
see this as a specific form of an economic agencement, i.e. a socio-technical agencement that 
enacts particular forms of what it is to be ‘economic’ (2007: 4). In other words, a market 
device is the arrangement of actors, institutions and objects through which specific objects or 
processes are rendered ‘economic’, where Muniesa et al. emphasise ‘rendering’ rather than 
what ‘economic’ should mean. They argue that the meaning of ‘economic’ in the context of a 
particular agencement is the outcome of a process of “economization” which is historical, 
contingent and disputable. Thus, market devices are “...objects, instruments, tools and 
techniques (i.e., technologies in the largest sense, that enable market activities” (Muniesa, 
2008: 291). For instance, Sjögren and Helgesson (2007) discuss how different 
pharmaceuticals and treatments are made commensurable, i.e. economised, through the 
concept of the quality-adjusted-life-year (QALY). The metrology of the QALY mediates 
between different pre-existing classification schemes for drugs and allows policy makers to 
determine which treatments will be reimbursable. Therefore, the QALY as a market device 
allows the comparison of differently framed treatments on an economic basis: through a 
historical, contingent process different treatments have become economic (exchangeable) 
within the space created by the QALY. Other examples of market devices are things like 
pricing equations which contribute to the construction of financial markets (MacKenzie, 
2006), telephones which configure how trades are made in trading rooms of financial 
institutions (Muniesa, 2008), or schemes through which different carbon markets are made 
commensurable (MacKenzie, 2009a). 
Applying the concept of market device to a sociotechnical arrangement formed by 
standards and the associated complex of actors and objects implies that voluntary product 
standards, unlike the QALY, construct an additional quality on the basis of which a 
completely new set of markets is made. More precisely, an existing market is redefined as 
‘conventional’, and in parallel a similar market emerges which is ‘qualified’. The main point 
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is that the presence of standards makes the conventional market fundamentally incompatible 
with the ‘qualified’ market: conventional products are by definition excluded from the 
‘qualified’ market. Thus, by coordinating a sociomaterial landscape through classification 
(Bowker and Star, 2000), standards create markets and simultaneously erect a boundary 
between those markets and the ‘unqualified’ markets. However, as suggested above, they do 
more. If a standard governs more than one market (for instance organic standards govern 
arable and livestock agriculture as well as aquaculture and processing), all of these ‘qualified’ 
markets become compatible: products from one market can serve as input to products in other 
markets (this is not dissimilar to what the QALY does). This coordination of markets internal 
to the market device is a result of the specifying property of standards: when technical 
properties of objects and practices are specified in similar terms, these objects and practices 
become compatible—they can circulate in the common space defined by organic standards.  
The process of differentiation is about how to make the boundary between conventional 
and ‘qualified’ products visible for consumers and actors within supply chains. Actors such as 
the standard setter, the adopter and the actor verifying the adoption are involved in this, as 
they classify products and processes within what Callon et al. (2002) termed an ‘economy of 
qualities’. They argue that competition in an economy of qualities is structured through 
singularisation of products and the attachment/detachment of consumers to goods. Crudely 
put, singularisation is a process of making something distinct, bounded, familiar, recognisable. 
But this process of letting something (a product) stand out requires that there is a basis of 
resemblance with other products: “[t]he singularization of a product, which allows its 
attachment to a particular consumer, is obtained against a background of similitude” (Callon 
et al., 2002: 203). Hence, the visible presence of an additional quality (such as a standard or 
its associated label or logo) helps in making a product singular in a particular way: this 
product was produced in accordance with additional standards whereas another, similar, 
product was not. In other words, the process of singularising products reproduces one or more 
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of the boundaries introduced by the market device. Therefore, the singularisation of products 
enacts the market-constituting component of the market device.  
Thus, the concepts of market device and singularisation are powerful tools to analyse 
how markets are performed: they draw attention to the ways in which markets are constituted 
through different sets of practices (see also Kjellberg and Helgesson, 2006, and Araujo et al., 
2010a). Yet, although these concepts do help shed some light on how constellations of actors 
are involved in enacting standards and markets, they do not reveal the specific practices 
through which boundaries are created and maintained between conventional and ‘sustainable’ 
markets, or show how compatibility within ‘qualified’ markets is organised. In the next 
section I therefore examine how these processes relate to the enactment of standards for 
organic agriculture in the UK.  
7.3  Cultivating exclusion 
“But for an inspector coming along is it easy to verify which one is which and 
which variety, physically do they look different?” (MvdK) 
“No. No, they look identical, except that maybe the organic [grain] will have more 
weed seeds in it, in the sample, and the non-organic will be a cleaner sample, 
maybe. Having said that all the crops go through a cleaner so by the end of it, it 
should be fairly similar.” (Farm manager Fergus) 
From the moment a crop is harvested and cleaned, there are few ways, if at all, of 
distinguishing whether it was grown organically: it is impossible for consumers, and even for 
processors in a supply chain, to assess how a product was grown. Thus, the visible application 
of the label ‘organic’ is the only way through which products can be singularised on retailers’ 
shelves and throughout supply chains. However, this label ‘organic’ itself is not singular: as 
discussed in the previous chapter and in Chapter 3, there are multiple certification bodies 
which all have their own ways of certifying licensees—even with the standardised 
certification processes and the coordinated interpretations. Moreover, the historical 
importance of the Soil Association in setting organic standards before the introduction of the 
EU regulation, the UK policy context is particular in that private standard setters are allowed 
to add standards beyond the regulatory minimum. This means that DEFRA requires each of 
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the seven certification bodies to administer the European regulation as the legal minimum, but 
beyond that each body can include additional standards against which practices will be 
assessed. Most notable, two schemes, the Soil Association and the Biodynamic Agricultural 
Association, have additional standards which are regarded as higher (stricter) than the legal 
minimum. Some of these additional standards are prominently marketed in the public domain 
with claims that these schemes for instance provide better animal welfare and restrict the 
presence of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) even further.  
As such, there are multiple versions of organic standards. They have the EU regulation in 
common, but beyond that they vary in their interpretation of how organic agriculture should 
be practised. Therefore, producers have access to different channels through which they can 
singularise their products: as Soil Association organic, Biodynamic (Demeter) organic, or 
‘plain’ organic (which means according to the EU regulations, not including additional 
standards). Being certified by for example the Soil Association may require compliance with 
standards beyond the legal minimum, but in return provide additional benefits in the market 
due to the Soil Association’s stance on animal welfare. This would suggest that the 
certification bodies are in competition with each other over what their version of organic 
standards offer producers. However, for most farmers this seems less relevant than other 
factors: 
“I honestly think that most farmers are making choices based on what they know 
their neighbours to be doing, or in some cases looking at the cost of the 
certification scheme rather than a detailed consideration, what the differences and 
standards are. I think the standards are too long and complicated for most farmers 
to spend a lot of time making contrasts, so if their neighbour says something 
they’ll go with it or if their adviser says something they’ll go with that.” (Roland) 
For producers in the smaller nations of the UK, social identity is an additional dimension 
to choosing a scheme: Roland added that over the last few years farmers in Wales and 
Scotland had chosen for a regional scheme specifically because the scheme is operated for 
Welsh or Scottish producers.  
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But social networks and cost of the schemes are not the only deciding factors. My 
respondents described how in general farmers navigate a complex world full of general and 
specific farming practice, regulations, European and UK agricultural policy measures, 
standards, and markets for produce as well as services. In attempts to coordinate some of these 
elements and to manage their implications in relation to the characteristics of individual farms, 
farmers, consultants, contractors, managers and NGOs take on varying roles and provide a 
wide range of services to each other. Farmers can buy in services ranging from technical 
expertise and agronomy to marketing support and from equipment and manpower to 
administrative services. In this field, certification bodies, dedicated sector organisations, trade 
associations and mainstream service providers are competing to deliver different levels of 
service with different levels of competence. To help producers manage some of these 
complexities, some of the organic schemes offer additional services alongside organic 
certification, such as general farm assurance schemes and access to advice. For farmers this is 
attractive as in a combined scheme multiple certificates are assessed during one inspection, an 
arrangement that reduces the number of inspections. For one of my respondents this was a 
sufficient advantage to remain licensed with a certification body while being dissatisfied with 
how the organisation had failed to support her on some organic matters: 
“There is a lot of story to that, but I sort of felt somewhat let down by them and I 
have considered going, there are other smaller organisations and I’m somebody 
who the smaller the organisation is the more I like it, but what they’re offering me 
now, which has kept me with them is the […] general farm assurance certification 
as well as the organic in one package.” (Farmer Frances) 
So rather than contrasting the technical details of different sets of standards, most farmers 
choose a certification scheme based on social, economic and operational considerations which 
relate to the setting in which the scheme is to operate. While certification bodies cannot shape 
the social network of a farmer, they can influence these considerations through the cost of the 
scheme and the additional services provided. This suggests that, rather than there being a 
market just for standards, there is a market for services surrounding certification: different 
versions of organic standards are not in direct competition but can coexist as each certification 
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scheme provides a slightly different package. The EU regulation provides the common basis 
on which the different schemes can connect (a point I will return to below), but other than that 
each individual set of standards and related services constitutes a distinct package. 
However, this is not to suggest that the specific interpretations of how organic agriculture 
should be practised are not relevant: the farmers who do choose actively between different 
certification bodies do so, according to a consultant, based on their ‘ethical’ stance towards 
organic farming. He suggested that if the organic principles are leading in the choice, farmers 
would choose higher standards, but where going organic is essentially a means to access that 
market, farmers might choose lower standards. This was echoed by a number of respondents: 
“So there’s a tension there between producers who are driven by the organic 
principles and who use the standards way of supporting and being able to achieve 
those principles; and producers who are looking just to access the market and the 
standards are a necessary hurdle to get over but they’re not particularly worried 
about going any further steps.” (Researcher Roland) 
“So, you have the purist is too strong, but the people who really take the principles 
to heart and say the true road is the only one we should go. You’ve got the Soil 
Association who are a bit below that. They certainly got far above the minimum 
standards but they still see the practical issues. Then you’ve got a few people, 
you’ve got another, you then grade down through that to people who are looking at 
it very much more on a commercial basis and the standards, and the actual 
production that’s happened is much ... has come together much more over time, 
certainly.” (Policy maker Peter) 
These comments suggest that that the way in which standards are positioned and viewed 
differs: for commercially minded producers compliance with standards is a means to market, 
but for producers for whom there is an ideal organic to work towards organic standards 
provide guidance on how to get to that point. As such, this leads to the enactment of different 
‘organics’. But while these producers might still draw on the same sets of standards, there are 
other ways in which different ‘organics’ are enacted: 
“That provides quite an interesting issue for debate at the moment as to who owns 
the organic idea. Is organic just defined by the standards and the regulations? Is 
there any other concept of organic that is separate from that? There is a group 
which will say ‘we are uncomfortable with the way organic is now reflected in 
standards, but we believe it should be more than those’ ... People talk about 
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‘beyond organic’ as a sort of phrase. ... It seems to me this division between 
certified organic and other more radical ideas is a matter of degree rather than a 
fundamental split but that’s one of the debates that’s ongoing.” (Roland) 
“... there’s quite a lot of Eastern European, Eurasian organic arable production that 
is very dubious in terms of the certification and I don’t mean that in terms of ‘oh 
well, it’s conventionally produced and they just falsify documentation and sell it as 
organic’. There is quite a lot of evidence that natural grass load is being ploughed 
in order to produce cereals ... [but] it isn’t what I would consider to be organic in 
terms of there’s no fertility building, there’s no rotation of the land ... I see that as 
an exploitation of natural resource which doesn’t for me fit very comfortably with 
the organic principle.” (Merchant Michael) 
Again, this implies that there is a multiplicity of ‘organics’: they are different objects 
which are enacted through different instantiations of market making. Some versions are 
codified by standards, but there are also ‘organics’ which are enacted at a distance from 
standards. It is nonetheless important to remember that differences between standards and 
approaches to implementing them are suppressed so as not to confuse consumers (although 
some specific differences in codified ‘organics’ are emphasised, e.g. Soil Association welfare 
standards)54: 
“Yes, which is where the danger is, that the consumer doesn’t care about the 
plethora of standard bodies, it just wants to buy organic food and it thinks it’s all 
the same and it thinks it’s all organic. … because if we give the consumer all this 
confusion they’re just going to walk away.” (Adviser Adrian) 
Many respondents made similar comments, which suggests that competing over 
standards is difficult: most differences between schemes need to be suppressed in relation to 
the consumer. Thus, boundaries within the organic sector are subdued so as to protect it from 
losing consumers to schemes perceived to be less ambiguous (such as free-range). In effect 
maintaining the boundaries of this essentially homogenised image of organic with 
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 It could be argued that if consumers would choose their products arbitrarily, retaining the notion of 
different ‘organics’ would not be necessary. While this may appear so for many products, the difference 
between some of the codified organics is emphasised towards consumers through a small selection of 
products. What is more, while for consumers there might not be a discernible difference between 
products marketed through different instantiations, it is relevant to actors in supply chains as it affects 
the markets for inputs and feeds (as I will explain below).  
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conventional agriculture depends on glossing over differences in the practices that are 
allowed. Some respondents gave specific examples of this: the fact that animal feed rations 
can be partly non-organic (due to shortages in organic supply), and how conventional 
marketing mechanisms (which, to some, do not always reflect the organic principles) had 
become part of organic trade in response to supermarket pressure. Merchant Michael, who 
was concerned with the marketing mechanisms, suggested that all actors in the organic sector 
had “become part of the conspiracy” so as not to “undermine what the organic brand is”. He 
suggested that disentangling organic products from their ‘conventional’ (and essentially anti-
organic) market structures would be near impossible as this would inevitably lead to 
disqualification of a substantial range of products which would damage consumer confidence 
in organic agriculture. In contrast, Adrian, who talked at length about the feed issue, suggested 
that the organic sector would need to inform consumers about the way in which the current 
standards allow non-organic elements in organic production systems—mainly to pre-empt 
negative publicity which would damage the organic sector. He described current practice as 
‘near organic’ and argued that the separation between organic and conventional should be 
complete rather than partial.  
These points seem to suggest that even if the enactment of these organics in local practice 
is very different, the diffusion of ‘organic’ in general depends on preserving this as a coherent 
term. This diffusion is possible through the qualifying mechanism in organic standards: what 
counts for consumers are the elements which draw on moral claims, i.e. the differences 
between organic and conventional products (see for example Larssæther, 2010); the technical 
elements of how organic farming practices and certification are coordinated and performed are 
irrelevant to consumers in their everyday consumption of organic foods. Hence, the detail of 
organic standards remains invisible. 
But consumer markets are not the only markets which are shaped through the market 
device: the markets for inputs and livestock feed are configured as well. For instance, most 
cereals grown will go into feed rations for livestock; they ‘disappear’ in the supply chain 
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before hitting the shelves. This means that the differences between multiple ‘organics’ within 
supply chains need to be managed to facilitate trade. Moreover, there is not one single organic 
market, but many different markets that need to be made compatible. As such, the different 
organics need to be managed throughout supply chains. The EU regulations form the basis for 
this, and my respondents indicated that actors regard certified organic ingredients as 
unproblematic within the supply chain (see also the next chapter). Trade within supply chains 
is managed on a practical level by going back to legal minimum—all products are 
singularised as ‘plain’ organic. Therefore, the regulations coordinate between different 
organics by providing common standards through which different, partly overlapping markets 
become compatible. However, as the Soil Association and Biodynamic standards are in some 
areas higher than the EU minimum, there are issues of equivalence for some products. For 
example, if a product like a chicken and leek pie is to be sold as Soil Association certified, all 
ingredients must be in line with Soil Association standards—including the chicken or egg 
which might come from a producer licensed by a different certification body. This is resolved 
by an abbreviated checklist of items that other certification bodies need to have checked while 
inspecting their licensees. There are sometimes tensions around this process, but it seems that 
differences in ‘organics’ have been negotiated away at least as far as the supply chain is 
concerned.  
But the coordination provided by the regulation is not complete: while the practical 
trajectory of crops and products is made possible by the regulation and equivalence checks, 
this does not mean the linked markets are coordinated. For example, some respondents 
commented that there is a disparity between the supply and demand of organic cereals and 
protein crops for the dairy and beef industry. They suggested that the organic dairy and beef 
sectors grew rapidly, but that the arable sector was not able to grow at the same rate55. This 
led to the allowance of non-organic protein and cereal crops as livestock feed, making it 
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 As will be clear from my discussion in Chapter 4, converting cattle based enterprises to organic is 
fairly easy, especially compared to converting arable operations.  
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harder for organic arable producers to find a market for their organic crops. Adrian argued that 
this had ‘stunted’ the development of the organic cereal sector. He suggested that if the 
growth of the markets had been coordinated, this would have resulted in a more balanced 
organic sector—although the sector overall would have grown slower. This suggests that the 
common space delineated by the diverse organic markets—the organic sector—is 
fragmented56. This stretches beyond disparities between markets: several respondents 
described how they attempted to provide coordination mechanisms beyond those provided by 
organic standards so as to help producers navigate this fragmented space. 
For instance, to address the opacity that characterises organic market transaction, a 
marketing organisation is trying to coordinate market transactions so that there is more 
transparency in the supply chain and so that farmers can gain a reasonable profit while leaving 
others in the chain with equally reasonable profits. To improve the quality of advice services 
available to farmers, a group of consultants is trying to establish standards for organic advice. 
Consultancies host events to facilitate the sharing and exchange of knowledge between 
farmers and consultants. Meanwhile, the certification bodies coordinate on how to interpret 
common standards so that the integrity of organic standards is maintained and so that farmers 
are inspected in a comparable way. DEFRA is trying to coordinate how standards for organic 
agriculture as enshrined in the EU regulations are administered, how new standards will be 
implemented and how the organic sector is supported. The two main research centres for 
organic agriculture are trying to coordinate research that is conducted and ensure that 
information and knowledge is disseminated, for example by organising discussion groups 
among farmers. 
Although not all of these coordination attempts are aimed at the same level, their 
presence implies that the actors involved want to provide some kind of integration or sharing 
                                                     
56
 While this is noticeable at the level of producers and traders, for consumers this is not visible: the 
greatest fragmentation is between grain-fed livestock enterprises and feed cereals (cereals used in 
consumer products—e.g. bread or steak and ale pie—are of a different grade than feed cereals, and 
therefore this fragmentation is not visible through cereal shortages in consumer markets). 
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in areas related to organic standards but where the standards do not reach. More importantly, 
these actors are all situated in the organic sector: there are no coordination attempts which 
specifically address the organisation of the organic sector by actors active in both the 
conventional and organic spaces (e.g. the National Farmers’ Union, large corporations). In 
fact, the practices of boundary-spanning corporate actors result in strong interactions between 
qualified markets and their conventional counterparts. For instance, the price fluctuations of 
organic cereals over the past five years tracked the fluctuations of conventional cereals. 
Various respondents indicated that although there are a number of specialised merchants who 
trade only organic produce, large quantities of organic produce is marketed by large traders 
who mostly trade conventional produce and for whom organic is a niche market. This implies 
that while organic standards constitute principally and technically different markets from their 
conventional counterparts, the organisation of trade in these markets strongly links 
conventional and organic markets. Put differently, as a market device organic standards 
configure only specific aspects of the markets they constitute: they render organic products 
‘economic’ but do not necessarily configure the socioeconomic relations through which these 
markets are enacted. 
7.4  Conclusion: enacting standards, multiple organics 
This chapter illustrates some of the ways in which standards enable market activities. It is 
clear that from a theoretical point standards could be considered a very strong market device 
in that they make ‘qualified’ products fundamentally incompatible with ‘unqualified’ 
products. However, as the empirical case shows, it is not possible to establish a market for 
‘sustainable’ products through standards alone. The multi-sited reproduction of different 
versions of organic standards results in a multiplicity of organics which are enacted through a 
horizontally and vertically segmented array of markets. These markets require additional 
coordination mechanisms to maintain the compatibility required for the functioning of the 
organic sector—these mechanisms are integral to the market device. But the resulting 
boundaries with other markets, and the constructed compatibility among ‘qualified’ markets, 
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are homogenised only to a limited extent. While diverse organic standards act as market 
device that renders organic products ‘economic’, this is not the whole story. The distributed 
enactment of multiple organic standards results in a multiplicity of markets which is 
characterised by a fragmented common space and boundaries that can only be partially 
maintained. This space and these boundaries do enable singularisation of products, but to do 
so require the performance of three related activities by a number of actors: simplification of 
‘organic’ to consumers, active suppression of controversies and internal differences towards 
consumers and within supply chains, and the provision of coordination mechanisms not 
embedded in organic standards. A crucial aspect here is the need to remove or suppress the 
multiplicity of organic standards at the final stage of marketing as part of a ‘totalising’ 
strategy to format market exchanges (Araujo et al., 2010b: 236) so that ‘organic’ can be 
constructed as a homogeneous entity which provides clear and distinct benefits. 
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Chapter 8 Policy interventions for organic farming 
8.1  Introduction 
In Chapters 4 and 5 I described different aspects of ‘doing’ organic, and discussed some 
implications of ‘going’ organic. But doing organic is not only set in general farming practice, 
it is also set in a policy context which in part shapes how organic can be done. For example, in 
the stage prior to going organic, a farmer explores and finds out what going and doing organic 
would entail for his or her farm. Some farmers will attend events where organic farming is 
explained, others may visit colleagues on organic holdings, and yet again others may discuss 
options with a consultant or with a representative of a certification body. Apart from these 
routes, there is one formal channel through which farmers can receive information and advice 
about organic farming and the conversion process. The DEFRA-funded Organic Conversion 
Information Service (OCIS) provides support for farmers thinking about conversion by 
offering information leaflets, a freephone helpline and free on-farm visits where experienced 
organic consultants provide advice about whether a holding could be run to organic standards, 
about the certification process and about what conversion would mean for the farm in terms of 
business planning, marketing of produce and some agronomic considerations. Since 
converting a farm will lead to a substantial loss of income during the conversion time (usually 
two years) as land is taken out of production to build fertility in the soil, the advice will 
certainly include information on funding available to support farmers going and doing 
organic. In England57, there is currently one scheme offering subsidies for this: DEFRA funds 
the Organic Entry-Level Stewardship (OELS) to provide a conversion grant and subsidies for 
the organic management of land. 
As a policy intervention by DEFRA to support organic farmers, OCIS and OELS apply 
equally to dairy farmers in the West Country, arable farmers in East Anglia, poultry rearers in 
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 In Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland there are nation-specific schemes funded by the devolved 
governments of these nations. 
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Lincolnshire, sheep farmers in Cumbria, and vegetable growers in Kent irrespective of the 
social, economic or material conditions of the farm. Another intervention for the organic 
sector regulates the certification process by controlling and coordinating between the 
certification bodies. These interventions therefore are intended to (re)shape how complexes of 
practice are or can be enacted. As policy makers cannot go out and monitor and steer each and 
every individual enactment, they try to structure at least some of the dimensions of possible 
enactments by providing rules, incentives, penalties, etc. Some of these mechanisms enable a 
practice by constraining possible performances (regulatory structures), others try to shape 
individual performances (funding). Thus, the policy interventions for organic farming in 
England shape certain aspects of ‘doing’ organic in all of its multiplicity. How is this 
achieved? In particular, how are these interventions configured to enable and constrain how 
organic can be enacted in the UK? In this chapter I examine the national and international 
layering of regulation on organic farming and the policy support for the organic sector in 
England. 
As such, the empirical story moves away from specific organic standards like the Soil 
Association standards as the policy interventions discussed here are based on the EU 
regulation. Therefore, this chapter is not about the enactment of standards in a direct sense, 
but about “how policy functions in the shaping of society” (Wedel et al., 2005: 35), or more 
precisely in the shaping of a particular segment of agricultural practice. In this, I do not 
attempt to deconstruct what the policy58 for organic farming is or whether this is effectively 
achieved. Instead, I focus on the configuration of specific policy interventions, a term which I 
will use to describe the actual instruments employed by policy makers in attempts to reshape 
how practices are enacted. Although I will provide some details of the policy goals around 
which these interventions are designed, I will not examine in detail how these goals were 
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 (Public) policy as a concept is very hard to authoritatively define, as Wedel et al. (2005) have pointed 
out, and trying to do so would not be of interest to the current discussion. 
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defined or how they shape specific discourses around organic farming. For more details about 
the historical emergence of these goals, see Tomlinson (2008, 2010). 
The chapter proceeds as follows: in the next section I argue that policy interventions are 
at the intersection of practice and the doing of policy making, the latter being a situated 
practice itself. I suggest that the way in which they affect sets of practices requires describing 
them in terms of the type of instrument (regulatory, incentives, etc.), which practices are 
targeted, the components and infrastructures which are required for their enactment, and the 
conditions under which they were designed. Based on this notion, I suggest that there are two 
policy interventions for organic farming in England in the form of a regulatory structure and 
financial and advisory support for farmers. In sections 8.3 and 8.4 I describe how these policy 
interventions are configured. I suggest that the regulatory structure forms a precondition to 
doing organic, and that the support for farmers is framed as providing public benefits. I argue 
that this support is based on devices which establish a simple, quantifiable relation between 
organic farming and environmental benefit—devices in which a singular organic is mobilised. 
In section 8.5 I argue that policy makers are actively involved in homogenising the organic 
sector in a way which proceeds alongside, but not in the same way, as that involved in the 
construction of ‘organic’ as a single, recognisable category in terms of which consumption 
can be organised. I conclude that policy making does not determine what organic is, but that it 
establishes a frame in which farmers respond and to which they adjust what they do. 
8.2  Shaping practice through policy interventions 
Interventions at the intersection of practices 
Policy interventions are usually designed to provide benefits to particular societal 
segments or even entire societies through the reshaping of what actors in that sphere of social 
interaction do. While governments cannot “flick a switch [so that] everything happens” (Lang, 
1998: 110), policy makers can try to influence practitioners by means of a number of different 
instruments, such as legislation, subsidies, sanctions or discursive framings, which can be 
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applied to specific classes of activity and in particular (or sometimes general) settings 
depending on the conditions of the intervention. When they take the form of general rules (for 
example the culling of all animals at risk of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [BSE] 
whether or not they have the disease; Hinchcliffe, 2001), policy interventions are intended to 
affect interconnected sets of practices carried by different actors rather than focus on changing 
one particular practice (in the example of BSE, this included farmers, vets, administrators, 
etc.; see Law, 2010). But to talk of general rules does not mean that they are generic, or 
context independent: the trajectory of a policy intervention is the outcome of a social and 
political process governed by historically contingent administrative and (dominant) discursive 
practices. As various practice-based studies of policy making (e.g. Hajer, 1995; Wagenaar and 
Cook, 2003; Wagenaar, 2004, Laws and Hajer, 2006; Tomlinson, 2008) have shown, 
interventions are not just designed and implemented in a top-down approach: they have a 
much more emergent and negotiated character as general rules need to be tinkered with to 
make policy interventions work. 
Despite the interesting insights that these studies offer, the relation between the ‘doing’ 
of policy making and the reshaping of practitioners’ doings has not been conceptualised in 
terms that are useful for the current discussion. Also, in accounts that develop theories of 
practice (e.g. Giddens, 1984; Schatzki, 1996), the intersection of practices carried by different 
sets of actors (such as policy makers and farmers) has not been explicitly described. For 
instance, Schatzki (1996) refers to the possibility of orchestration through which practices can 
be directed, but this would, as I read it, still come from actors associated with the orchestrated 
practice. Finally, accounts which describe how practices change over time and space (e.g. 
Shove, 2003; Shove and Pantzar, 2005, Warde, 2005, Shove et al., 2007; Shove et al., 2009) 
focus on the dynamics of emergence, reproduction and disappearance of individual practices; 
they do not necessarily examine the relation between practices and the policy context in which 
these practices are enacted. 
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One recent study describes more specifically how policy and practice are related: Shove 
and Walker (2010) provide some useful considerations of how policy interventions influence 
practices. Their account contributes to a debate in the literature on infrastructural transitions 
towards sustainability by opening up questions about how such transitions can be governed by 
policy makers given the dynamics of how practices are reproduced and how they emerge and 
disappear. They illustrate how interventions have unintended consequences alongside 
intended outcomes, and argue that both types of outcomes are unstable and emergent in that 
constituent elements are continuously reconfigured in relation to each other. As there is “a 
central role that practitioners themselves play in generating, sustaining and overthrowing 
everyday practices” (2010: 476), the governance of practice cannot be understood adequately 
if the role of practitioners is limited to being mere ‘users’ of a infrastructure which is shaped 
solely by policy makers and corporate actors. Instead, by emphasising the uncontrollable 
character of how practices change, Shove and Walker argue that policy makers and corporate 
actors can no longer be regarded as the key players in how practices change and transform 
into more or less sustainable configurations. This implies that policy makers and corporate 
actors can only control a limited array of conditions governing the enactment of practice. 
What is more, they do not steer from an external position: 
“[...] it is misleading to imagine or suppose the existence of sources or forces of 
influence that are somehow external to the reproduction and transformation of 
practice. [...] Yet these actors can and do influence the availability and circulation 
of elements knitted together in the course of daily life.” (2010: 475)  
As such, policy interventions shape some of the conditions which enable and constrain 
how practices are enacted—not as an external influence on practice but perhaps by modifying 
the ‘elements’ of which practices are constituted. Hence, a policy intervention is located at the 
intersection of practices: they connect particular activities in administrative practice to the 
activities of groups of actors enacting interrelated sets of practice, i.e. complexes which are to 
be reshaped or adjusted through the policy intervention.  
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To conceptualise how policy interventions relate to the complex patterns of practice, it is 
helpful to consider one of the empirical cases in Shove and Walker’s article—the introduction 
of the London congestion charge scheme in 2003. In its simplest form, this scheme depends 
on enforcing a rule: a fixed charge applies to those who drive a car into the central London 
charging zone between defined times during the day59. On its own, this rule would do little to 
change patterns of mobility in and around the congestion charge zone. To enforce it, many 
further elements are required, for example traffic cameras, signage, a complex technological 
infrastructure, pay-points, a financial management and debt recovery system, and many more. 
Jointly, these elements make up the infrastructure through which the policy intervention is 
made real. From this example, several relevant points can be made: firstly, this intervention is 
based on several components, namely rules (codified in legislation), money and legally 
sanctioned mechanisms for its administration. Some of these instruments are only available to 
policy makers: no other actor would be able to capture rules in legislation or mobilise 
sanctions such as fines. Secondly, the constituting components are mobilised not in isolation, 
but as entities that hang together as the intervention contains prescriptions of how they refer to 
each other. Thirdly, each of these components comes with its own, often complex 
infrastructure(s) for its enactment (e.g. a banking system, a system of sanctions). In fact, 
without these systems such components could not be mobilised.  
These components set conditions for certain modes of doing things—including an 
attempt to re-structure practices. This attempt is based on an ability to control elements which 
are likely to influence what practitioners do. For example, coercive resources set different 
conditions compared to incentives or information provision; but not all actors are equally 
susceptible to coercion—for some, other instruments may be more suitable to effecting 
change. Moreover, as noted above, policy making is itself locally situated. Policy goals and 
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 When the scheme was introduced, the charge was £5 between 7am and 6.30pm. In 2005 the charge 
was elevated to £8, and in 2007 the charge period was shortened to 6pm while the charge area was 
extended. 
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priorities are subject to changes in the social, economic and political context of ‘doing’ policy 
making. For example, initiatives to cut red tape for practitioners, budget cuts, and political 
changes in government affect the extent to which certain instruments (e.g. rules, sanctions, 
incentives, enforcement mechanisms, with their infrastructures) can be mobilised. 
These points suggest that to examine the way in which policy interventions affect sets of 
practices requires describing them not only in terms of the type of instrument (regulatory, 
incentives, etc.) and which practices are targeted, but also in terms of the components and 
infrastructures which are required for their enactment, and the conditions under which they 
were designed. Before analysing in detail the policy interventions for organic agriculture as 
enacted in the UK in subsequent sections, I briefly sketch out the historical emergence of the 
policy context for organic farming, and describe the two policy interventions which shaped 
the organic sector at the time of my fieldwork. 
Policy interventions for organic farming 
“[...] I think the big changes in the last two decades organic farming has become an 
accepted part of government policy for achieving marketing and environmental 
marketing rules and long term goals; whereas right through until the late 1980s 
most governments would have felt that it was contradictory to what they were 
trying to achieve so there’s been a big shift in government attitude. That has 
changed the types of policies that are available.” (Researcher Roland) 
Until the late 1980s EU agricultural policy was aimed at increasing productivity through 
technological development. In organic farming, a number of those key technologies were 
rejected which meant that there was no government support for organic farming. From the 
mid-1980s, the increase in consumer demand for organic produce and problems with 
environmental degradation and surplus production led to the recognition that organic farming 
could potentially contribute to policy objectives (Padel and Lampkin, 2007). After national 
standards were drawn up in various EU member states in the 1980s (mostly to protect 
consumers from fraud), the first EU regulation on organic food (EC, 1991) was published in 
1991 (to be effective from 1 January 1993). In accordance with this regulation, the UK 
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government passed its own Organic Products Regulation in 1992, in which the requirements 
of the EU regulation were embedded in UK law. After a number of updates, the UK 
government passed a revised regulation in 2004, and again in 2009, the latter on the basis of 
the updated EU regulation on organic production (EC, 2007).  
Secondly, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) introduced 
financial aid for converting farms in the UK in 1994 alongside support for marketing 
initiatives and research, followed by the Organic Conversion Information Service in 1996 
(Padel, 2001). Both policy interventions were specifically intended to expand consumer 
choice and support an infant industry to the point where it could independently compete in 
established markets (Padel and Lampkin, 2007). Specifically, the objective of increasing the 
market was tied to the proportion of organic produce supplied by British farmers to the home 
market: in 2002, they supplied around 30% of all organic produce consumed in the UK, and 
DEFRA policy was to increase this to at least 70%, mirroring the UK market share for home-
grown conventional produce (DEFRA, 2002). However, the financial aid was delivered as 
part of an EU-wide scheme promoting the management of environmental objectives through 
farming (albeit that individual member states could define how much would be paid), and by 
the time I did my fieldwork, policy support was formally no longer to support a fledgling 
market but only for the ‘public good’ aspect of organic farming: 
“The department’s policy is to encourage and support organic farming because of 
the environmental public benefits that it delivers. We recognise that it’s good for 
consumers to have a choice and the organic farming adds to that choice but that’s 
more a recognition of the fact rather than a reason for a support.” (Policy maker 
Philip)  
Philip explained that the main environmental benefit provided by organic farming is the 
increase in biodiversity on organic farms. He also indicated that organic farming “could be a 
tool for climate change mitigation”, but that this is not formally recognised yet. A secondary 
driver for policy support is the benefit that organic farming can deliver “for the rural 
economy, partly in terms of employment but partly organic farming, the research evidence 
seems to show, attracts a younger, more dynamic type of farmer who is interested in 
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something new”. But Philip was also quick to point out that “we don’t, I’d better say quickly, 
support it because we think it produces a more healthy, more nutritious product.” (Philip). 
Combined with the regulatory requirements for enacting the EU regulation, this general 
policy translates into two policy interventions for England60: 
 implementing of the EU regulations in the UK context and controlling the certification 
bodies through direct and indirect control; 
 supporting farmers through information provision, including through OCIS, the Institute 
of Organic Training and Advice (IOTA) and research institutions; and supporting farmers 
financially, through an organic option in the agri-environment scheme available in 
England. 
In the sections that follow, I will examine for each of these interventions how they are 
shaped and what the implications are for how certification and farming are done. 
8.3  Coordinating a UK-wide interpretation of the EU regulation 
To organise the enactment of the EU regulations in member states, the EU regulation on 
organic production stipulates that each member state should appoint a so-called competent 
authority to oversee the “organisation of official controls in the field of organic production in 
accordance with the provisions set out under this Regulation...” (EC, 2007: art. 2.n). In most 
EU member states, including the UK, this means that a ministry (usually of food and/or 
agriculture) is legally responsible for the effective implementation of the regulations in the 
context of the member state. These ‘official controls’ required to implement the EU regulation 
include at least three things. Firstly, competent authorities must ensure that the EU regulation 
is embedded in their national regulatory systems. In the UK, this is achieved through a 
Statutory Instrument (HMSO, 2009), which makes a number of clauses in the EU regulations 
                                                     
60
 In Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland the support for farmers is shaped by the devolved 
governments. This means that DEFRA is the competent authority and legislator for the EU regulation 
for the whole of the UK, and responsible for farmer support only for England. 
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specific to the UK context. For example, it defines relevant actors (such as the competent 
authority), states the exceptions and derogations that can be administered by certification 
bodies without reference to DEFRA, provides the conditions under which organic products 
can be imported into the UK, stipulates the structure of sanctions, etc. This means that through 
these generally applicable rules, rather than replicating the EU regulations, the UK regulations 
make explicit how the EU regulations are administered in the UK.  
The second aspect of implementing the EU regulation is to organise the certification of 
producers. The EU regulation allows the competent authority to devolve the day-to-day 
activities of inspecting and certifying licensees to either a public administrative organisation 
or to one or more “independent private third part[ies]” (EC, 2007: art. 2.p). In the latter case, 
the regulation stipulates that member states should “designate authorities responsible for the 
approval and supervision of such bodies” (EC, 2007: art. 27.4.b). The EU regulation includes 
a number of criteria that an organisation needs to comply with before it can be considered for 
a licence to operate as a certification body, the most important being that it is accredited to EN 
45011 (CEN, 1998) or ISO Guide 65 (ISO, 1996)—which are standards stipulating how 
certification processes should be shaped (see also Chapter 6). 
As outlined in Chapter 3, until 2003 the competent authority in the UK was the United 
Kingdom Register of Organic Food Standards (UKROFS). This executive non-departmental 
public body gave licences to operate to certification bodies, controlled their performance 
through witnessed inspections and audits, approved all inspectors doing organic inspections, 
and provided certification services to research centres. In 2003, UKROFS was replaced by 
ACOS, which took over the role of approving and controlling organic certification bodies 
(next to providing advice to DEFRA about interpretations as described below). However, 
some of UKROFS’s control measures, such as the approval of inspectors, were abolished. The 
accreditation of certification bodies according to EN 45011 was taken over by the United 
Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS). After a review of ACOS in 2007, the additional 
checks (control inspections where qualified inspectors carry out an independent inspection of 
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a licensee) of the certification bodies—which were routinely carried out by ACOS—were 
replaced in 2008 by additional control inspections by UKAS.  
While from a regulatory perspective (both UK and EU) this is an adequate and even 
desirable way of organising how certification bodies are controlled, for the certification bodies 
this is problematic: as SACL’s Technical Manager Theo suggested, DEFRA has no ability to 
audit UKAS, making it impossible for DEFRA to control the capabilities and resources that 
UKAS mobilises to accredit certification bodies61. Thus, although UKAS accreditation is a 
condition to operate as a certification body, the lack of control of DEFRA over this process 
fragments the policy intervention from the perspective of the certification bodies. However, as 
Peter explained, the choice of UKAS was a way to help reduce the cost for DEFRA and the 
administrative burden on the certification industry: 
“With shortage of funds the role [was] given to UKAS and the certification bodies 
themselves to ... it all fits in with the government policy of reducing burdens on the 
industry as a whole.” (Peter) 
Therefore, the delegation of regulating organic certification to certification bodies, 
UKAS and, until recently, ACOS, helped achieve other policy aims of reducing the cost of 
government and to cutting red tape. Yet, as Theo explained, DEFRA has not devolved all 
elements of the regulatory policy intervention:  
“[DEFRA] will issue us a letter to operate, permission to operate each year, which 
is dependent on (1) predominantly UKAS’s interpretation of what’s going on and 
whether we are compliant with ISO65 or not; and (2) anything else they think is 
important and current, and not necessarily being completely covered by ISO65 and 
DEFRA’s interpretation of it.” (Theo)  
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 Another controversial issue around UKAS is that it has a monopoly on accreditation in the UK, but 
no remit outside the UK. For accreditation valid in other countries, certification bodies require 
accreditation from the national accreditation bodies in those countries, or from an independent 
accreditation body such as the International Organic Accreditation Service (IOAS). This means that 
certification bodies are faced with at least two accreditation processes if they are offering services to 
overseas producers. 
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One prominent issue raised by DEFRA around the time of my fieldwork was about 
conflict of interest between the shareholders and certification activities of the certification 
bodies. According to Theo, DEFRA imposed further requirements, beyond those in EN 
45011, about how the financial and managerial independence of the certification bodies from 
their shareholders should be guaranteed. Without these guarantees, there could be conflicts of 
interest where shareholders could pressure on their certification body to certify (or refuse to 
certify) certain practices or producers, resulting in an unfair advantage for certain licensees. 
As this would distort the regulation of the consumer markets for organic produce, DEFRA 
required detailed plans of how the interests of shareholders would be separated from the 
certification decisions taken by the certification bodies. 
This means that DEFRA, in the role of regulator, has devolved inspection and 
certification of licensees to certification bodies, and the accreditation of these bodies to 
UKAS—while maintaining a role in setting and controlling further requirements for 
compliance before certification bodies can operate. This results in a recursive organisation of 
the certification process relying on a complex system of checks, balances and paperwork 
through which particular standards are enacted: certification bodies are inspected and 
accredited through a process analogous to how they inspect and certify organic producers.  
The final aspect of implementing the EU regulations on organic production is to 
coordinate what they mean for the context of the member state (for example, requirements of 
providing access to a range for poultry may need a different interpretation in Scandinavian 
member states compared to other geographic locations due to the climate; the competent 
authority can define additional provisions to accommodate such aspects of organic 
production). At the time of my fieldwork, DEFRA was in the process of drawing up a formal 
guidance document which would set out the way in which the EU regulation would be 
interpreted in the UK context (the guidance was published in January 2010; DEFRA, 2010b). 
In order to do this, DEFRA organised various consultations with stakeholders such as the 
certification bodies, the National Farmers’ Union, food processors and retailers, and was 
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informed by the Advisory Committee on Organic Standards (ACOS). As researcher Ruth 
explained, the remit of ACOS was to consider the “wider impact [of the EU regulation] on the 
organic sector in a broader sense”. Whereas other stakeholders, such as industries, 
certification bodies and NGOs, would have clear commercial or political agendas on the topic 
of how the EU regulation would be enacted in the UK, ACOS provided scientifically 
informed advice on the development and implementation of standards—advice which was not 
connected to any particular political position but which aimed to set out the consequences of 
different interpretations.  
According to policy maker Philip, the objective of these consultations was to construct 
“as broad a consensus as possible on the basis of the most practical approach as possible” to 
manage the enforcement of the EU regulations. However, the interests of some actors are 
more prominently present in the guidance that was ultimately produced, notably the 
certification bodies and industry. For the former, DEFRA partially funds two additional 
coordination mechanisms through which certification bodies establish common positions on 
how the business and practicalities of certifying farmers is organised in the UK (the UK 
Organic Certifiers Group, UKOCG, for business, and the Control Bodies Technical Working 
Group, CBTWG; for the latter, see also Chapter 6). In particular, the positions adopted by 
CBTWG are also based on consensus about which interpretations are allowed of specific 
rules; in some cases the consensus among certification bodies meant that specific 
interpretations of the EU regulation would no longer be allowed in the UK. For instance, 
SACL Technical Manager Theo explained that the certification bodies had agreed to no longer 
certify the conversion of non-organic pigs—although this would still be permitted in the EU 
regulation—because “the UK industry has gone beyond that”. 
In contrast to the certification bodies, no other actor relates to DEFRA through such 
mandated coordinative mechanisms. Yet, the interests of industries in the organic sector are 
prominent due to the political dimension of policy making: Philip indicated that the strict 
enforcement of a principle could mean that an industry would no longer be able to meet the 
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resulting standards and therefore collapse. He suggested that for the Ministers heading the 
department this would be a major concern for the interpretation of the EU regulation in the 
UK context: 
“[...] let’s take a concrete example. The poultry industry, the organic poultry 
industry like the conventional poultry industry by and large depends on bought in 
feed. So, that means it’s very sensitive to the price of feed and it’s very sensitive to 
the problems of producing an adequate ration for different types of poultry. So, 
you can see that we will have some difficulty in saying to Ministers, ‘well you 
have a choice, you can obey organic principle, or you can put this sector out of 
business’, because that’s the choice. I don’t think you will need me to tell you what 
that means in terms of the political decision.” (Philip) 
This implies that the guidance is constructed as largely reflecting current practice in the 
organic sector in the UK: what industrial sectors are doing beyond the minimum standards is 
codified, and what would jeopardise these industries is managed so as to protect the sector 
from collapse and from what the sector deems unfair competition from organic producers in 
other EU member states—even in cases where this contradicted the input of other actors, like 
ACOS. Thus, through the guidance document, DEFRA mediates interpretations of the EU 
regulations in ways that reflect existing UK interests. In this context, DEFRA’s consultation 
processes are important in modulating the way in which EU rules are interpreted. The fact that 
many organisations are involved seems to mean that potential disputes about interpretation 
and market disruption are muted, thus facilitating the enactment of organic standards over 
spatial and temporal distances. 
Jointly, these components—the embedding of the EU regulation in UK law, the control 
of the certification process, and the coordination of a UK-wide interpretation of the EU 
regulations—constitute a structure which enables organic production by regulating it in the 
UK context. Characterised by a delegated and recursive organisation, this structure involves 
certification bodies and UKAS, which in turn mobilise complex systems of checks, balances 
and paperwork to make production of organic stuff and its verification traceable. Moreover, 
the Statutory Instrument and the control of the certification process contribute to a 
homogenisation of organic agriculture as both components refer to a singular ‘organic’ as the 
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object of these controls. This implies that this regulatory structure stabilises the meaning of 
this undifferentiated ‘organic’: consumers, farmers, certification bodies and other actors can, 
in principle, rely on the fact that products labelled organic were produced under certain, 
enforced conditions which apply equally to all organic producers in the UK (and to imported 
organic products). As such, this arrangement is a precondition for enacting standards for 
organic agriculture in the UK. 
8.4  Supporting farmers 
So far, I have discussed the implementation of the EU regulations in the UK context. In 
this section, I turn to more local, English concerns—as outlined earlier, the support for 
farmers in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland is organised by the devolved governments in 
those nations. In England, the support for organic farmers consists of two components: the 
provision of information and funding for organic agriculture. I discuss these in turn below. 
(Not) developing a market for organics 
In 1996, MAFF (the precursor to DEFRA) introduced government aid for farmers 
wishing to convert to organic production. As part of this, the Organic Conversion Information 
Service (OCIS) was started “[t]o provide farmers with adequate information to be able to 
make an informed decision on whether or not organic farming is an option for their business” 
(ADAS and Organic Centre Wales, 2005: p. 1). The services included a free helpline and 
information packs which were provided by the Soil Association charity, and free on-farm 
visits by experienced consultants of the Organic Advisory Service based at the Organic 
Research Centre at Elm Farm (ORC). Until 2006, OCIS was run with the objective of 
increasing the market for domestically grown organic produce. The idea was that by providing 
some basic information about the agronomic, economic and business management 
implications of converting to organic production, by pointing to other information sources and 
through the on-farm visits, farmers would be able to assess the business case for conversion 
more adequately. This would mean that farmers who would otherwise not have considered 
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conversion would be able to do so, and farmers for whom conversion would be inappropriate 
would not have to invest before finding out that organic would not be suitable for their farms.  
MAFF decided to fund this service fully as the free access to this information would help 
to fulfil public policy goals by providing wider consumer choice, reducing consumer prices 
and supporting the development of an emerging market62 (thus benefiting consumers). By 
providing knowledge as a public good, the scheme would provide another public benefit as it 
would help to minimise environmental damage during conversion (ADAS and Organic Centre 
Wales, 2005). As Peter suggested, the rationale at the time was that the environmental benefits 
could only be achieved through the development of ‘the market’, and therefore they would be 
a consequence of the policy intervention rather than a specific policy goal. However, in 2006 
OCIS was suspended for about a year, but then reinstated with different objective: 
“[...] this new scheme is, we are managed, project managed by Natural England 
whose brief is for the environment, habitat management, sensitive farming, all of 
those environmental issues, and the objective is to increase the number of hectares 
in the organic entry level scheme. There is no longer any emphasis on market [...]” 
(Rory) 
The organic entry level scheme Rory refers to is the mechanism (also delivered by 
Natural England) through which farmers can get subsidies for going and doing organic; I will 
discuss this in more detail below. The point is that although the policy objective changed from 
developing markets to providing particular environmental benefits, the services offered by 
OCIS are much the same as before 2006 (though now delivered fully by the Organic Advisory 
Service). This means that the rationale for the policy support has inverted. The use of Natural 
England to manage the scheme on behalf of DEFRA, and the reframing of policy goals and 
associated management targets, demonstrate that the focus of the policy has changed from 
market development to public benefit provision—but without changing the content of the 
information provided. 
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 My respondents all referred to the development of ‘the organic market’ rather than to markets. I have 
retained here their use of the singular, but would like to emphasise that, in line with my argument in 
Chapter 7, they were actually speaking about the development of organic consumer markets. 
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Indeed, researcher Roland argued that there are still traces of the market development 
component present in some aspects as he suggested that policy makers “are not always clear 
whether they’re supporting [organic farming] for market reasons or supporting it for 
environmental reasons”. He explained that there is a tension in supporting the financial 
viability of farmers in conversion as part of an agri-environment scheme while needing to 
regulate a market for consumer protection. This means that the EU regulation, while mainly 
about consumer protection, helps formalise the forms of support that can be given to organic 
farmers. By setting minimum standards, the additional support for organic farming can be 
justified to actors with a stake in how subsidies are distributed in terms of the additional 
environmental benefits it delivers: 
“[...] it is a consumer protection issue. It’s also a justification issue to the 
conventional farmer as to why the organic farmer should get paid more. It’s 
assuring the conventional farmer that the rules are being adhered to and therefore 
they’re not getting extra money for doing the same as they’re doing and cheating. 
[...]” (Policy maker Peter) 
Peter’s comment indicates that the policy intervention of providing direct support to 
organic farmers was contested, which constrained the scope of the intervention. At the time of 
my fieldwork, the extent of farmer support still needed to be negotiated in relation to 
conventional farming, even though financial and advisory support for organic farming had 
become an established part of DEFRA’s agricultural policy. This means that the amount of 
support for each farmer is restricted, not only by budget but also by the amount that can be 
justified to other policy makers and to conventional farmers.  
In addition to these knowledge based forms of support, DEFRA supported other forms of 
information provision, for instance, the Institute of Organic Training and Advice (IOTA), an 
association of consultants working in the organic sector, received government funding to 
prepare reviews of previous DEFRA-funded research on organic farming and technical 
leaflets summarising key practical recommendations from existing research. The purpose of 
these documents was to improve the advice available to farmers. Other research outputs, such 
as the outcome based standards for animal welfare developed by Bristol University on animal 
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welfare (see also chapter 6) were introduced as a learning tool for interested farmers. But at 
the time of our interview, the direct funding stream for organic research had ceased within 
DEFRA, and Roland explained that research activities and dissemination were now funded in 
a more haphazard fashion.  
This component of the policy intervention to support farmers described here focuses on 
sharing research and knowledge such that an individual farmer can draw on knowledge about 
organic farming which is generated outside of his or her immediate social network. But this is 
not primarily done for the farmers’ benefit: currently, the support is framed in terms of 
increasing the size of the area under organic management for the environmental benefits that 
this delivers. As such, it is shaped by a policy objective which is based on a singular notion of 
organic: the specifics of organic management (enterprises or land use) are irrelevant—they are 
not specified in the policy targets for Natural England; organically managed land, as a 
singular entity, delivers certain qualified environmental benefits. The implications of this 
become even clearer when considering the second component (financial support) below. 
Calculating organic environmental value 
In 1994, MAFF introduced financial support for farmers during organic conversion. In 
2003, financial support was extended under the Organic Farming Scheme (OFS), providing 
subsidies which extended beyond the end of conversion. The conversion option of the scheme 
(support for five years from the start of conversion) was framed in terms of growing markets 
for domestic organic produce, but the maintenance option (for a further five years after the 
conversion option) was framed in terms of environmental benefits. However, the OFS was 
superseded in 2005 as a result of the reform of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
These reforms replaced production-based subsidies (guaranteed prices for farmers) with 
incentives to maintain land in good agricultural and environmental condition. This meant that 
payments for organic management of land were embedded in EU regulation as part of the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). In the specific regulation 
covering rural development (EC, 2005), farmers can receive payments for their voluntary 
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commitment to achieve environmental objectives on agricultural land; as organic farming is in 
principle voluntary, the payments which are made available to farmers are such agri-
environment payments. These payments compensate farmers for their agri-environment 
commitment by paying for the additional costs farmers have incurred to manage their land in a 
particular way, but also for the loss of income for the farm as the amount of marketable 
produce will decrease (I will explain this in more detail below).  
In England, there is currently one agri-environment scheme open to farmers, namely the 
environmental stewardship scheme. This scheme is managed for DEFRA by Natural England, 
and has four strands, one of which is dedicated to organic farming. The Organic Entry Level 
Stewardship (OELS) strand is one of three equivalent, basic (entry level) strands, which is 
open to farmers who are registered with an organic certification body, or who have been 
accepted by a body for conversion. Farmers commit to the scheme for five years, for which 
they receive £60 per hectare per year. If converting, this is supplemented by another £175 per 
year for a maximum of two years as conversion support63. Under the fourth strand, the Higher 
Level Stewardship (HLS) larger amounts of funding are available, but this strand is based on 
more extensive modes of environmental management which are site specific, and therefore 
depends on the particulars of individual agreements. In contrast, the entry level strands are 
based on a number of standard management options for different environmental farm features, 
and farmers need to select options to provide a set amount of value in terms of environmental 
management.  
Going or doing organic counts as fulfilling £30 per hectare of environmental benefits, 
provided that organic farmers select an additional package of measures through which they 
achieve another £30 per hectare64. This means that just being organic is not sufficient to 
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 For farmers growing top fruit such as apples, plums or pears, this is £600 per hectare per year for 
three years. 
64
 The other two entry level schemes are based on this £30 of benefits per hectare. So conventional and 
organic farmers need to provide the same amount of environmental benefits in order to be eligible, but 
organic farms receive an additional £30 per hectare for being organic. 
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qualify for payment: farmers are required to deliver further benefits such as conserving 
hedgerows or stonewalls, preserve biodiversity or conserving species, managing woodland, 
conserving historic or landscape features, protecting soil or water courses, grazing cattle in 
specific ways, managing arable fields in environmentally sensitive ways etc. Each of these 
options carries a number of points, and farmers need to deliver at least 30 points per hectare in 
environmental benefits across the farm above the 30 points per hectare provided by farming 
organically. For instance, managing a hedgerow on both sides of the hedge delivers 22 points 
per 100m of hedgerow, protecting a tree which is in a field which is part of the organic 
rotation delivers twelve points per tree, introducing or maintaining plots which form habitats 
for skylarks delivers five points per plot, and sowing nectar flower mixtures in organic 
grassland delivers 550 points per sown hectare. In total, there are 49 different management 
options for organic farms in ten categories, and farmers can choose those options that are best 
suited to their farm conditions and configuration of farming practices. The handbook which 
describes the options also contains the rules and conditions for each option. For example, the 
rules for hedgerow management contain prescriptions about the minimum height of the 
hedgerow and when and how often to cut it, prohibitions to use fertilisers, manures and 
pesticides within a specified range around the hedgerow, and guidelines for ensuring that the 
hedgerow is not eroded by livestock or weather; the rules for sowing nectar flower mixtures 
contain prescriptions about when and how to sow and mow the plants, the minimum number 
of plant species and ratio between species in the mix, and the minimum and maximum 
dimensions of the area sown, and guidance about how optimise environmental benefits for 
nectar-feeding insects. 
In this case, the component of financial support in this policy intervention comes with 
strings attached, requiring farmers to change their practices—beyond those required by the 
organic conversion. It includes additional paperwork and calculations of how the adopted 
options relate to the existing features of the farm. The paperwork is controlled every year by 
administrators of Natural England who include checks on end dates for conversion aid, 
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reference checks with the Rural Land Register for field details, and controls of field use by 
means of satellite imagery. Also, the body administering the cross compliance scheme and 
processing the payments for the single payment and environmental stewardship schemes, the 
Rural Payments Agency (RPA), sends out inspectors to verify at least 1% of contracts per 
year. These inspections focus on compliance with the Environmental Stewardship rules, and 
do not duplicate any aspects of an organic inspection; Natural England relies on the 
certification bodies to provide the verification of the organic status of a farm.  
Therefore, what matters in how the policy intervention is shaped is the way in which the 
level of payments is linked with the doing of organic. By means of a calculation, DEFRA has 
defined that doing organic provides environmental benefits to the value of £30 per hectare per 
year in income foregone. This figure was calculated in the same way as the points for the 
other options are determined. Calculations underpinning the number of points per unit for 
each option are based on the costs of doing something in a particular way, the income that 
cannot be generated by doing so and the costs that are saved by not producing a crop. Paul, 
who had been involved in these calculations, explained that they include not only the variable 
costs but also the overheads and even the savings that farmers make on bank interest 
payments for not needing to invest in seed etc. The calculations are done on a national basis, 
using average figures for costs and revenues which are forecast over a five year period. After 
the calculations are complete, the underlying assumptions about commodity prices, input 
prices and the way these were included in the model underpinning the calculations are verified 
by an external expert associated with a UK agricultural college. Then, DEFRA take a view on 
how much compensation to offer, based on judgements about the likely uptake of various 
options, their environmental benefits and the budget available: 
“[...] that percentage depends upon those judgments as to whether we will get the 
uptake of the scheme without paying the full amount or not. [...] Dead weight 
means uptake that we get without paying anything because some farmers do things 
without being paid. So why do we need to, if we’ve got a fixed budget we don’t 
need to pay the full amount.” (Paul)  
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Whereas all additional options are restricted to a maximum of 100% income foregone 
(meaning that an average farmer would not make a profit on doing environmental 
stewardship), the £30 of environmental benefit delivered by being organic covers 115% 
income foregone to encourage farmers to consider conversion. Namely, the calculations for 
the organic option—the cost of merely maintaining organic certification—arrive at an average 
cost of £26 per hectare per year. While this means that the policy intervention provides a 
notional incentive to convert to organic farming, in combination with the additional options, 
the commitment to an environmental stewardship scheme may mean that not all costs and 
incomes foregone are covered. Moreover, when farmers enter into the scheme, the 
administrators of Natural England dealing with the scheme usually advise them to build in a 
buffer in terms of number of points they choose. This does not mean that they get paid more; 
rather, it means that, while they deliver benefits for which they do not get compensated, 
farmers are less likely to be penalised when situations change and some of the options end up 
being reduced in ‘value’ (through a reduction in area, length or number of features for those 
options) or removed completely during the five years of the agreement. 
Even so, committing to the OELS scheme provides a guaranteed, stable source of income 
for an organic farm. Adviser Alistair commented that for most farms “[i]t’s a no-brainer”. But 
he explained that for some enterprises, the required additional options could conflict with 
cropping programmes (high value horticultural enterprises) or animal rotations (specialised 
pig and poultry enterprises). Moreover, for these enterprises, the rate of return on these high 
value products would exceed the £60 per hectare per year return from doing environmental 
stewardship. Thus, uptake of the scheme is not spread evenly over the organic sector. 
In fact, the environmental benefits delivered by the OELS scheme were analysed by the 
National Audit Office (the NAO reports to Parliament on the value for money achieved by 
government departments). Its reviewers argued that while “[r]esearch indicates that organic 
farming delivers environmental benefits, and in particular has been shown to have benefits for 
biodiversity [...] [t]he Department has insufficient research evidence to quantify the extent to 
 197
which the Scheme has contributed to achieving benefits of this kind, or how the impact may 
vary between farming sectors” (p. 6). Indeed, most options chosen could be considered 
‘deadweight’, since “[m]any of the more challenging options are rarely implemented” (p. 7). 
This suggests that existing policy strategies might not be delivering the results expected of 
them. Here the relation between doing policy and configuring what practitioners do is made 
visible: the policy intervention is shaped—and is likely to be reshaped as a result of the 
review—by policy targets which require the mobilisation of farmers to deliver targets by 
changing farming methods. But as Alistair explained, for farmers the financial support has a 
different function: it constitutes a guaranteed income, providing stability when commodity 
prices fluctuate as a result of factors beyond their control. 
At this point it is important to note that although the scheme offers financial support to 
organic farmers, it is an intervention aimed at providing a public benefit—the provision of 
information as described above and the financial support are linked in this respect. As such, 
the targets for the intervention are not to provide all organic farmers financial and advisory 
support but to deliver a set number of organic hectares under agri-environment management. 
Thus, as a policy intervention, financial and advisory support for doing organic is intended to 
help farmers act in certain ways such that these activities help meet policy targets for 
environmental benefits: the activities of farmers are turned into a resource for policy makers 
to achieve certain policy objectives.  
This requires a move in which ‘relevant’ activities are standardised and qualified: by 
constructing environmental benefits in terms of the costs and incomes foregone for an average 
practitioner enacting an option according to its rules, they become calculable as costs the state 
is willing to pay for achieving targets about biodiversity, conservation etc. Put differently, 
they are calculative devices (Callon, 1998) which establish a relation between the support 
provided to farmers and the environmental benefits delivered through them as a public good. 
Through these calculative devices, policy makers can tinker with this relation: for example, 
uptake of different options can subsequently be modulated by attributing a percentage of 
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‘deadweight’ to them. But as the NAO review illustrated, and echoing Shove and Walker’s 
(2010) observation about the unpredictability of how practices are reconfigured as a result of a 
policy intervention, this does not necessarily lead to the desired uptake of the ‘more 
challenging options’: the method of designing a system of options which can be assembled in 
numerous ways depending on the site-specific arrangements on a farm (physical and 
organisational) means that policy makers cannot fully control how practitioners reshape their 
practices. 
8.5  Enabling and constraining practice 
I began this chapter with the observation that the policy interventions for organic farming 
in England matter for the enactment of standards for organic agriculture. Having examined the 
two interventions (the regulatory structure and the support for farmers), it becomes possible to 
outline how they shape the doing of organic. To start with the regulatory structure, this 
intervention defines the outermost contours of what it is to do organic. Namely, the EU 
regulation contains a basic set of standards which need to be adhered to for produce to be 
legitimately labelled organic. But it also contains prescriptions for how this needs to be 
controlled—which are embodied by DEFRA’s organisation of those controls. Thus, the 
enactment of the regulation demands that there are actors capable of doing organic, doing 
certification, and doing accrediting of the certification. Secondly, the UK-wide coordination 
of interpretation (between different actors in the sector) harmonises some of the boundaries of 
what should be considered organic. Constraining the multitude of ways in which these 
boundaries could be interpreted enables the protection of industries so that doing organic 
remains economically and politically feasible in the UK as well as the advancement of the 
interests of these industries in international markets. While the second intervention (advice 
and subsidy) enables the doing of organic by supporting farmers during and after the 
conversion process, it does this by constraining the kind of organic which is enacted: currently 
framing it as an environmental benefit.  
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This latter form of policy making takes place in a dynamic ‘field’. For example, Philip 
commented that uncontrollable commodity price fluctuations could have a significant effect 
on the delivery of the public benefit targets, strongly echoing Shove and Walker’s (2010) 
point that instances of policy intervention happen not in isolation but in an ongoing flow of 
events. At the same time, the regulatory structure shapes conditions which matter for the 
enactment of specific practices, and for the organic sector as a whole.  
These points suggest that policy makers are actively involved in homogenising the 
organic sector in different ways: by regulating and coordinating how the EU regulation on 
organic production is enforced, DEFRA places farmers and certification bodies within a single 
regulatory regime through which consumers are protected from fraud. Thus, this regime 
provides the space in which multiple ‘organics’ can be singularised as ‘plain’ organic (see 
previous chapter), and therefore afford trade and the constitution of supply chains. Yet, this 
homogenisation of organic proceeds alongside, but not in the same way, as that involved in 
the construction of ‘organic’ as a single, recognisable category in terms of which consumption 
can be organised. 
Farmers and their farms are standardised in another way as well: through the support 
available, the site-specific enactment of standards for organic agriculture is singularised as 
providing an amalgam of environmental benefits. To make this work, policy makers operate 
generally applicable rules and conditions that are nonetheless capable of being adopted and 
implemented in very many different circumstances. These rules reduce the local material 
conditions of farms to a limited number of features, turned into a points system designed to 
represent environmental benefits and the cost of achieving them. Yet, the discussion on uptake 
of the OELS shows that policy making is an approximate instrument to shape what 
practitioners do. In fact, this is unavoidable: these policy interventions do not determine what 
is ‘organic’. However, they establish a frame in which farmers respond and to which they 
adjust what they do. And organic is the outcome of this interaction.  
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Chapter 9 Living standards 
9.1  Introduction 
The starting point of this thesis was a sense of curiosity about multiple ‘sustainability’ 
labels on an inconspicuous, everyday consumption object. Through the example of a flapjack, 
I raised some questions in chapter 1 about how labels advocating more sustainable practices 
and lifestyles got onto the packaging of certain consumer goods. The main aim of this thesis 
emerged from these queries along with the ambition of uncovering the invisible, taken-for-
granted infrastructure through which the standards underpinning such labels are enacted. To 
capture the active role of how standards organise and coordinate different practices (such as 
farming, certification, marketing) I suggested in chapter 2 that standards ‘come alive’ through 
the activities of different actors, and that in turn they affect what these actors do and the 
context in which they act. In the five empirical chapters, I have examined this dynamic in 
relation to the practices of distinctly different actors. 
While the separation of these different points of view and different activities was 
analytically necessary to capture some of the intricacies of each form of enacting organic 
standards, it will be clear that those standards only ‘come alive’ through the everyday 
interaction between these practices: for example, a farmer can only sell the ‘stuff’ he or she 
produced after the farming practices were certified through the certification process. Put 
differently, while each of these sets of activities provides a necessary part of the story of how 
organic standards are reproduced, it is only through the interrelations between them that 
organic standards organise and integrate the activities of individual actors into an 
infrastructure through which ‘doing’ organic (in all of its multiplicities) is constituted. 
Therefore, in this final chapter I reflect on how organic standards coordinate between these 
different practices, and discuss the theoretical implications of this for the understanding of 
how standards, as ordering devices, shape social and material relations in everyday life. 
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I start by summarising the key points of the empirical chapters in the next section, and 
then revisit my research questions to consider how organic standards coordinate the practices 
of different actors (section 9.3). In particular, I suggest that voluntary product standards 
distribute the local site-specific enactment of organic standards between the practices of 
farmers and certification officers due to a relocation of discretionary space. I argue that this 
arrangement results not only in unique, site-specific enactments of organic, but also in the 
continuous rewriting of organic standards by certification officers and certification committee. 
I suggest that standards for organic agriculture organise more than only markets or farming 
practices, and that the necessarily distributed reproduction of organic standards results in a 
multiplicity of different ‘organics’. I argue that this multiplicity coexists with global, 
homogenised and coordinated notions of a singular ‘organic’, which implies that that the 
diffusion of ‘organic’ as a coherent concept is perfectly possible, even if the enactment of 
‘organic’ in local practices is very different.  
I argue that all site-specific enactments of organic standards are abstracted into various 
formal spaces where they are made commensurable, and that the uniformity of organic ‘stuff’ 
is not located in the individual enactments through which it was produced, but in the way 
these enactments are conjoined. I argue that therefore the infrastructure through which 
standards for organic agriculture ‘come alive’ remains invisible to consumers outside this 
infrastructure, and suggest that standards are vectors of practice which provide an ordering 
force which shapes the enactment of specific practices in particular ways. As such, I suggest 
that voluntary organic standards can shape different forms of agriculture—or more precisely a 
related set of agricultural systems—dependent on the local practices, coordinative structures, 
calculative devices, mechanisms of verification and discretion and systems of valuation which 
are mobilised in their ordering.  
In the final section of the thesis I conclude with some more general considerations about 
the use of voluntary product standards in shaping alternative modes of agriculture. I argue that 
the move towards the use of voluntary standards in creating a more sustainable form of 
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agriculture (however that may be defined) and that this has implications that stretch far 
beyond debates in which the relative merits of one system over another are compared in 
supposedly ‘objective’ terms; I conclude that the way in which voluntary product standards 
shape agricultural systems has political, organisational and ethical consequences for how 
‘sustainable’ products are constituted. 
9.2  Summary of the empirical chapters 
In chapter 4 I began by describing how the rules in organic standards exclude products 
and practices from the repertoire available to farmers to produce food and farmed 
commodities. I suggested that the rules in organic standards, while not prescribing how 
farming practices should be configured, have multiple, unpredictable consequences as an 
effect of prohibiting certain practices. In their local enactment, individual rules become 
process injunctions which produce frameworks for action for farmers, guiding how local farm 
arrangements (of activities, materials and tools) need to be configured such that they are 
compliant. I then examined the consequences of this for the temporal and spatial 
configurations of ‘doing’ organic farming. I suggested that these configurations, while 
multiple in their performances, are specific to organic farming and that they enact a mode of 
farming which is preventative rather than reactive. I concluded that the ‘doing’ of organic is 
characterised by multiplicity: each enactment of organic standards is unique. I argued that this 
is irrelevant for the organicness of products: as long as all relevant rules were complied with, 
each configuration is a permitted way of organising an organic farm.  
Chapter 5 continued the discussion about how organic standards shape farming practice 
by exploring how certain practices and tools—in all of their necessarily multiple 
performances—define the ‘doing’ of farming. I showed how a particular form of farming 
economics, the integration of enterprises, the choice of varieties and breeds and the extension 
of farming practices through administrative activities are shaped by injunctions which do not 
directly follow from specific rules in organic standards, but from the practicalities of 
interpretation in everyday life, and of ‘doing’ of organic itself. I suggested that these practices, 
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along with the temporal and spatial configurations of organic farming practice, enable the 
production of organic ‘stuff’, and concluded that this results in farm systems which are 
agronomically, economically and socially feasible and which allow the traceability of the 
organic status of their produce. 
In chapter 6 I described the certification process, and suggested that it is based on an 
interpretation of standards and practice in the context of each other. I suggested that inspectors 
and certification officers are not mere external observers trying to reveal how a licensee enacts 
certain standards, but that they are active participants in shaping this object and therefore how 
a particular, ‘sustainable’ form of farming is enacted by a licensee. I argued that the licensee-
specific knowledge object underpinning this process can be characterised as having partial 
epistemic properties (drawing on Knorr Cetina, 2001) which need to be managed through a 
standardised process to avoid paralysis or arbitrariness in the certification of licensees. I 
showed how parts of the knowledge objects of different licensees circulate, thereby shaping 
the way in which organic standards will be enacted by connecting the context and conditions 
of the licensees. As such, I concluded that standards for organic agriculture are not only 
written by the standard setter, but that they are continually rewritten—re-produced—in the 
certification process. As such, they are alive in yet another sense: with each new interpretation 
and with each new instantiation they subtly change and reconfigure how a particular form of 
farming is and can be enacted.  
In chapter 7 I drew on the concept of a market device (Muniesa et al., 2007) to describe 
how organic standards organise markets for organic products. I argued that the multi-sited 
reproduction of different versions of organic standards results in a multiplicity of organics 
which are enacted through a horizontally and vertically segmented array of markets. I showed 
how the heterogeneous sets of standards as market device render organic products ‘economic’ 
in a necessarily incomplete way. I argued that the distributed enactment of standards results in 
a multiplicity of markets which is characterised by a fragmented common space and 
boundaries that can only be partially maintained. I suggested that this space and these 
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boundaries do enable singularisation of products (compared to conventional products), and 
that doing so requires that the multiplicity of organic standards is removed at the final stage of 
marketing so that ‘organic’ can be constructed as a homogeneous entity which provides 
qualified benefits. 
Finally, in chapter 8 I turned to the policy interventions which shape the ways in which 
‘organic’ can be enacted. Starting from the idea that policy interventions are located at the 
intersection of different practices, I then explored two strategies mobilised by EU and UK 
policy makers in their attempts to enable and stabilise organic and to turn the activities of 
organic farmers into a resource for different policy objectives. I showed that a regulatory 
structure based on EU and UK regulations provide a precondition for doing organic farming 
by shaping the outermost contours of possible organic enactments. In this context, policy also 
has an interest in treating organic as ‘one’ and as I showed, various devices (points systems 
etc.) are used to establish a simple, quantifiable relation between organic and environmental 
benefit. I argued that policy makers are actively involved in homogenising the organic sector 
and suggested that this homogenisation of organic proceeds alongside, but not in the same 
way, as that involved in the construction of ‘organic’ as a single, recognisable category in 
terms of which consumption can be organised. I concluded that the two policy interventions 
for organic agriculture establish a frame in which farmers respond and to which they adjust 
what they do.  
9.3  Living standards 
Enacting standards is a distributed activity indeed: this thesis has shown that organic 
standards ‘come alive’ in fields and barns, in processing plants, in certification bodies’ offices, 
in Whitehall, in traders’ offices, etc. Having delineated how standards for organic agriculture 
shape the separate situated practices (Suchman, 2007) carried by distinctly different actors, it 
becomes possible to analyse how standards coordinate constellations of actors, objects, 
activities and knowledge across time and space (Timmermans and Berg, 1997). To structure 
this discussion, I return to the research questions I posed in chapter 2, and in doing so I will 
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reflect on the contributions of this thesis to the sociological understanding of standards and 
standardisation. 
Standards as living entities 
My first research question was about how standards ‘come alive’ through the practices of 
different actors, and in turn how they, as living entities, shape these practices.  
A first observation, already made, is that in contrast to the medical protocols documented 
by Timmermans and Berg (1997, 2003) and others, standards for organic agriculture do not 
explicitly script work sequences. As such, they do not intervene in work practices as directly; 
rather, the rules in organic standards exclude certain activities and packaged entities. How 
farm practices are configured depends on the injunctions which emerge from interpreting and 
applying rules in a local setting, so as to produce frameworks for action. Thus, what 
configurations underpin local enactments follow from locally constructed frameworks for 
action rather than direct prescriptions inscribed in standards for organic agriculture. This 
suggests that notions of deviance and compliance (Akrich, 1992) are not sufficient to capture 
how voluntary product standards like standards for organic agriculture are enacted: as I 
concluded in chapter 4, the local conditions of a particular farm make the enactment of 
organic standards unique. As such, there is no detailed script that farmers comply with or 
deviate from. I therefore argue that, in the context of voluntary product standards, 
understanding ‘standards at work’ requires the notion of locally produced injunctions to 
capture how individual rules in those standards (re)configure practices in their local settings. 
This forms the basis of the enactment of organic standards through farming practice, and 
expresses the particular configuration of how ‘stuff’ is produced at a given farm. It is at this 
point that notions of deviance and compliance become useful in describing and determining 
whether generic rules have or have not been included in the situated detail of farming practice.  
There are some significant differences between this account and how Timmermans and 
Berg conceptualised the implementation of protocols through the simultaneous transformation 
of actors, practices and protocol. While the enactment of product standards also requires a 
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simultaneous transformation of practices, actors and standards, these transformations are 
configured differently. As farming practices are assembled site-specific from pre-existing 
elements rather than pre-scribed in organic standards, the location of the script through which 
practices are transformed is different: I suggested that situated ‘scripts’ and ways of doing 
farming are written on that farm, using standard elements. Typically, organic farmers need to 
transform practices and themselves from a reactive to a preventative mode of farming, and 
they need to change the infrastructures in which they farm so that organic configurations of 
practice are economically and socially possible.  
This implies that the form of the rules in organic standards—what they prescribe and how 
they do this—shapes what needs to be made specific: whereas a protocol requires the 
transformation of practices, actors and the protocol itself, a voluntary product standard 
requires the reconfiguration of farm arrangements and the transformation of actors and 
infrastructures. This means that Timmermans and Berg’s (2003) argument that standards 
partially delegate tasks from actor to text (the task of organising, sequencing and shaping 
activities is partially located in the text of a protocol) and therefore enable an increase in 
overall complexity of work (as actors can accomplish more) does not apply to product 
standards. Indeed, for organic farming the reverse seems to be true: the farmers in my research 
commented that farming organically was more challenging than conventional farming. For 
them, finding and tinkering with configurations of interrelated elements introduced additional 
considerations that needed to be resolved. As such, the process injunctions emerging from 
rules in organic standards pose additional requirements that need to be included in the active 
transformation of practices, actors and farming systems. 
A second, related observation is that organic standards are transformed through their 
local contextual enactment and their continuous rewriting by certification officers. In contrast 
to the enactment of protocols, the discretion to ‘adapt’ is different in form, character and 
location than suggested by Jasanoff (1998). For organic farmers, the adaptation is achieved 
through the farm-specific configurations of farming practice. While this requires extensive 
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knowledge of the local agronomic, economic and social conditions of a farm and of a wide 
range of standardised elements and their interrelationships with each other and with the local 
conditions, there is no professional discretion, and no scope for tinkering with organic 
standards themselves. Rather, tinkering is done with each of the elements that jointly 
constitute the local, contextual enactment—the localised universality—of organic standards. 
This does not mean that the discretionary space has dissolved: on the contrary, it has shifted 
from the practitioner (farmer) to a different actor (certification officers and committee). Thus, 
the consequences of the incompleteness and overdetermination of standards (Timmermans 
and Epstein, 2010) are negotiated between farmers and certification officers; it is not left to 
farmers to decide how to interpret or deviate from a standard. As a result, the discretionary 
space is highly formalised and documented—whatever discretion is granted is recorded so that 
justifications are retained for future reference65 (these justifications and records also enable 
accreditation of the certification process). This space is placed outside of the practices to 
which discretion is applied: any consideration for discretion must be referred to an actor who 
is external to the context in which a standard is enacted. This suggests that the local 
universality located in the site-specific enactment of organic standards is, in fact, distributed 
between the practices of farmers and certification officers. This arrangement results not only 
in unique, site-specific enactments of organic (the local universality) but also in the 
continuous rewriting of organic standards by certification officers and committee: the unique 
enactments are used to define and redefine how standards should be interpreted and how these 
interpretations should be assessed by inspectors and certification officers. 
A third observation is that inspectors, certification officers, the certification committee 
and policy makers all are actively involved in shaping how farmers can enact organic 
standards. This corresponds with Zeiss’s (2004) argument that standards are mobilised in 
different ways by different actors: they act as rules or guidelines for farmers, as a yardstick to 
                                                     
65
 To a very limited extent certification officers still have an informal discretionary space in dealing 
with particular licensees. 
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assess farming practice against for inspectors and certification officers, as a resource for 
policy makers, and as a market device for market actors. While the way in which inspectors 
and certification officers mobilise organic standards is scripted in those standards, this is not 
the case for the other actors. This suggests that the notion that standards redirect the course of 
trajectories (Timmermans and Berg, 1997) must be extended to include actors whose 
trajectories are not precisely defined. Even so, the way in which organic standards can be 
mobilised is not arbitrary: standards for organic agriculture are specifically third party 
certification standards. This is a particular arrangement of actors (Hatanaka et al., 2005) and 
practices in which particular mobilisations of organic standards by specific actors are possible, 
while others are not. 
With its focus on the current arrangements of the infrastructure constituted by standards 
for organic agriculture, my study does not provide insights into how this system evolved into 
its current form. Thus, there is scope to build on the argument in this thesis by examining the 
conditions under which standards and third party certification coevolved. Such a study would 
provide insights into how certifiers have been able to assume a position as apolitical, external 
and objective observers of practice (Hatanaka and Busch, 2008). 
Multiplicity and singularity 
The second research question was about how the multitude of unique enactments in 
farming practice relates to the singular concept diffused by this standard. 
The reproduction of organic standards is necessarily distributed due to the specific 
practices that constitute them and that are performed by different actors: farming in particular 
ways, inspecting and certifying licensees, coordinating activities, setting standards, trading 
produce, advising producers, suppressing issues while emphasising others, etc. As such, the 
multiplicity of how different ‘organics’ are enacted is unavoidable. In the empirical chapters, I 
have shown a number of tensions between multiplicities in enactments and attempts to create 
singular entities. For example, site-specific reconfigurations of practices are collapsed through 
the certification process so that produce can be traded; calculative devices permit comparison 
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between diverse farms, sites and sectors, organic labels constitute a single market, overwriting 
differences of farming practice; and in policy, there is a similar need to construct, approach 
and support ‘a’ single organic sector; and so forth. 
In each of these instances there are moves between the multiplicity of enactments and a 
singularised ‘object’. For example, organic produce can only travel because the specific 
characteristics of its production have been removed and folded into the label ‘organic’; 
exactly how the produce was grown or reared has become irrelevant—it simply meets generic 
conditions. At the same time, this labelled produce is transformed into an income in the 
profitability calculations for a farmer, and into a certain agronomic and economic value for 
another farmer or into a singularised product for a consumer. This suggests that the enactment 
of organic standards in highly localised settings coexists with global, homogenised and 
coordinated notions of a singular ‘organic’. As I wrote earlier, this implies that the diffusion 
of ‘organic’ on the basis of a coherent term is perfectly possible, even if the enactment of an 
‘organic’ in local practices is very different. 
As is clear, the enactments of organic standards are standardised—uniform—as well as 
internally differentiated (Hatanaka et al., 2006). This suggests that the notion of uniformity 
(e.g. Busch, 2000; Brunsson, 2000) requires qualification: what is it that is made uni-form 
through organic standards? This thesis has shown that local enactments are not homogenised 
or made uniform by reference to a shared template of organic. Rather, the ordering of local 
sociomaterial practices through organic standards allows the folding of complexities, 
idiosyncrasies and peculiarities of enactments into singular notions which can circulate 
between different practices and between heterogeneous metrics (Bowker and Star, 2000). The 
processes of third party certification provide one mechanism of achieving commensurability 
between different enactments; they provide a device “‘to abstract’, that is, to transport, 
transform and displace an action into a formal, calculative space” (Loconto and Busch, 2010: 
527). This means that all site-specific enactments of organic standards are abstracted into a 
formal space where they are made commensurable: each enactment undergoes an external 
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verification of compliance with the rules in organic standards based on a standardised and 
accredited certification process and hence becomes available in the organic space that is 
thereby created. The uni-formity of organic ‘stuff’ is not located in the individual enactments 
through which it was produced, but in the way these enactments are made commensurable. It 
is this particular uniformity, then, that provides the basis on which goods can be singularised 
as products having certain qualities (Callon et al., 2002) and which can be integrated in pre-
existing practices of consumption (e.g. Gronow and Warde, 2001; Halkier, 2009).  
But as I have shown, ‘doing’ organic is abstracted in other ways as well. Loconto and 
Busch (2010) focus on the obvious processes of third party certification (verification of 
compliance, accreditation of certifiers and sanctions for violations), but I argue that, when 
considering organic standards as an infrastructure, their ‘coming alive’ requires other devices 
which abstract different aspects of ‘doing’ organic (e.g. calculative devices such as farming 
economics). This implies that how standards mediate between multiplicities and singularities 
in the constitution of the infrastructure extends beyond what is written in those standards. In 
each of these abstractions, the purpose is to make products or practices not the same but in 
certain respects comparable. It is in this way that voluntary product standards shape different 
forms of agriculture—or more precisely a related set of agricultural systems.  
As this thesis has only considered how organic is ‘done’ in the UK, and England in 
particular, I have described only one form of agriculture which is situated in a particular 
context. However, the last point implies that in different contexts (e.g. the Netherlands, Egypt, 
China or Tanzania), a different form of organic agriculture will emerge—even if the same 
standards are used. As such, a further research project would be to examine how standards 
‘come alive’ in different contexts (for a first attempt, see Loconto and van der Kamp, 2011). 
Standards as vectors of practice 
My final research question was about how standards produce order for different actors, 
and therefore the disorders they attempt to eradicate. 
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The moves between multiplicities and singularities described above mark out specific 
points at which differences emerge and (are made to) disappear. I argue that these changing 
representations are bound up with the movement of produce through the total system of 
provision and that this representational work would not be required if produce remained 
within its original context. For example, organic ‘stuff’ produced in a particular instantiation 
of doing organic becomes an organic commodity when its specifics of production are removed 
through the application of the label ‘organic’. It is at this point that other actors (buyers, 
consumers) can integrate the commodity into their practices—the trajectory of the artefact is 
no longer shaped by farming practice but by practices of marketing and consumption. 
Simultaneously, the disparate practices of farming and of marketing and a particular practice 
of consumption are coordinated. Thus, only when other actors become involved in the shaping 
of a particular trajectory is a singular notion required to facilitate the transition from one actor 
to another. As such, those moves signal a pattern of interaction between different actors, i.e. 
sites where coordination between ‘disparate elements’ take place (Berg, 1997; Timmermans 
and Epstein, 2010). This implies that at every move to a singular notion, the practices of 
different actors intersect as they are coordinated through the trajectory of an object or practice. 
Also the subsequent trajectory—as a singularised element integrated in a new practice—is 
coordinated in part by organic standards. In effect, organic standards include orders for 
different actors (Berg and Timmermans, 2000). To reveal these orders, it is useful to start 
from the practical strategies (logistics; Seltzer, 1992) which embody specific rationalities, 
before considering the order and its disorder coproduced by organic standards (Berg and 
Timmermans, 2000) for each set of actors. 
First, the process injunctions emerging from organic standards result in specific ways of 
doing farming, which in turn require particular abstractions of farming practices in the form of 
calculations and standard techniques which are specific to organic farming systems. As 
discussed in chapters 4 and 5, these farming systems are organised around distinctive 
agronomic and economic strategies, often involving a different way of conceptualising time, 
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risk and response. For example, since fluctuations in agronomic performance cannot be 
eradicated, they need to be included as a standard cost in the calculations of profitability. 
Moreover, while organic farmers can produce systems in which external inputs are minimised, 
the need for them cannot be eliminated: livestock will occasionally need veterinary 
treatments, and sometimes new seed needs to be bought.  
Second, certification bodies manage their work and establish organisational procedures 
so as to comply with accreditation requirements set by DEFRA and UKAS. In fact, the 
practices and organisational form of certification bodies is almost entirely ordered through 
different sets of standards. The logic behind the certification system is to prevent consumers 
from fraud through the independent monitoring of farming practice. However, as is clear from 
the discussion in chapter 6, the inherent uncertainty in the certification process constitutes a 
form of disorder that cannot be overcome. Another disorder is provided by the multiple 
interpretations which are possible for the rules in standards for organic agriculture, and which 
need to be continuously negotiated and formalised and which can be contested.  
Third, in relation to the part organic standards play in structuring markets, singularised 
organic commodities reproduce and reinforce boundaries with conventional markets while 
suppressing differences within the organic sector. However, as the example of beef cattle 
shows (see chapter 5), being organic is rarely the only consideration: other factors, such as the 
weight, fat content and carcass shape are the prime factors to establish price rather than the 
organic certificate. As such, other economic orders structure that which is constituted by 
organic standards. Furthermore, the requirement of additional coordination mechanisms 
beyond those included in organic standards to help producers navigate the fragmented space 
within the boundaries of the organic markets indicates that social orders interfere with the 
economic order of organic standards: organic markets only function because of these 
additional mechanisms. 
Finally, policy makers, in their capacity as regulators, mobilise organic standards to 
provide the precondition to ‘doing’ organic. In turn, this opens the possibilities for organic 
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farming, as a singular entity, to be mobilised as a resource for different policy interventions. 
However, as is clear from the discussion of option uptake that this order cannot be fully 
managed: farmers choose easy options or do not enter a scheme in the first place. 
As these examples show, organic standards contain a number of orders for different 
actors which relates to the way in which those actors mobilise organic standards. In addition, 
many of these ordering systems suppress or remove the multiplicities of organic farming, so 
that the resulting object—organic produce—can enter other markets and orders as a singular, 
recognisable entity. One consequence is that the processes through which organic standards 
‘come alive’ remain invisible to actors outside this infrastructure: consumers know little or 
nothing of the intricacies of how something became organic. 
There are two more observations that can be made from the argument developed in this 
thesis. First, I argue that standards are vectors66 or carriers of certain ways of doing: in this 
role they provide an ordering force which shapes the enactment of specific practices in 
particular ways. This ordering spills out beyond the realm of standards themselves: hence the 
infrastructure constituted by standards provides directionality to the trajectories of many 
practices—a directionality which is stronger, or more forceful for some practices and actors 
than for others. 
Second, it is important to note that the assembly of practices that fall within the reach of 
organic standards is not stable. While standards for organic agriculture do provide stability to 
what actors do at any given point in time, how they coordinate the activities between actors 
changes over time (as was clear from the history of the organic sector in the UK; see chapter 
3). The relative stability at any point in time is an accomplishment which is rooted in the 
reflexive monitoring of past, present and future performances from and by different actors 
(Giddens, 1984).  
                                                     
66
 I draw on an analogy with physics here: in physics, vectors are forces which have magnitude and 
direction. 
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These last two points implicitly contain a suggestion for further research beyond the 
scope of this thesis and for which the presented material provides a starting point: as vectors 
of practice, standards shape the way in which elements of practice are integrated, not in a 
static way but as a dynamic influence (I have provided an attempt at exploring this in chapter 
8; for a discussion of the dynamics of how different elements of practice are actively 
integrated over the career of a practice see for example Shove and Pantzar, 2005). Moreover, 
the reflexive monitoring of past, present and future performances as suggested by Giddens 
(1984) in what he describes as a ‘reproduction circuit’ by means of loops of feedback and feed 
forward provides a set of terms with which to characterise the ways in which practices 
emerge, change, merge with others and disappear (see also Shove et al., forthcoming). This 
thesis has presented an account of how standards for organic agriculture ‘come alive’ in a 
particular moment in time—a snapshot of the way in which they organise the practices of 
different actors and shape the trajectories of objects and artefacts. With some small 
exceptions, I have not discussed the temporal dynamics of how these practices evolve in 
relation to each other—this is another avenue for future research. For example, how has the 
emergence of an organic market, as a concept and an economic reality, played into the 
detailed design of policy strategies designed to promote this sector (for one reason or 
another)? Has the growth in organic farming changed the strategies of seed merchants and 
others, doing so in ways that change the future conditions and possibilities of being organic? 
Such considerations are important in understanding how the possible enactments of these 
standards change over time. 
9.4  Multiple labels on inconspicuous consumption items 
In the previous section I argued that voluntary product standards can shape different 
forms of agriculture—or more precisely a related set of agricultural systems—dependent on 
the elements which are mobilised in their ordering. Moreover, I suggested that the moves to 
remove specifics of production from circulating objects make invisible the infrastructure of 
organic standards for consumers. In this final section of the thesis it is time to return to the 
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flapjack and consider briefly some general implications of my thesis for the use of standards 
to promote more sustainable agricultural practices.  
It will be clear that each of the standards on the flapjack is based on its own 
infrastructure, with its own conditions and history, and that they are all implicated in further 
configuring how farmers produce ‘stuff’ and in how markets are made. Such infrastructures 
can be modest (e.g. the Vegetarian label), but they can include a substantial reconfiguration of 
how farmers operate (e.g. Fairtrade; see for example Loconto, 2010, Reinecke et al., 2010, 
and Haggarty et al., 2011). Different certifications could imply requirements for different 
farming arrangements, and will include different multiplicities that need to be singularised in 
particular ways and in relation to different forms of order that need to be enacted.  
In fact, the multitude of standards that farmers can choose from to be certified with 
provides a meta-standardisation analogous to how consumers are standardised into choice-
makers by a range of standardised products (Michael, 2010). Thus, farmers have become 
choice makers, requiring them to consider strategically which certifications suit their farming 
system, what potential markets can be accessed and therefore what sort of profitability could 
be achieved—or perhaps not to bother with certification at all. However, in some contexts a 
‘differentiation standard’ (Hatanaka et al., 2006) may become so standardised that choice is 
not an option. In other cases, there are forms of meta-certification where compliance with one 
certification scheme prompts other certifiers to infer compliance with their scheme (see 
Loconto, 2010). For consumers, Michael’s (2010) argument that they have become meta-
standardised can also be extended (see also Cochoy, 2005, 2007, 2010): not only do 
consumers need to decide between a ‘standardised’ and a ‘differentiated’ product, but also 
between differently differentiated products—or, as the flapjack shows, products with multiple 
differentiations. 
Thus, the move towards the use of voluntary standards in creating a more sustainable 
form of agriculture (however that may be framed) has implications that stretch far beyond 
debates in which the relative merits of one system over another are compared in supposedly 
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‘objective’ terms. As this thesis has shown, the way in which voluntary product standards, 
through the infrastructures they constitute, shape agricultural systems has inherent political, 
organisational and ethical consequences for how ‘sustainable’ products are constituted—my 
Soil Association organic, Fairtrade and vegetarian-approved flapjack could only end up on a 
supermarket shelf through distributed practices which were coordinated, organised and 
ordered through the ‘coming alive’ of different standards in those practices. This implies that 
understanding the conditions under which an agricultural system based on voluntary product 
standards functions requires a detailed look at what these standards do and how this is 
achieved. In fact, such analyses are essential in uncovering the potential as well as the 
limitations of using voluntary standards in achieving more sustainable forms of agriculture—
in whatever terms that might be defined.  
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Appendix 2: Sample of interview guides 
Interview guide for Fergus (Gooseberry Estate) 
 Introduction – introducing myself and my research, confidentiality, recording, questions 
― Agenda: Practicalities of ‘doing’ organic compared to conventional farming 
 History of conversion (in 2000 250ha, in 2004 400ha) – prior to conversion – training Fergus 
― Long rotation, commodity crops – no niche? 
― Arable with livestock tenanted – integration? Separation of business and organic systems? 
― Thistles, docks 
 Farm economics, conservation, funding 
 How did practices and knowledge change – processes of learning organic 
 Market development – routes  
― Challenges, frictions, volatility 
― Coordinating trade 
― Advice 
 Use of standards and other regulations 
― Interpretations, translations 
― Boundary work 
 Certification – challenges, frictions, negotiations 
 Support network 
 ‘Real’ organic – meaning of organic evolving over time 
 End of interview – thank you, confidentiality, still OK with everything discussed? 
 
Interview guide for Adrian (adviser) 
 Introduction – introducing myself and my research, confidentiality, recording, questions 
― Agenda: exploring differences and similarities with conventional farming 
 Adrian’s history in organic – main changes 
 Position in large conventional consultancy 
― Challenges, frictions, opportunities 
― Support network 
 Dynamics conventional organic – similarities and differences 
― Agronomy, business management 
― Practices, equipment 
― Learning, training, codevelopment with clients, education 
 In web between Certification Bodies, farmers, markets, funding, information 
― Coordination between all of these actors 
― Coordination attempts at different levels 
― Developing markets for organic produce – volatility  
― Links with policy interventions – funding, information, research 
 Use of standards and other regulations 
― Different readings between farmer and adviser? – interpretation, translations 
― Boundary work, quantification 
 ‘Real’ organic – meaning of organic evolving over time 
― Formalisation, who owns organic? 
 End of interview – thank you, confidentiality, still OK with everything discussed? 
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Interview guide for Peter (retired policy maker) 
 Introduction – introducing myself and my research, confidentiality, recording, questions 
― Agenda: the policy process from 1980s to now 
 Peter’s long history in organic – main changes 
 Regulations influencing the organic movement 
― ‘Real’ organic – how standards coevolve with meaning of organic 
― Formalisation – conventionalisation, tension between principles and economics 
― Direction of organic, who owns it? 
 Practicalities of coordinating implementation 
― Policy interventions – funding, information, research 
― Shift from market development to public good (environmental benefits) 
― Volatility in markets 
― Challenges in supporting organic effectively 
― Tension between conventional and organic (e.g. breeds, varieties) 
 Organisational complexity – emerging institutions 
― Rapidly expanding industry 
― Coordination between actors 
― Regulation – DEFRA, UKAS, ACOS 
― Practical dimensions of engaging actors 
 Market development in new areas? (e.g. aquaculture, poultry) 
 Standards 
― Organising interpretation 
― EU connections, negotiations, frictions, opportunities 




Appendix 3 Sample of research outline 
I have provided the sample sent to farmers—for other actors, sections 5 and 7 were modified 
to suit the organisation or actor I planned to visit. 
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 RESEARCH OUTLINE (Farmer) 
 
A standard in action: How organic standards shape and are shaped 
through practice 
1. BACKGROUND. Although regulation of food has a long history, the independent certification of 
properties falling outside regulatory control is a much more recent phenomenon. Such properties 
include the control of ingredients for particular types of consumers (e.g. vegetarians) as well as 
specific ways of growing, processing and trading produce (e.g. organic, fairtrade). The standards 
that govern these properties are mostly based on ideas promoting more sustainable practices 
and lifestyles and as such are intended to influence the practices of consumers, manufacturers, 
farmers and other groups alike. How standards are created and maintained by organisations has 
been studied in quite some detail. However, most of this research is abstract and formulaic, and 
it is less clear how standards organise and influence the interaction between different groups 
relating to a standard. In particular, little is known about how standards shape actions of 
different groups so as to create a recognisable ‘standard’ product.  
2. THE RESEARCH. Taking a standard as an entity that comes alive through the actions of 
different groups, I am interested in how a standard coordinates the actions of different groups 
and in turn how those coordinated actions are essential to make the standard work: 
 The standard shapes how groups connect to other groups through the coordination of sets of 
activities. How and where do which connections need to come together to make the standard 
work?  
 Standardisers, accreditation bodies, producers and others read a standard for particular 
purposes and as such the standard has different practical implications for each of them: 
individuals in these groups need to say and do things in specific ways for the standard to 
work. How do different groups derive different practices from the same document? How does 
the standard coordinate these practices? 
 The standard works because making and revising the standard, implementing and following 
the standard, and independently verifying the standard are all routinely carried out by the 
standardiser, adopters and certifiers. How do these ways of doing things by different groups 
help in making the standard recognisable to others and giving it integrity? 
3. THE SITE. I explore these questions by looking at organic standards because: 
 They constitute one of the most prominent independent standards promoting sustainable 
practices in the food industry underpinned by EU regulation; 
 Recent substantial increases in conversion to organic farming mark a trend in food 
certification;  
 The spread of farming practices—stockless arable to fully mixed to horticulture—allows useful 
comparisons by looking at the structures of the cereal, meat and fruit and vegetable 
industries. 
4. METHODS. The groups relevant to my study are: 
 Certification officers and inspectors of different certification bodies; 
 Farmers specialising in either stockless arable or mixed farming; 
 Consultants and farm advisers specialising in organic farming; 
 Natural England’s OELS team and the OCIS at EFRC; 
 Policy makers at DEFRA. 
My data come from conducting in-depth interviews with representatives of these groups to 
understand the context in which organic farming is situated, and from observing the practices 
that underpin the standards. The focus of my study is on the sets of day-to-day activities through 
which the standards come alive. 
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 RESEARCH OUTLINE (Farmer) 
 
5. FARMERS. Farmers form an essential connection in making organic standards come alive. 
Indeed, without the farming community there would be no organic movement or market. On the 
ground, this means changing conventional farming practices according to organic standards, 
maintaining paperwork to show what was done and how it was done, informing certification 
officers about certain practices, being inspected, and marketing produce in an organic market. As 
such, farmers are putting in a lot of effort to make organic standards a reality.  
Therefore, I would like to interview farmers about the practicalities of becoming and remaining 
organic. I anticipate that the interview would last about an hour to an hour and a half, and focus 
on two aspects: how farmers connect with other groups involved in making organic standards 
work, and more practically how practices change over time.  
6. TIMELINE. I intend to complete my research within 18 months from March 2009, and 
therefore follow these key dates: 
 07/09 – 12/09: Data gathering 
 01/10 – 05/10: Data analysis 
 05/10: Report to stakeholders (Certification bodies, DEFRA, Natural England, OCIS, 
participating farmers and processors) 
 01/10 – 09/10: Thesis writing 
 09/10: Submission of thesis to Lancaster University 
7. OUTCOMES. My research has a number of potential implications in different domains and for 
various relevant groups: 
 A theoretical contribution to academic knowledge about standards, practice theory and 
science and technology studies; 
 The processes of translation of the organic standard by different groups will provide an 
understanding of how practising the standard results in intended and unintended 
consequences for organic farming practice which is relevant for farmers, certification bodies 
and policy makers; 
 More practically, the findings will be relevant for farmers: by understanding how organic 
standards as a living entity shapes practices it will be possible for farmers to implement 
organic standards more efficiently. 
8. ETHICS. The research is subject to ethics guidelines of Lancaster University, and an assessment 
has been carried out. For all participants informed consent will be obtained before their input 
would be used. Also, all data will be kept confidential and where necessary made anonymous. 
9. ABOUT LUMS. Lancaster University Management School is one of the leading institutions in 
the UK for business and management studies. 75% of Lancaster University Management School’s 
research activity has been assessed in the latest UK Research Assessment Exercise as world-
leading or internationally excellent in terms of originality, significance and rigour, and on this 
measure Lancaster is 3rd equal in the UK. Virtually all of LUMS' research (95%) is of international 
standing, as judged by the assessment. LUMS provides a dynamic research environment in which 
doctoral students play a full and active part. 
10. CONTACT.  Maarten van der Kamp, doctoral researcher 
 Lancaster University Management School  
 Lancaster, LA1 4YX 
 t: +44 (0)7932 665463 
 e: m.vanderkamp@lancaster.ac.uk 
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Appendix 4 Transcript of lyrics 
OMSCo advert 
Scene description 
Two children climbing on a fence in the country side, looking over a field of Friesian cows 
whose black patches turn into animations of a cup of tea with a spoon falling in, a bowl with 
cereal falling in, a pot with steam curls coming off, and a cake, which, when the cow licks the 
spot, loses its cherry and icing - children smiling - cow with patch with £1 written in it - cows 
being herded away - children waving, face of middle aged moustached and capped farmer 
smiling at the children - picture of jug of milk and slogan in meadow. 
 
Text 
“If you change one thing to organic, make sure it's your milk; think about it, milk's in your tea, 
your cereal, your mash, even your cakes; and as organic milk costs less than £1 a week to 
switch to, it's a great way to make your day more organic. Organic Milk, go organic every 
day.” 
Yeo Valley advert 
Scene description 
Panorama shot Somerset, over river and rolling hills and farms - close up of farmer 1 and of 
four farmers hanging around a tractor, farmer speaking the intro - Farmer 2 starts in shed in 
front of his tractors - shot of Massey Ferguson in field - Shot of farmer 1 drinking glass of 
milk - back to shot of farmer 2 in shed - Farmer 2 rapping in front of other three farmers 
hanging around tractor in field - shot of tractor driving, two close ups of silver statuette of cow 
on bonnet (like Rolls Royce Angel) - Farmer 2 rapping in shed - shot of tractor driving in field 
- farmer 2 in front of other three - shot of Famer 2 in cap and shirt - rapping in shed - close up 
shot of cows - in front of other three - Farmer 1 takes over - farmer 1 and farmer 3 in shed 
next to tractor - close up shot of cows - all four farmers sitting in field next to farmstead, 
consuming Yeo Valley products with labels clearly visible - shot of farmer 1 and 3 in shed - 
shot of owl - tractor and lloader driving - owl doing head turns - tractor - farmers 1 and 3 in 
shed - Tractor doing press-ups with shovel arm on ground - four farmers rapping in front of 
tractor in field - shot of farmer 3 - shot of milk being poured into a glass from a Yeo Valley 
bottle - close up of cow - four farmers in front of tractor rapping - close up of farmer 3 in cow 
shed - farmers walking through shed - shot of cows eating hay - close up of farmer 3 - slow 
motion clip of farmers walking through shed - revolving shot of Massey tractor driving - 
Close up of cow - farmer 3 rapping in front of other three - close up of farmer 3 in cow shed - 
zoom past farmer 4, 3 and 1 hanging in front of cows in shed - close up of farmer 3 - farmer 4 
takes over (check out daisy), pointing to cow in shed - close up of cow - farmer 4 rapping in 
front of cows - close up of farmer 4 gesturing to his head (know how) - show of grazing cows 
- farmer 4 rapping in front of others hanging around tractor in field - show of cow - farmer 4 
looking out of cab of tractor - shot of cows looking around - four farmers rapping, farmer 4 
climbing out of cab - more press ups - farmers in shed - shot of wellies stepping out of tractor 
into grass - farmer 4 walking in slow motion - farmer 1 and 2 laughing in front of farmstead 
with glass of milk - farmer 3 rapping in cow shed - shot of four farmers in front of tractor in 
field, cows in the background - final shot over the valley, logo (milk drop with Yeo Valley 




The sun is up, 
the milk is chilled, 
it's going to be a good one. 
Yo, yo. 
Yo, I'm rollin' in my Massey on a summer's day, 
chugging cold milk while I'm baling hay. 
Yeo Valley's approach is common sense, 
harmony in nature takes precedence. 
My ride's my pride that's why you never see it dirty, 
and I love it here man, that's why I'm never leavin' early. 
I'm looking girt in my cap and my shirt, 
I'm representing for the West so hard it hurts. 
Yeah. 
We make this look easy 
'cos we're proper modern with this farmin', believe me. 
Wind turbines are shining, baby, 
it's solar farming no buts no maybes. 
Here we're down with the Soil Association 
and we do lots of what? Conservation! 
Sustain, maintain, it ain't no [?] thing, 
We set the bar, real leaders by far. 
YEO VALLEY, YEO VALLEY 
We change the game, it will never be the same 
YEO VALLEY, YEO VALLEY, 
Big up ya chest, represent the West 
This isn't fictional farming, it's realer than real, 
you won't find milk maidens, that's no longer the deal. 
I'm in my wax coat 'n' boots, I'm proper farmer Giles, 
now look, you urban folks done stole our style. 
I'm not a city dweller, me I like to keep it country, 
the air is clean and all those cars won't make me jumpy. 
It's different strokes for different folks, my man, 
Just enjoy the results with what we do with the land. 
Check out Daisy, she's a proper cow, 
a pedigree Friesian with know-how. 
Her and her girls they got their own name, 
We treat them good, they give us the cream. 
YEO VALLEY, YEO VALLEY 
We change the game, it will never be the same 
YEO VALLEY, YEO VALLEY, 
Big up ya chest, represent the West 
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Why I love organic campaign 
Website text explaining organic 
Better for nature 
Organic farming works with the environment as it uses fewer pesticides. It’s a way of farming 
that protects and encourages wildlife whilst looking after the health of the soil. Instead of 
relying on chemicals, organic farmers work with nature to feed the soil and control pests. 
They use crop rotation and clover to build fertility in the soil. Organic farming uses mainly 
natural methods, developing a good soil and healthy crops which have stronger natural 
resistance to pests and diseases, and encourage natural predators to avoid the need for almost 
all pesticides. Organic farming releases less greenhouse gases and can significantly reduce 
your carbon footprint. 
 
Better for animal welfare 
Organic means free-range. Organic standards insist that animals are given plenty of space and 
fresh air to thrive and grow more naturally, guaranteeing a truly free-range life. Free-range 
systems encourage healthy animals and this means fewer drugs or antibiotics. That’s better for 
the animals and good for your peace of mind! 
 
More Natural food 
When it comes to organic, you know exactly what’s in your food. GM crops and ingredients 
are banned in organic farming as are hydrogenated fats, artificial pesticides and it does not 
allow aspartame, tartrazine and monosodium glutamate to be used. Put simply organic food is 
a more natural choice. 
 
Great tasting food 
Organic farmers rely on developing a healthy, fertile soil to grow a mixture of crops that are 
bursting with flavour. So you can rest assured it tastes great too! 
 
Text of magazine advert 1 (painter) 
I love organic because it feels right for my family 
I know it might not look like it, but I do try and buy the right food. When you’ve got little 
ones, you have to. That’s why me and the missus buy organic, because we want the kids 
eating food that’s more natural and tastes great, free from all that GM nonsense and most 
pesticides too. OK it sometimes costs a bit extra, but I’m not going to scrimp when it comes to 
my kids. 
 
Text of magazine advert 2 (pantomime duo) 
We love organic because we care about animals 
I like to see myself as the brains of this outfit, even if my son doesn’t agree! But when he told 
me about organic, well, I never looked back. Organic means fewer drugs or antibiotics, it also 
means better conditions for animals so they get to thrive and grow more naturally. Surely 
that’s good for them and good for our peace of mind! We’re happy to pay a little extra for 
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